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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
IN NATURAL RESOURCE 
LAW: EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
I oseph L. Sax* 
P unuc concern about environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the courtroom. Private citizens, no longer willing to ac-
cede to the efforts of administrative agencies to protect the public in-
terest, have begun to take the initiative themselves. One dramatic 
result is a proliferation of lawsuits in which citizens, demanding 
judicial recognition of their rights as members of the public, sue the 
very governmental agencies which are supposed to be protecting the 
public interest. While this Article was being written, several dozen 
such suits were initiated-to enforce air and water pollution laws in 
states where public agencies have been created for that purpose;1 to 
challenge decisions of the Forest Service about the use of public land 
under its control;2 to question the Secretary of the Interior's regula-
tion of federal offshore oil leases;3 and, in a myriad of cases against 
state and local officials, to examine airport extensions,4 highway lo-
cations/• the destruction of parklands,6 dredging and filling,7 oil 
dumping,8 and innumerable other governmental decisions dealing 
with resource use and management.9 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard University; J.D. 
1959, University of Chicago.-Ed. This Article is part of a larger study I am making 
of citizen efforts to use the law in environmental-quality controversies. My research 
has been made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation; Resources for the 
Future, Inc., Washington, D.C., bas provided office space and related facilities for the 
term of my grant. To both I am very grateful. 
I. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., Civil No. 1694 (D. Mont., 
filed Nov. 13, 1968) (air pollution); Sklar v. Park Dist. of Highland Park, No. 69HI64 
(Cir. Ct., 19th Jud. Cir., Lake County, III., filed Aug. II, 1969) (water pollution); Sierra 
Club v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, No. 662,008 (Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., 
Minn. Sept. 19, 1969) (water pollution; writ of mandamus issued). The citations in 
notes 2·9 infra are meant to be exemplary, rather than comprehensive. 
2. Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civil No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed June 5, 1969); Parker v. 
United States, Civil No. C-1368 (D. Colo., filed Jan. 7, 1969). 
3. Weingand v. Hickel, No. 69-1317-EC (S.D. Cal., filed July IO, 1969). 
4. Abbot v. Osborn, No. 1465 (Super. Ct., Dukes County, Mass., filed March 28, 1969); 
Kelly v. Kennedy, Civil No. 69-812-G (D. Mass., filed July 29, 1969). 
5. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), 
affd., (2d Cir. 1969), 297 F. Supp. 809 {S.D.N.Y. 1969), 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 
Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. McCabe, No. 2872/68 (Sup. Ct., Rockland 
County, N.Y., filed Oct. I, 1968). 
6. Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969). 
7. Fairfax County Fedn. of Citizens Assns. v. Hunting Towers Operating Co., Civil 
No. 4963A (E.D. Va., filed Oct. 1, 1968); Citizens Comm. for the Columbia River v. 
Resor, No. 69-498 (D. Ore., filed Sept. 4, 1969). 
8. Ottinger v. Penn Cent. Co., No. 68 Civil 2638 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 28, 1969). 
9. Defenders of Florissant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., No. C-1539 (D. Colo., filed July 
[473] 
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The cases present legal theories which are as diverse as lawyers' 
imaginations are fertile; they range from grandiose constitutional 
claims of the right to a decent environment10 to simple assertions 
that an administrator committed a procedural error.11 This diversity 
is not merely the product of variant legal skills and attitudes; it is 
largely attributable to the enormous disparity in legal standards 
which govern different resource problems. Our legal system tends to 
provide specific and limited responses to particular problems. The 
notorious oil spill at Santa Barbara, for example, led to the adoption 
of extensive federal regulations on the responsibilities of federal 
lessees,12 but a hundred other environmental problems will remain 
untouched until some dramatic event mobilizes public opinion and 
leads to legislative and administrative action. 
Inconsistency in legislative response and administrative action 
is one reason why private citizens have felt compelled to go to court 
and to devise such a pastiche of legal claims. But even more im-
portant, that inconsistency has promoted a search for some broad 
legal approach which would make the opportunity to obtain effective 
judicial intervention more likely. That search is the subject of this 
Article. 
Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public 
trust doctrine13 seems to have the breadth and substantive content 
which might make it useful as a tool of general application for cit-
izens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource 
management problems. If that doctrine is to provide a satisfactory 
tool, it must meet three criteria. It must contain some concept of a 
legal right in the general public; it must be enforceable against the 
government;14 and it must be capable of an interpretation consistent 
with contemporary concerns for environmental quality. 
3, 1969) (moratorium pending legislative action on creation of National Monument); 
Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council v. Austral Oil Co., No. C-1712 (D. Colo., 
filed Aug. 25, 1969) (to enjoin nuclear blast); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps 
of Engineers, Civil No. 2655-69 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 16, 1969) (to enjoin Corps construc-
tion project). 
IO. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., Civil No. 1694 
(D. Mont., filed Nov. 13, 1968). 
11. D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns., Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (failure 
to hold public hearings). 
12. 30 C.F.R. § 250 (1969). 
13. The basic content of the doctrine is discussed at text accompanying notes 46-58 
infra. 
14. In some cases a governmental agency or official is not sued directly. Instead, the 
defendant may be a private party whom the government has inadequately regulated. 
Furthermore, in many traditional public trust cases, the state was the plaintiff, and the 
defendant was a private landowner, a local government, or a public agency. Such cases 
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I. THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. The Historical Background 
475 
The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept 
that received much attention in Roman and English law-the na-
ture of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That 
history has been given considerable attention in the legal liter-
ature, 15 and need not be repeated in detail here. But two points 
should be emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation 
and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the pub-
lic; accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished 
from general public property which the sovereign could routinely 
grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in 
certain common properties-such as the seashore, highways, and 
running water-"perpetual use was dedicated to the public,"16 it 
has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to 
prevent infringement of those interests. Although the state appar-
ently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public 
rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government. It 
has been said of the elaborate categories of common properties in 
Roman law that 
[a]ll this is very confused.- ... As to the seashore, there is no reason 
in the nature of things why it should not be owned by private 
persons .... Indeed, there are texts which say that one may become 
owner of a portion of the shore by building on it, remaining owner, 
however, only so long as the building stands. But in general the 
shore was not owned by individuals. One text suggests that it was the 
property of the Roman people. More often it is regarded as owned 
by no one, the public having undefined rights of use and enjoy-
ment.17 
are essential to understanding judicial approaches to the public trust, but the implica-
tion should not be drawn that there will be equal judicial hospitality to a privately 
initiated suit. 
15. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); W. BucKLAND, A TEXT• 
BOOK OF Ro:-.IAN LAW FROM AUGUSI"US TO JusnNIAN 182-85 (2d ed. 1932); 1 H. FARNHAM, 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36, at 165-75 (1904); M. FRANKEL, LAW OF SEASHORE, 
WATERS AND WATER COURSES, MAINE AND MAssACHUSETIS (1969); R. HALL, EssAY ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF 
THE REALM (2d ed. 1875); w. HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 309-14 (4th ed. 1903); JUSrINIAN, 
INSTITUTES, Lib. II, ch. I, §§ 1-5, at 67-68 (3d ed. T. Cooper 1852); R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS 
OF ROMAN LAW 109-10 (4th ed. 1956); Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-
A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REv. 313,429 (1918); Stone, Public Rights in Water Use 
and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 3 
(R. Clark ed. 1967). 
16. W. HUNTER, supra note 15, at 311. 
17. R. LEE, supra note 15, at 109. 
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In England, the history of public uses is closely involved with a 
struggle between the Crmm and Parliament. As a result, 
[t]here was a time when the Crown could grant away to the subject 
the royal demesnes and landed possessions at pleasure; but now, by 
statute law, such royal grants are prohibited, and the Crown lands 
cannot be so aliened. So much, therefore, of the seashore as has not 
actually been aliened by grant, and bestowed on lords of manors 
and other subjects, remains vested in the Crown, incapable of alien-
ation.18 
But it is important to realize that the inability of the Sovereign to 
alienate Crown lands was not a restriction upon government gen-
erally, but only upon the King: 
The ownership of the shore, as between the public and the King, 
has been settled in favor of the King; but, as before observed, this 
ownership is, and had been immemorially, liable to certain general 
rights of egress and regress, for fishing, trading, and other uses 
claimed and used by his subjects. These rights are variously mod-
ified, promoted, or restrained by the common law, and by numerous 
acts of parliament, relating to the fisheries, the revenues and the 
public safety •... 19 
Thus, whatever restraints the law might have imposed upon the 
King, it was nonetheless within the authority of Parliament, exer-
cising what we would call the police power, to enlarge or diminish 
the public rights for some legitimate public purpose. 
As carried over to American law, 20 this history has produced 
great confusion. Our system has adopted a dual approach to public 
property which reflects both the Roman and the English notion that 
certain public uses ought to be specially protected.21 Thus, for ex-
ample, it has been understood that the seashore between high and 
low tide may not be routinely granted to private 01mers as was the 
general public domain under the Homestead Act and similar laws.22 
It has rather been a general rule that land titles from the federal 
government run down only to the high water mark, with title sea-
ward of that point remaining in the states, which, upon their ad-
mission to the Union, took such shorelands in "trusteeship" for the 
public.23 
Whether and to what extent that trusteeship constrains the states 
18. R. HALL, supra note 15, at 106. 
19. Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
20. The American history is recounted at length in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 
(1894). 
21. E.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 
237 Mich. 14, 20-21, 208 N.W. 51, 54, reh., 237 Mich. 37, 211 N.W. 647 (1927). 
22. See generally P. GATES, HlsTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968). 
23. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 57-58 (1894). 
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in their dealings with such lands has, however, been a subject of 
much controversy. If the trusteeship puts such lands wholly beyond 
the police power of the state, making them inalienable and un-
changeable in use, then the public right is quite an extraordinary 
one, restraining government in ways that neither Roman nor Eng-
lish law seems to have contemplated. Conversely, if the trust in 
American law implies nothing more than that state authority must 
be exercised consistent with the general police power, then the trust 
imposes no restraint on government beyond that which is implicit in 
all judicial review of state action-the challenged conduct, to be 
valid, must be exercised for a public purpose and must not merely 
be a gift of public property for a strictly private purpose.24 
The question, then, is whether the public trust concept has 
some meaning between the two poles; whether there is, in the name 
of the public trust, any judicially enforceable right which restrains 
governmental activities dealing with particular interests such as 
shorelands or parklands, and which is more stringent than are the re-
straints applicable to governmental dealings generally. 
Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often 
thought to be imposed by the public trust: 25 first, the property sub-
ject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it 
must be held available for use by the general public; second, the 
property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, 
the property must be maintained for particular types of uses. The 
last claim is expressed in two ways. Either it is urged that the re-
source must be held available for certain traditional uses, such as 
navigation, recreation, or fishery, or it is said that the uses which 
are made of the property must be in some sense related to the 
natural uses peculiar to that resource. As an example of the latter 
view, San Francisco Bay might be said to have a trust imposed upon 
it so that it may be used for only water-related commercial or amen-
ity uses. A dock or marina might be an appropriate use, but it 
would be inappropriate to fill the bay for trash disposal or for a 
housing project.26 
24. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) ("The United States do not and 
cannot hold property as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes.'); Roe v. 
Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 234, 199 A.2d 834, 858-59 (1964). 
25. This sort of threefold formulation is suggested by broad language which com-
monly appears in public trust cases: 
This title is held in trust for the people for the purposes of navigation, fishing, 
bathing and similar uses. Such title is not held primarily for purposes of sale or 
conversion into money. Basically, it is trust property and should be devoted to the 
fulfillment of the purposes of the trust, to wit: the service of the people. 
Hayes v. Bowman, 91 S.2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957). 
26. The controversy over San Francisco Bay is discussed at length at text accom-
panying notes 183-90 infra. 
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These three arguments have been at the center of the contro-
versy and confusion that have swirled around the public trust doc-
trine in American law. Confusion has arisen from the failure of many 
courts to distinguish between the government's general obligation 
to act for the public benefit, and the special, and more demanding, 
obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources. 
B. The Public Trust as a Public Right 
One cannot evaluate the public trust concept without under-
standing the reasons advanced for imposing upon governmental acti-
vities dealing with certain resources a standard which is more rigor-
ous than that applicable to governmental activity generally.27 
I. The Concept of Property Owned by the Citizens 
The most common theory advanced in support of a special trust 
obligation is a property notion; historically, it is said, certain re-
sources were granted by government to the general public in the same 
sense that a tract of public land may be granted to a specific in-
dividual. If that were the case, the government's subsequent effort 
to withdraw the right would confront the same barrier that the 
government faces when it condemns private property. The test is 
no longer whether the government is acting for a public purpose 
within the legitimate scope of regulatory powers, but rather whether 
it is taking property. 
There are several serious problems ·with such a formulation. 
It is seldom true that a government conveys anything to the general 
public in the sense that it grants a property deed to a private owner.28 
27. To some extent special obligations toward particular resources are imposed by 
statutory or constitutional provisions, rather than by judicially developed theory. See 
text accompanying notes 37-38 infra. The laws, however, are subject to great judicial 
manipulation, and the case is very rare in which a court feels compelled to adopt a 
standard more rigorous than that which it desires to impose. 
28. See City of Coronado v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 227 Cal. App. 2d 455, 
470-76, 38 Cal. Rptr. 834, 842-45 (1964), appeal dismissed, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). Some-
times, however, there are actual conveyances, such as those from the federal govern-
ment to a state for particular public uses; in such cases it clearly can be said that if 
the state changes the use, it is acting contrary to the grant. See, e.g., United States v. 
Harrison County, Miss., 399 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968) (federal funds for construction 
of a beach conditioned on state's assuring perpetual public ownership of the beach). 
See also Department of Forests & Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md. 
125, 128, 242 A.2d 165, 167, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968) ("The above described 
land shall be used for public purposes, and if at any time said land ceases to be so 
used the estate hereby conveyed shall immediately revert to ••• the United States.'); 
Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R.R., 32 F. 9, 20 (D.N.J. 1887) (state cannot obtain com-
pensation for the use of its submerged land by railroad since such land is not private 
property in the constitutional sense). This problem is discussed at length in the con-
text of the California cases in which state grants of submerged lands to cities are cha!-
January 1970] The Public Trust Doctrine 479 
At most, the government may resolve that certain resources will be 
used for specific purposes-for instance, that land is to be set aside as 
a park. But it is reasonable to assume that such decisions imply that 
the specified uses shall be available only until the legislature decides 
to devote the land to some other public purpose. Obviously it would 
not be fruitful to try to show whether, as a matter of legal analysis, 
a statute creating a park has the latter meaning or is tantamount to a 
deed. 
There is another, more abstract, difficulty in analogizing a re-
dedication of public land to a new use with a taking of private 
property by the government. That difficulty becomes apparent from 
an analysis of the rationale which supports the constitutional pro-
vision that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use 
without just compensation."29 The rationale is that economic bene-
fits are to be protected against certain kinds of public acquisitive-
ness lest the cost of public progress be unfairly thrust upon certain 
individuals or groups instead of upon the general community which 
benefits from public enterprises.30 Thus, it is thought that although 
an individual may have an automobile which the police department 
would find useful, the cost of supporting law enforcement should 
not be borne more heavily by him than by his neighbors; if the 
police department wants the car, it must pay for it and thereby 
spread the cost among all taxpayers. Any attempt to apply this con-
cept to property assertedly owned by the whole public is plainly 
incongruous. It makes economic sense to prevent the government 
from taking the property of an individual mvner, but it is difficult 
to understand why the government should be prevented from taking 
property which is mvned by the public as a whole. Whether or not 
lenged. See text accompanying notes 183-90 infra. See N.Y. Times, March IO, 1968, at 
80, col. 1: 
Conservationists attending a convention of the national Wildlife Federation voted 
to help sponsor a legal test-they say the first since Magna Carta-over the right 
of Federal authority to kill deer ••• even if done on Federal land •••• They say 
the nonmigratory Wildlife belongs to the people and not to Federal authority. 
See also New Me.xico State Game Commn. v. Udall, 281 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1968), 
revd., 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1969). 
Sometimes one state agency takes land which has been granted to another agency for 
a specific purpose; in such cases it has been held that compensation must be paid and 
that the proceeds must be used to maintain the value of the specific trust. See notes 
35, 233 infra. But such cases involve specific grants or dedications by a third party, and 
the courts are merely enforcing the explicit desires of the grantor. Such cases are not, 
therefore, authority for the proposition that land carved out of the public domain and 
devoted to one use by the sovereign may not later be freely reallocated to another use. 
29. U.S. CoNsr. amend V. 
!10. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). 
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the people and the government should theoretically be recognized 
as distinct, it is clear that the concept underlying the constitutional 
protection against taking does not accommodate itself very easily to 
situations in which the public as a whole claims to be a property 
owner. 
What really seems to be at stake, then, is the question whether 
the government can or should be viewed as having made any ir-
revocable commitments about the use of particular governmental 
resources. The question is usefully illustrated by asking oneself 
whether there are any circumstances under which it would be for-
bidden for the United States to abolish a National Park and change 
its use, or to sell the land to private parties. Of course, it makes some 
difference whether it would take the act of a particular administrative 
official, a statute, a presidential proclamation, a constitutional amend-
ment, or a popular referendum to achieve that result; but the es-
sential question is whether any such formal acts could accomplish 
the result. 
Apparently, that question has never been adjudicated, although 
it has been raised in several recent cases. In one of those cases the 
Audubon Society, suing on behalf of the public, sought to enjoin 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from continuing a canal-build-
ing project on the ground that it would both divert needed fresh 
water from the Everglades National Park and promote detrimental 
salt water incursions.31 It was alleged in the complaint that to permit 
31. National Audubon Socy. v. Resor, No. 67-Zll, CIV-TC (S.D. Fla., filed March 
15, 1967). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., Civil No. 
1694 (D. Mont., filed Nov. 13, 1968), in which declaratory and injunctive relief was 
sought on the ground that "continued emission of noxious sulfur compounds by the 
Defendant violates the rights of the Plaintiff guaranteed under the Ninth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States and the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Complaint ,r 3(c). Application 
for temporary injunction was withdrawn after pretrial conference; the case had not yet 
gone to trial as of December 1969. Cf. Feliciano v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1356 
(D.P.R. 1969). 
A more limited and more tenable claim asserts that the public has a constitutional 
right to procedural due process in such cases. In essence, the claim is that the public 
has a sufficient interest in public resource allocation decisions that it is entitled to 
notice, access to data, and at least some form of participation in the administrative 
process. It is alleged that interested segments of the public are entitled, at the very 
least, to as much due process as is given private entrepreneurs who have an economic 
stake in the decision. See Weingand v. Hickel, No. 69-1317-EC (C.D. Cal., filed July 10, 
1969), in which an action was brought to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from 
approving recommendations regarding continued oil operations of federal lessees in 
the Santa Barbara channel "without first according ••• the members of the public 
••• a full and fair hearing, after adequate notice, and without, prior thereto, accord-
ing the .•. public access to the data upon which ••• recommendations were based." 
Complaint ,r XVI, at 11. This principle has already obtained considerable acceptance 
in cases involving public participation in established administratve proceedings [Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 
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the "destruction" of the park, which had been dedicated to the use 
of the people of the United States, would constitute a taking of 
property in violation of the fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution.82 After the case was filed, however, it was settled, at 
least temporarily, and so the court took no action on the Society's 
allegation. In another case, the state of New Hampshire brought an 
action against the Atomic Energy Commission to enjoin the grant 
of a license to build a nuclear power plant. The plant allegedly 
presented dangers of thermal pollution to the Connecticut River. 
The state claimed that it held that river in trust for the use of its 
citizens, that the issuance of the license would subvert the state's 
obligation to maintain the river free from pollution, and that issuing 
the license would thereby constitute an unconstitutional taking 
of property.33 The case was fully litigated, but the court decided 
against the state on the ground that the Atomic Energy Commission 
was not authorized by statute to condition its licenses upon consid-
erations of pollution.34 It did not address the constitutional claim. 
U.S. 9·11 (1966); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)], and in cases involving standing to challenge the lawfulness 
of administrative decisions [Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967)). See also Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 729, 752-55, 453 P.2d 832, 846-48 
(1969) (after public hearing on rezoning, commission went into executive session in which 
it heard proponents but not opponents; held illegal spot zoning). But there are two 
significant differences between these cases and the claim in Weingand v. Hickel. In 
these cases the public's legal rights are recognized as having been created by statute, 
not by constitutional necessity; and in each case the public sought to intervene in, or 
to initiate, a conyentional format for adjudication, rather than to claim that some 
such format must be made available as a matter of constitutional law. 'While Weingand 
is thus a more difficult case, it is by no means frivolous. Once it is accepted that the 
general public has a legally cognizable interest-a view which is beginning to be 
recognized [see Sax, Public Rights in Public Resources: The Citizen's Role in Con-
servation and Development, in 1969 PRoc., UNIV. OF TEXAS LAw SCHOOL 'WATER LAW 
CONFERENCE (forthcoming)]-it may become much more likely that courts will grant 
to the holders of that right the rudiments of due process. 
There is also a clear distinction between such constitutional claims of procedural 
rights and those claims which would impose constitutional restraints on the govern-
ment's authority to make resource reallocations. 
l!2. Complaint 1f 41. The property claim is sometimes presented as an assertion that 
a disposition for less than market value denies the plaintiffs, as representatives of the 
public, "their property rights in the subject property without due process of law be-
cause the sum realized ... will be substantially less than would have been realized 
had the land been put up for public sale ..•• " Fairfax County Fedn. of Citizens Assns. 
v. Hunting Towers Operating Co., Civil No. 4963A (E.D. Va., filed Oct. I, 1968). The 
claim that government is engaging in a "giveaway" and is letting public property be 
used for private purposes must be distinguished from the blunter claim that once 
public property has been dedicated to a particular use, it cannot be rededicated to a 
different use. Only the latter is so rigid as to prevent a redistribution of public wealth 
for a legitimate public purpose. 
l!3. New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 176 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 
(1969). 
l!4. 406 F.2d at 175-76. 
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To accept such claims of property rights would be to prohibit the 
government from ever accommodating new public needs by reallocat-
ing resources. Certainly any such notion strikes at the very essence of 
governmental power, and acceptance of such a theory by a court 
would be as unwise as it is unlikely. It is important to recognize that 
the assertion of a taking is not a mere claim to compensation, for the 
objectors do not want cash; rather, it is a claim that when a resource 
is dedicated to public use, that dedication is irrevocable.35 However 
strongly one might feel about the present imbalance in resource 
allocation, it hardly seems sensible to ask for a freezing of any future 
specific configuration of policy judgments, for that result would 
seriously hamper the government's attempts to cope with the prob-
lems caused by changes in the needs and desires of the citizenry. 
Although it would be inappropriate for a court to declare that 
governmental resource allocations are irreversible, 36 the government 
may certainly make less binding commitments which discourage cer-
35. Thus the claim is likely to be one for injunctive relief; see notes 31-33 supra. 
In some cases, however, a monetary recovery is desired; it is argued that the cash 
equivalent of the land sought to be diverted must be posted and put in a trust fund 
to purchase, for example, substitute park land. This technique has been used in cases 
involving the diversion of land which had been given for park purposes by private 
donors. Town of Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592 (1942); Union County 
Bd. of Freeholders v. Union County Park Comnm., 41 N.J. 333, 196 A.2d 781 (1964); 
State v. Cooper, 24 N.J. 261, 131 A.2d 756, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957): State v. 
City of Albuquerque, 67 N.M. 383, 355 P .2d 925 (1960). Courts will sometimes indicate 
that the legislature may never authorize any use other than that specified in the 
dedication, but the decisions do not expressly hold that compensation used to acquire 
substitute property would be an impermissible alternative. City of Jacksonville v. 
Jacksonville Ry., 67 Ill. 540 (1873); Cummings v. City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259, 2 S.W. 
130 (1886). 
36. In a theoretical sense, no decision is utterly irreversible. For example, if a court 
were to hold that decision to create a park was irreversible because the park belonged 
to the public, the public itself could reverse that decision by constitutional amend• 
ment. But such a reversal is hardly practicable in the vast majority of cases. A judicial 
holding of constitutional dimension, restraining the legislature, is ordinarily the end 
of the matter. 
Cases in which a court holds that resource allocation decisions are irreversible 
should be distinguished from those in which a court holds that a determination 
originally made by the public through referendum or constitutional amendment cannot 
be reversed by legislative action, but must be returned to the public if a change in 
policy is to be made. Decisions of the latter type, if supported by the facts, are 
unobjectionable. 
Occasionally, a case contains dicta suggesting that even a constitutional amendment 
would be insufficient to change a policy, but it is hardly likely that any such principle 
would survive a direct test in court. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v. Case, 
151 Colo. 235, 244, 380 P.2d 34, 39-40 (1963). In one recent instance a suit was filed by 
the Governor of New Jersey in order to prevent putting on the ballot a proposed con-
stitutional amendment which would have let the voters decide to "give away" the 
state's tidelands to private interests. Hughes v. Blair, No. C-1528-68 (Super. Ct., Ch., 
Mercer County, N.J., filed Feb. 19, 1969). But the action was terminated after the 
existence of the lawsuit was successfully used in negotiations with the legislature and 
the proposed amendment was taken off the ballot. 
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tain reallocations. An example of such commitments is found in 
the "forever wild" clause in the New York constitution,87 which 
reserves the Adirondack forest as a wilderness-a dedication to pub-
lic uses which cannot be abrogated without a constitutional amend-
ment repealing that clause. Similarly, many statutory dedications, 
such as those creating public parks, will be interpreted as immune 
from changes without specific statutory authorization.33 
There are also a few situations in which public authority is re-
strained by nonstatutory limitations. The most common situation is 
that in which the government has acquired possession of land under 
a deed restricting the uses to which the land may be put.39 In that 
case, the classic notion of a trust is most accurate, for the govern-
ment actually serves in the capacity of a trustee to carry out the 
wishes of the donor. As a practical matter, the government's choices 
are to conform to the wishes of the donor or to lose the property 
through reversion.40 
37. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § I; In re Oneida County Forest Preserve Council, 309 
N.Y. 152, 128 N.E.2d 282 (1955); Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks v. 
McDonald, 253 N.Y. 234, 170 N.E. 902 (1930). An amendment to the Oregon Consti-
tution, proposed and defeated in 1968, provided that: 
Fee title to ocean beach lands now owned or hereafter acquired by the State of 
Oregon shall not be sold or conveyed, and all lands shall be forever preserved 
and maintained for public use. No interest less than fee title and no rights or 
privileges in the lands now owned or hereafter acquired by the state shall be 
conveyed or granted by deed, lease, license, permit, or otherwise, except as pro-
vided by law. 
Proposed Article XI-H, § 6. See AUDUBON MAGAZINE, Jan. 1969, at 106. 
38. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37-133 (1967): "All real estate ••• held ••. for the 
purpose of public parks shall be forever kept open and maintained as such." But see 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37-146.1 (1967). See James Drago v. Hudson County Park Commn., 
No. L-31694-68 P.W. (Super. Ct., L. Div., Hudson County, N.J. July 14, 1969) (opinion 
of Judge Lynch). See also the cases discussed at text accompanying notes 78-92 infra. 
39. E.g., Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175, 180 (D.D.C. 1960) (citing many 
decisions); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 
(1966). See also United States v. Harrison County, Miss., 399 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(federal funds granted for construction of beach on the condition that the state ensure 
perpetual public ownership of the beach); Department of Forests &: Parks v. George's 
Creek Coal &: Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 128, 242 A.2d 165, 167, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 
(1968). But when a deed is absolute in form, courts will sometimes look beyond the 
document to protect the donor's intent. Anderson v. Mayor &: Council of Wilmington, 
Civil No. 885 (Ch., New Castle County, Del. Jan. 9, 1958); Baker v. City of Norwalk, 
No. 6269 (Super. Ct., Fairfield County at Stamford, Conn. Dec. 4, 1963); Annot., Nature 
of Estate Conveyed by Deed for Park or Playground Purposes, 15 A.L.R.2d 975 (1951). 
See cases cited at notes 230, 233 infra. 
40. City of Barnesville v. Stafford, 161 Ga. 588, 131 S.E. 487 (1926); Howe v. City of 
Lowell, 171 Mass. 575, 51 N.E. 536 (1898); Carpenter v. City of New Brunswick, 135 
N.J. Eq. 397, 39 A.2d 40 (1944); Craig v. City of Toledo, 60 Ohio App. 474, 21 N.E.2d 
1003 (1938). 
Sometimes a court will enforce the duty to conform to the donor's specific intent. 
Nikols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, 341 Mass. 13, 166 N.E.2d 911 (1960); 
Village of Riverside v. Maclean, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N.E. 408 (1904). In other cases, a court 
will hold that such lands may be taken for other purposes, but that if they are, a cash 
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2. The Conceptual Support for the Public Trust Doctrine 
Other than the rather dubious notion that the general public 
should be viewed as a property holder, there is no well-conceived 
doctrinal basis that supports a theory under which some interests 
are entitled to special judicial attention and protection. Rather, 
there is a mixture of ideas which have floated rather freely in and 
out of American public trust law. The ideas are of several kinds, and 
they have received inconsistent treatment in the law. 
The approach with the greatest historical support holds that 
certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that 
their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens 
rather than of serfs.41 It is thought that, to protect those rights, it 
is necessary to be especially wary lest any particular individual or 
group acquire the power to control them. The historic public rights 
of :fishery and navigation reflect this feeling; and while the partic-
ular English experience which gave rise to the controversy over 
those interests was not duplicated in America, the underlying con-
cept was readily adopted. Thus, American law courts held it "incon-
ceivable" that any person should claim a private property interest in 
the navigable waters of the United States.42 It was from the same 
concept that some of the language of the Northwest Ordinance was 
taken: 
[T]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence 
and the carrying places between the same, shall be common high-
ways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory 
as to the citizens of the United States ... without any tax, impost, 
or duty therefor.43 
An allied principle holds that certain interests are so particularly 
the gifts of nature's bounty that they ought to be reserved for the 
whole of the populace. From this concept came the laws of early 
New England reserving "great ponds" of any consequence for gen-
eral use and assuring everyone free and equal access.44 Later this 
amount equal to the value of the property must be set aside for similar purposes. or • 
for the acquisition of substitute lands. See cases cited supra note 35 and infra note 233. 
The legal problems which arise when land is received by the public from private 
donors arc discussed in R. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF 
OPEN LAND (1967) (Conservation & Research Foundation, Box 1445, Conn. College, New 
London, Conn. 06320). See also C. LITI'LE, CHALLENGE OF THE LAND (1968) (Open Space 
Action Institute, 145 E. 52nd St., N.Y. 10022). 
41. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet,) 367, 414 (1842). 
42. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913). 
43. Act of July 13, 1787, art. IV, 1 Stat. 51. 
44. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91 (1967), ch. 131 (Supp. 1968), ch. 140, §§ 19·1-96 
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same principle led to the creation of national parks built around 
unique natural wonders and set aside as natural national museums. 
Finally, there is often a recognition, albeit one that has been 
irregularly perceived in legal doctrine, that certain uses have a pe-
culiarly pub!ic nature that makes their adaptation to private use 
inappropriate. The best known example is found in the rule of 
water law that one does not mm a property right in water in the 
same way he mvns his watch or his shoes, but that he owns only an 
usufruct-an interest that incorporates the needs of others. It is thus 
thought to be incumbent upon the government to regulate water 
uses for the general benefit of the community and to take account 
thereby of the public nature and the interdependency which the 
physical quality of the resource implies. 
Of all existing legal doctrines, none comes as close as does the 
public trust concept45 to providing a point of intersection for the 
three important interests noted above. Certainly the phrase "public 
trust" does not contain any magic such that special obligations can 
be said to arise merely from its incantation; and only the most manip-
ulative of historical readers could extract much binding precedent 
from what happened a few centuries ago in England. But that the 
doctrine contains the seeds of ideas whose importance is only begin-
ning to be perceived, and that the doctrine might usefully promote 
needed legal development, can hardly be doubted. 
C. An Outline of Public Trust Doctrine 
One who searches through the reported cases will find many 
general statements which seem to imply that a government may 
never alienate trust property by conveying it to a private owner and 
that it may not effect changes in the use to which that property has 
(1965). The purpose was to state "a great principle of public right, to abolish the forest 
laws, the game laws ••• and to make them all free." Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 
(7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851). See Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance-Collectivism in Northern 
New England, 30 B.U. L. R.Ev. 178 (1950). 
"The great ponds of this Commonwealth are among its most cherished natural 
resources. Since early times they have received special protection. See Whittlesey, Law 
of the Seashore, Tidewaters and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine. (Under the 
Colony Ordinance of 1641-1647).'' Sacco v. Department of Pub. Works, 352 Mass. 670, 
671, 227 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1967). 
45. Public nuisance law is the only likely doctrinal competitor. That approach, 
however, is encrusted with the rule that permits lawsuits to be initiated only by the 
state attorney general, and not by private citizens. It also has an unfortunate historical 
association with abatement of brothels, gambling dens, and similar institutions, and 
the case law is therefore not easily transferable to natural resource problems. Con-
sequently, while nuisance law should not be ignored, public trust law is more promis-
ing. 
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been devoted. In one relatively old case, for example, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio said that 
[t]he state as trustee for the public cannot by acquiescence abandon 
the trust property or enable a diversion of it to private ends different 
from the object for which the trust was created. 
If it is once fully realized that the state is merely the custodian 
of the legal title, charged with the specific duty of protecting the 
trust estate and regulating its use, a clearer view can be had. 
An individual may abandon his private property, but a public 
trustee cannot abandon public property.46 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida said: 
The trust in which the title to the lands under navigable waters 
is held is governmental in its nature and cannot be wholly alienated 
by the States. For the purpose of enhancing the rights ahd interests 
of the whole people, the States may by appropriate means, grant to 
individuals limited privileges in the lands under navigable waters, 
but not so as to divert them or the waters thereon from their proper 
uses for the public welfare .... 47 
But a careful examination of the cases will show that the excerpts 
just quoted, and almost all other such statements, are dicta and do 
not determine the limits of the state's legitimate authority in deal-
ing with trust lands. Unfortunately, the case law has not developed 
in any way that permits confident assertions about the outer limits 
of state power. Nonetheless, by examining the diverse and often 
loosely written opinions dealing with public lands, one may obtain 
a reasonably good picture of judicial attitudes. 
The first point that must be clearly understood is that there is 
no general prohibition against the disposition of trust properties, 
even on a large scale. A state may, for example, recognize private 
ownership in tidelands and submerged lands below the high water 
mark; indeed, some states have done so and have received judicial 
approval.48 Still, courts do not look kindly upon such grants and 
usually interpret them quite restrictively,49 and apply a more rigor-
ous standard than is used to analyze conveyances by private parties.150 
In this connection, courts have held that since the state has an obliga-
46. State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R., 94 Ohio St. 61, 80, 113 N.E. 677, 682 
(1916). 
47. Brickell v. Trammel, 77 Fla. 544, 559, 82 S. 221, 226 (1919). 
48. See Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent 
to Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 3, at 193-202. (R. Claik ed. 1967). 
49. Id. 
50. E.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913). 
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tion as trustee which it may not lawfully divest, whatever title the 
grantee has taken is impressed with the public trust and must be 
read in conformity with it.51 It is at this point that confusion sets 
in, for the principle, while appealing, simply states a conclusory 
rule as to the very matter that is in question-what, exactly, are the 
limitations which must be read into such grants? In attempting to 
answer that question, one can do no more than cite some illustra-
tions which suggest the content of the principle as courts have come 
to understand it. 
In the old Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Alger,52 the 
court examined the validity of state grants to private persons of tide-
lands below the high water mark. The court recognized that such 
grants were lawful even though they permitted grantees to fill or to 
build in the submerged lands and thereby to terminate the public's -
free right of passage across those areas. A question was raised, how-
ever, as to the limits of the principle which had been expressed in 
an earlier Massachusetts case, that "the riparian proprietor has an 
absolute right under the colony law, so to build to low water mark 
and exclude all mankind."53 It was apparently argued in Alger that 
the implication of that rule, if sustained, would permit a holder of 
such riparian rights to thwart all navigation or, through his eco-
nomic power, to bend navigation to his will. The court made clear 
that no such meaning could, or should, be read into the language 
of the earlier case: 
No qualification ... to the general rule was expressed ... not even 
the condition not to hinder the passage of boats and vessels .... This 
judgment must be construed according to the subject matter, which 
was, the right to flats then in controversy, belonging to land ad-
joining the Charles River ... where the river was broad, and where 
the channel or deep part of the river was quite wide, and afforded 
abundant room for any boats or vessels to pass along the river and 
to other men's houses and lands. Had the court been giving an 
opinion in regard to flats differently situated, there is no reason to 
doubt that they would have qualified it by stating the proper con-
ditions and limitations.54 
A similar concern, and limitation, was noted by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in State v. Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railway.55 In 
that case a railroad which owned riparian upland on Lake Erie 
51. Stone, supra note 48. 
52. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 74-5 (1851). 
53. 61 Mass. at 75 [quoting Austin v. Carter, 1 Mass. 231 (1804)]. 
54. 61 Mass. at 75. 
55. 94 Ohio St. 61, 113 N.E. 677 (1916). 
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successfully tested its right to build a wharf upon submerged lands 
that were said to belong to the state of Ohio; no grant had been 
made, and the state itself was the plaintiff. The court found that a 
wharf could be built, without regard to the title question, out to an 
area where ships could come. But as in the Massachusetts case, the 
extreme implications of the case were suggested by counsel,56 and 
the court made it clear that wharves which interfered with naviga-
tion would not be allowed and that no rights which would permit 
that result were obtainable. The state's trusteeship existed 
to secure the rights of the public and prevent interference with navi-
gation .... It must be remembered that [the littoral owner's] right 
. . . is one that can be exercised only in aid of navigation and com-
merce, and for no other purpose. What he does is therefore in further-
ance of the object of the trust, and is permitted solely on that 
account.57 
As these cases make clear, the courts have permitted the transfer 
of some element of the public trust into private o-wnership and con-
trol, even though that transfer may exclude or impair certain pub-
lic uses. In both of the cases just cited, private entrepreneurs were 
permitted to enhance their own rights by excluding the public from 
a part of the trust property which was formerly open to all. Thus, 
what one finds in the cases is not a niggling preservation of every 
inch of public trust property against any change, nor a precise 
maintenance of every historical pattern of use. The Wisconsin court 
put the point succinctly when it permitted a segment of Milwaukee 
harbor land on Lake Michigan to be granted to a large steel com-
pany for the building of navigation facilities: 
It is not the law, as we view it, that the state, represented by its 
legislature, must forever be quiescent in the administration of the 
trust doctrine, to the extent of leaving the shore of Lake Michigan 
in all instances in the same condition and contour as they existed 
prior to the advent of the white civilization in the territorial area 
of Wisconsin. 58 
These traditional cases suggest the extremes of the legal con-
straints upon the states: no grant may be made to a private party if 
that grant is of such amplitude that the state will effectively have 
56. [l]t is contended [the court replied] that piers and' wharves may be extended 
into the harbor in such a manner and may be constructed and used in such a 
way as to occupy all the space to practically destroy the harbor .•. and thereby 
hinder and interfere with navigation itself. 
94 Ohio St. at 78, 113 N.E. at 681. 
57. 94 Ohio St. at 79, 113 N.E. at 681. 
58. City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 451-52, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (1927). 
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given up its authority to govern, but a grant is not illegal solely 
because it diminishes in some degree the quantum of traditional 
public uses. 
D. The Lodestar in American Public Trust Law: 
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois 
The most celebrated public trust case in American law is the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central 
Railroad Company v. Illinois.59 In 1869 the Illinois legislature made 
an extensive grant of submerged lands, in fee simple, to the Illinois 
Central Railroad. That grant included all the land underlying Lake 
Michigan for one mile out from the shoreline and extending one 
mile in length along the central business district of Chicago--more 
than one thousand acres of incalculable value, comprising virtually 
the whole commercial waterfront of the city. By 1873 the legislature 
had repented of its excessive generosity, and it repealed the 1869 
grant; it then brought an action to have the original grant declared 
invalid. 
The Supreme Court upheld the state's claim and wrote one of 
the very few opinions in which an express conveyance of trust lands 
has been held to be beyond the power of a state legislature. It is that 
result which has made the decision such a favorite of litigants.60 But 
the Court did not actually prohibit the disposition of trust lands to 
private parties; its holding was much more limited. What a state 
may not do, the Court said, is to divest itself of authority to govern 
the whole of an area in which it has responsibility to exercise its 
police power; to grant almost the entire waterfront of a major city to 
a private company is, in effect, to abdicate legislative authority over 
navigation. 
But the mere granting of property to a private owner does 
not ipso facto prevent the exercise of the police power, for states 
routinely exercise a great deal of regulatory authority over privately 
owned land. The Court's decision makes sense only because the 
Court determined that the states have special regulatory obligations 
over shorelands, obligations which are inconsistent with large-scale 
private ownership. The Court stated that the title under which 
Illinois held the navigable waters of Lake Michigan is 
different in character from that which the state holds in lands in-
tended for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
59. 146 U.S. 887 (1892). 
60. E.g., Town of Ashwaubenon v. Public Serv. Commn., 22 Wis. 2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 
647 (1963). 
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state that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from 
the- obstruction or interferences of private parties.61 
With this language, the Court articulated a principle that has 
become the central substantive thought in public trust litigation. 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of 
the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism 
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to real-
locate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses 
to the self-interest of private parties. 
The Court in Illinois Central did not specify its reasons for 
adopting the position which it took, but the attitude implicit in the 
decision is fairly obvious. In general, governments operate in order 
to provide widely available public services, such as schools, police 
protection, libraries, and parks. While there may be good reasons to 
use governmental resources to benefit some group smaller than the 
whole citizenry, there is usually some relatively obvious reason for 
the subsidy, such as a need to assist the farmer or the urban poor. 
In addition, there is ordinarily some plainly rational basis for the 
reallocative structure of any such program-whether it be taxing 
the more affluent to support the poor or using the tax base of a 
large community to sustain programs in a smaller unit of govern-
ment. Although courts are disinclined to examine these issues 
through a rigorous economic analysis, it seems fair to say that the 
foregoing observations are consistent with a general view of the 
function of government. Accordingly, the court's suspicions are 
naturally aroused when they are faced with a program which seems 
quite at odds with such a view of government. 
In Illinois Central, for example, everything seems to have been 
backwards. There appears to have been no good reason for taxing 
the general public in order to support a substantial private enter-
prise in obtaining control of the waterfront. There was no reason 
to believe that private ownership would have provided incentives 
for needed developments, as might have been the case with land 
grants in remote areas of the country; and if the resource was to be 
maintained for traditional uses, it was unlikely that private man-
agement would have produced more efficient or attractive services 
to the public. Indeed, the public benefits that could have been 
achieved by private ownership are not easy to identify. 
Although the facts of Illinois Central were highly unusual-
and the grant in that case was particularly egregious62-the case 
61. 146 U.S. at 452. 
62. The facts in the Illinois Central case were not as unique as one might hope. 
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remains an important precedent. The model for judicial skepticism 
that it built poses a set of relevant standards for current, less dramatic 
instances of dubious governmental conduct. For instance, a court 
should look skeptically at programs which infringe broad public 
uses in favor of narrower ones. Similarly, there should be a special 
burden of justification on government when such results are brought 
into question. But Illinois Central also raises more far-reaching 
issues. For example, what are the implications for the workings of 
the democratic process when such programs, although ultimately 
found to be unjustifiable, are nonetheless promulgated through 
democratic institutions? Furthermore, what does the existence of 
those seeming imperfections in the democratic process imply about 
the role of the courts, which, Illinois Central notwithstanding, are 
generally reluctant to hold invalid the acts of co-equal branches of 
government? 
II. THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST: 
AN INSTRUMENT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION 
A. The Massachusetts Approach 
The Illinois Central problem has had its most significant modern 
exegesis in Massachusetts. In that state, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has shmm a clear recognition of the potential for abuse which exists 
California's early dealings with its tidelands and submerged lands are all too similar 
to the Illinois Central situation. 
By the time 152 prominent Californians met in Sacramento on September 28, 1878, 
to draft a new state constitution ••• people ••. had become aware • . . of a great 
many abuses growing out of the sale of tidelands .•• the Central Pacific Railroad 
had bought up all the frontage on the bay, so that no other company could erect 
a wharf without its consent ••• unscrupulous speculators had purchased tide lots 
and then tried to force owners of the abutting dry lands to pay extortionate prices 
for mud flats, in order to attain access to the bay. 
"If there is any one abuse greater than another that I think the people of the 
State of California has suffered at the hands of their law-making power, it is the 
abuse that they have received in the granting out and disposition of the lands 
belonging to the State,'' [a delegate] told the constitutional convention. Swamp 
lands, tidelands, and marsh and overflowed lands had been taken in such vast 
quantities, he said, that "now the people are hedged off entirely from reaching 
tide water, navigable water, or salt water." 
M. Scorr, THE FUTURE OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY 9 (Institute of Govt!. Studies, Univ. of 
Cal., Berkeley, Sept. 1963) [quoting DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CoNVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1038 (Sacramento, 1881)]. 
The Spring 1968 issue of CRY CALIFORNIA, a journal published by California 
Tomorrow, San Francisco, reported that 
the Alameda Conservation Association is challenging in court the recent land 
"swap" made by the State Lands Commission with Leslie Salt Company, involving 
some 2,000 acres of San Francisco Bay tideland. Under the agreement, Leslie gets 
title to several acres of land. Conservationists • • • have called the settlement a 
giveaway of public property. 
Id. at 39. 
See also Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824 
(1936); In re Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E. 849 (1914); Coxe v 
State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895). 
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whenever power over public lands is given to a body which is not 
directly responsive to the electorate. To counteract the influence 
which private interest groups may have with administrative agen-
cies and to encourage policy decisions to be made openly at the legis-
lative level, the Massachusetts court has developed a rule that a 
change in the use of public lands is impermissible without a clear 
showing of legislative approval. 
I. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission 
In Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission,63 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts took the first major step in devel-
oping the doctrine applicable to changes in the use of lands ded-
icated to the public interest. Because Gould is such an important 
case in the development of the public trust doctrine, and because 
the implications of the case are so far-reaching, it is important to 
have a clear understanding of both the facts of the case and the 
court's decision. 
Mount Greylock, about which the controversy centered, is the 
highest summit of an isolated range which is surrounded by lands 
of considerably lower elevation. In 1888 a group of citizens, in-
terested in preserving the mountain as an unspoiled natural forest, 
promoted the creation of an association for the purpose of laying 
out a public park on it. The state ultimately acquired about 9,000 
acres, and the legislature enacted a statute creating the Greylock 
Reservation Commission and giving it certain of the powers of a 
park commission.64 By 1953 the reservation contained a camp 
ground, a few ski trails, a small lodge, a memorial tower, some TV 
and radio facilities, and a parking area and garage. In that year, the 
legislature enacted a statute creating an Authority to construct and 
operate on Mount Greylock an aerial tramway and certain other 
facilities, 65 and it authorized the original Commission to lease to 
the Authority "any portion of the Mount Greylock Reservation."66 
63. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). 
64. 350 Mass. at 412,215 N.E.2d at 117. 
65. 350 Mass. at 413-14, 215 N.E.2d at 118-19. The other facilities whose construc-
tion the statute authorized included 
approach roads to the ••. base of the tramway; parking facilities ••• ski facilities, 
stores, including gift, souvenir and ski or equipment shops; dining and refresh-
ment facilities; lounges, comfort stations, warming huts and such other accom-
modations for the convenience • • • of the public; and such other facilities and 
services as are reasonably necessary for the public purposes of the authority. 
350 Mass. at 414 n.6, 215 N.E.2d at 118 n.6. The Authority was also empowered to 
make contracts necessary or incidental to its duties, "to lease or grant the right to 
exercise such powers" and to do all "things necessary or convenient to carry out the 
powers expressly granted." 350 Mass. at 414 n.6, 215 N.E,2d at 118 n.6. 
66. 350 Mass. at 415, 215 N.E.2d at 119. 
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For some time the Authority was unable to obtain the financing 
necessary to go fonvard with its desire to build a ski development, 
but eventually it made an arrangement for the underwriting of 
revenue bonds. Under that arrangement the undenvriters, organized 
as a joint venture corporation called American Resort Services, were 
to lease 4,000 acres of the reservation from the Commission. On that 
land, the management corporation was to build and manage an 
elaborate ski development, for which it was to receive forty per cent 
of the net operations revenue of the enterprise. The undenvriters 
required these complex and extensive arrangements so that the 
enterprise would be attractive for potential purchasers of bonds. 
After the arrangements had been made, but before the project 
went fonvard, five citizens of the county in which the reservation is 
located brought an action against both the Greylock Reservation 
Commission and the Tramway Authority. The plaintiffs brought 
the suit as beneficiaries of the public trust under which the reserva-
tion was said to be held, and they asked that the court declare in-
valid both the lease of the 4,000 acres of reservation land and the 
agreement between the Authority and the management corporation. 
They asked the court to examine the statutes authorizing the project, 
and to interpret them narrowly to prevent both the extensive devel-
opment contemplated and the transfer of supervisory powers into the 
hands of a profit-making corporation. The case seemed an exceed-
ingly difficult one for the plaintiffs, both because the statutes creating 
the Authority were phrased in extremely general terms, 67 and because 
legislative grants of power to administrative agencies are usually 
read quite broadly. Certainly, in light of the statute, it could not be 
said that the legislature desired Mount Greylock to be preserved in 
its natural state, nor could the legislature be said to have prohibited 
leasing agreements with a management agency. Nonetheless, the 
court held both the lease and the management agreement invalid 
on the ground that they were in excess of the statutory grant of 
authority.68 
Gould cannot be considered merely a conventional exercise in 
legislative interpretation. It is, rather, a judicial response to a situa-
67. See note 65 supra. The court held that, despite these broad mandates, the Com-
mission was empowered to lease only those portions of Mount Greylock which might 
prove reasonably related to a project of permitted scope. Thus, the court found, the 
lease from the Commission to the Authority covered an excessive area and consequently 
was not authorized by the statutes permitting the leasing of Mount Greylock. It also 
held that there was no authority for the plan to build "four chairlifts of a total 
length of 14-,825 feet and eleven ski trails of a total length of 56,600 feet." 350 Mass. 
at 419-23, 215 N .E.2d at 121-24-. 
68. For a fuller explanation of the basis for the court's decision, see text accom-
panying note 70 infra. 
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tion in which public powers were being used to achieve a most 
peculiar purpose.69 Thus, the critical passage in the decision is that 
in which the court stated: 
The profit sharing feature and some aspects of the project itself 
strongly suggest a commercial enterprise. In addition to the ab-
sence of any clear or express statutory authorization of as broad a 
delegation of responsibility by the Authority as is given by the man-
agement agreement, we find no express grant to the Authority of 
power to permit use of public lands and of the Authority's bor-
rowed funds £or what seems, in part at least, a commercial venture 
for private profit.70 
In coming to this recognition, the court took note of the unusual 
developments which led to the project. What had begun as au-
thorization to a public agency to construct a tramway had developed 
into a proposal for an elaborate ski area. Since ski resorts are popular 
and profitable private enterprises, it seems slightly odd in itself that 
a state would undertake such a development. Furthermore, the 
public authority had gradually turned over most of its supervisory 
powers to a private consortium and had been compelled by economic 
circumstances to agree to a bargain which heavily favored the private 
investment house. 
It hardly seems surprising, then, that the court questioned why 
a state should subordinate a public park, serving a useful purpose as 
relatively undeveloped land, to the demands of private investors for 
building such a commercial facility. The court, faced with such a 
situation, could hardly have been expected to have treated the case 
as if it involved nothing but formal legal issues concerning the state's 
authority to change the use of a certain tract of land. 
Yet the court was unwilling to invalidate an act of the legislature 
on the sole ground that it involved a modification of the use of 
public trust land. Instead, the court devised a legal rule which im-
posed a presumption that the state does not ordinarily intend to 
divert trust properties in such a manner as to lessen public uses. Such 
a rule would not require a court to perform the odious and judicially 
dangerous act of telling a legislature that it is not acting in the public 
interest, but rather would utilize the court's interpretive powers in 
69. For a confirmation that the "feel" of a case is critical to its decision, the Gould 
case should be compared with People ex rel. Kucharski v. McGovern, 42 Ill. 2d 119, 
245 N.E.2d 472 (1969). In the latter case, the court upheld recreational developments 
in a forest preserve, despite a limited statute of authorization, apparently because the 
public action seemed reasonable and it was the posture of the objector which gave rise 
to suspicion. 
70. 350 Mass. at 426, 215 N.E.2d at 126. Cf. Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. 
App. 2d 407, 413-14, 326 P.2d 957, 961 (1958). 
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accordance with an assumption that the legislature is acting to main-
tain broad public uses. Under the Massachusetts court's rule, that 
assumption is to guide interpretations, and is to be altered only if 
the legislature clearly indicates that it has a different view of the 
public interest than that which the court would attribute to it. 
Although such a rule may seem to be an elaborate example of 
judicial indirection, it is in fact directly responsive to the central 
problem of public trust controversies. There must be some means 
by which a court can keep a check on legislative grants of public 
lands while ensuring that historical uses may be modified to accom-
modate contemporary public needs and that the power to make such 
modifications resides in a branch of government which is responsive 
to public demands. Similarly, while there ought to be available 
some mechanism by which corrupt legislative acts can be remedied, 
it will be the rare case in which the impropriety is so patent that, 
as in the Illinois Central case, a court would find it to be outside the 
broad boundaries of legitimacy. It is to these concerns that the 
Massachusetts court so artfully addressed itself. 
While it will seldom be true that a particular governmental act 
can be termed corrupt, it will often be the case that the whole of 
the public interest has not been adequately considered by the legis-
lative or administrative officials whose conduct has been brought 
into question. In those cases, which are at the center of concern with 
the public trust, there is a strong, if not demonstrable, implication 
that the acts in question represent a response to limited and self-
interested proponents of public action. It is not difficult to perceive 
the reason for the legislative and administrative actions which give 
rise to such cases, for public officials are frequently subjected to 
intensive representations on behalf of interests seeking official con-
cessions to support proposed enterprises. The concessions desired 
by those interests are often of limited visibility to the general public 
so that public sentiment is not aroused; but the importance of the 
grants to those who seek them may lead to extraordinarily vigorous 
and persistent efforts. It is in these situations that public trust lands 
are likely to be put in jeopardy and that legislative watchfulness 
is likely to be at the lowest levels.71 To send such a case back for 
71. An examination of such situations, and their implications for judicial interven-
tion, constitutes a significant part of the author's larger study of which this Article is 
a part. For an example of one such controversy, see Permit for Landfill in Hunting 
Creek, Va., Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), pt. 2 (1969); THE PERMIT FOR LANDFILL IN HUNTING 
CREEK: A DEBACLE FOR CONSERVATION, H.R. REP. No. 91-113, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
See note 32 supra and text following note 99 infra. 
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express legislative authority is to create through the courts an open-
ness and visibility which is the public's principal protection against 
overreaching, but which is often absent in the routine political 
process. Thus, the court should intervene to provide the most 
appropriate climate for democratic policy making. 
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission is an important case 
for two reasons. First, it provides a useful illustration that it is pos-
sible for rather dubious projects to clear all the legislative and 
administrative hurdles which have been set up to protect the public 
interest. Second, and more significantly, the technique which the 
court used to confront the basic issues suggests a fruitful mode for 
carrying on such litigation. Moreover, Gould is not unique; it is one 
of a line of exceedingly important cases in which the Massachusetts 
court has produced a remarkable body of modern public trust inter-
pretation by using the technique which it developed in that case. 72 
2. The Development of the Massachusetts Response to the 
Problem of Low-Visibility Policy Decisions 
Gould, like Illinois Central, was concerned with the most overt 
sort of imposition on the public interest: commercial interests had 
obtained advantages which infringed directly on public uses and 
promoted private profits. But the Massachusetts court has also con-
fronted a more pervasive, if more subtle, problem-that concerning 
projects which clearly have some public justification. Such cases arise 
when, for example, a highway department seeks to take a piece of 
parkland or to fill a wetland. It is clear that the appropriate agencies 
hear and attend to the voices which call for getting the job of road 
building done as quickly and cheaply as possible.73 But there are 
also individuals who put a high premium on the maintenance of 
parks, wetlands, and open space. Are their voices adequately heard 
and their claims adequately taken into account in the decisional 
process? 
There is no single answer to that question. Sometimes, to be 
sure, the objectors in a community are alert and highly organized 
and make their views knmvn very clearly.74 In other situations, a 
72. See cases cited in notes 81-88 infra. 
73. The politics of highway building and the travails of those who challenge the 
program have been widely discussed of late. See generally A. MOWBRAY, RoAD TO RUIN 
(1969); Whalen, The American Highway: Do We Know Where We're Going?, SATURDAY 
EVENING POST, Dec. 14, 1968, at 22. 
74. The recent battles to obtain a Redwoods National Park and to prevent dam-
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project will go forward quietly and will approach the point of ir-
reversibility before those who would question it can initiate their 
questioning.75 Such situations are hardly consonant with a demo-
cratic view of government and are undesirable even when they are 
the result of mere inadvertence on the part of public agencies. But 
it often appears that there is a conscious effort to minimize public 
awareness and participation.76 Situations of that sort arise almost 
building in the Grand Canyon are the most notable examples. Clearly citizen political 
activity is most likely to be efficacious on highly visible, national issues, such as concern 
for "the last Redwood." The diligence of an aroused citizenry, both inside and out-
side the courtroom, is illustrated by cases like Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference 
v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Road Review 
League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns., Inc. v. 
Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The controversy in Airis is far from ended. See 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1969, at 66, col. I; Wash. Eve. Star, Oct. 17, 1969, at 1, col. I. 
75. One of the uncertainties in this area is the extent to which effective political 
activity by objecting citizens is made feasible by litigation. See Tague, The Rise and 
Evaporation of the .Mount Greylock Tramway, 3 BERKSHIRE REv. (Williams College, 
Mass.) No. I (Summer 1967). Citizen lawsuits have been lost on the ground that the 
objection has come too late because commitments to the project are too far advanced to 
be restrained. E.g., Nashville I-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179, 185 (6th 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 
650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Iowa Natural Resources Council v. Mapes, 164 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 
1969). Some courts seem peculiarly insensitive to the fact that the very derelictions in 
procedure which are being challenged have prevented earlier citizen intervention. 
Moreover, attorneys for the government are skillful in utilizing the arguments that it 
is either too early or too late for review. See Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Cross-Motion To Dismiss upon Objection in Point of Law, Oct. 29, 1968, filed by the 
State of New York in Citizens Comm. £or the Hudson Valley v. McCabe, No. 2872/68 
(Sup. Ct., Rockland County, N.Y., filed Oct. 1, 1968). Still, sometimes a court does refuse 
to "knuckle under" to a fait accompli. See Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash. 2d 580, 445 P.2d 
648 (1968) (developer ordered to remove fill even though between $100,000 and 
$250,000 had already been expended). 
76. Cases of this nature are numerous. One was brought to light recently after 
the massive oil leakage off the Santa Barbara coast. See generally Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution, Senate Comm. on Public Works, Water Pol• 
lution-1969, pts. 2, 3, 4, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). In that instance, the governmental 
agency charged with protecting the public interest decided against holding public 
hearings prior to granting approval for a project because the agency "preferred not to 
stir the natives up any more than possible [sic]" Interoffice Memo. from Eugene W. 
Standley, Staff Engineer, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Feb. 15, 1968. When questions 
were raised, the agency publicly responded by saying, "we feel maximum provision 
has been made for the local environment and that further delay in lease sale would 
not be consistent with the national interest." N.Y. Times, March 25, 1969, at 30, col. 6 
(quoting from a letter from the Undersecretary of the Interior to the chairman of the 
board of supervisors of Santa Barbara County). But the agency privately indicated 
that "the 'heat' has not died down but we can keep trying to alleviate the fears of 
the people," id. at col. 3, and noted that pressures were being applied by the oil com-
panies whose equipment "costing millions of dollars" was being held "in anticipation," 
id. at col. 5. 
There are a variety of other ways in which agencies minimize public participation 
in their deliberations. For example, the duty to hold a public hearing may technically 
be satisfied by holding a hearing which is "announced" to the public by posting a notice 
on an obscure bulletin board in a post office. Nashville I-40 Steering Comm. v. 
498 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:471 
daily in the thousands of resource development and conservation 
matters that come before state and federal agencies. Often the picture 
is not a pretty one. Yet many courts respond to objections simply by 
asserting that protection of the public interest has been vested in 
some public agency,77 and that it is not appropriate for citizens or 
the courts to involve themselves with second guessing the official 
vindicators of the public interest. 
As a result of Gould and the cases which followed it, the situation 
is considerably better in Massachusetts. That state's supreme judicial 
court has penetrated one of the very difficult problems of American 
government-inequality of access to, and influence over, administra-
tive agencies. It has struck directly at low-visibility decision making, 
which is the most pervasive manifestation of the problem. By a 
simple but ingenious flick of the doctrinal wrist, the court has forced 
agencies to bear the burden of obtaining specific, overt approval of 
efforts to invade the public trust. 
The court has accomplished that result by extending the ap-
plication of a well-established rule designed to mitigate traditional 
conflicts between public agencies arising when one agency seeks to 
condemn land held by another. Under that established rule, one 
agency cannot take land vested in another agency without explicit 
authorizing legislation; othen'lise the two agencies "might succes-
sively try to take and retake the property ad infinitum."78 Clearly, 
that principle evolved as a judicial means of avoiding conflict be-
tween agencies. The Massachusetts court has turned it into an 
affirmative tool for private citizens to use against governmental 
agencies which are assertedly acting contrary to the public interest.79 
Thus, the legal doctrine did not formally change, but an extremely 
Ellington, 387 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968). Alter-
natively, a statutory hearing requirement may simply be ignored, and the argument 
later made that despite the omission no citizen has legal standing to challenge the 
agency's action. See D.C. Fedn. of Civic Assns., Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). 
77. E.g., Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. Housing&: Home Fin. Agency, 310 
F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963): "The legislature, through 
its lawfully created agencies, rather than 'interested' citizens, is the guardian of the 
public needs to be served by social legislation." 
78. Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 346 Mass. 250, 255, 191 
N.E.2d 481, 484 (1963). 
79. The court has made this shift knowingly and explicitly: "That decision [Com-
monwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 346 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d 481 (1963)] 
does not rest, as the defendant argues, on our inability to determine which of two 
state agencies was intended by the legislature to have paramount authority over the 
land in question." Sacco v. Department of Pub. Works, 352 Mass. 670, 672, 227 N.E.2d 
478, 480 (1967). 
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important modification was made in its application. It now operates 
to overrule the doctrine that citizens must acquiesce in discretionary 
administrative actions which are not plainly in contravention of law. 
The administrative agencies now have the burden of establishing an 
affirmative case before the legislature in the full light of public at-
tention. 
Having set the stage in cases involving conflict between public 
agencies, the Massachusetts court took the important step of inter-
vention on behalf of private citizens in Gould.80 The next year, that 
court further emphasized its views in Sacco v. Department of Public 
Works.81 In that case, residents of the town of Arlington sought to 
enjoin the Department of Public Works from filling a great pond as 
part of its plan to relocate part of a state highway. The department 
thought it had all the legislative authority it needed, for it was 
operating under two particularly broad statutes.82 The court not 
80. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. The Massachusetts court had been 
progressing in this direction for at least a decade, during which it had seen in many 
contexts that public agencies paid very little regard to the maintenance of important 
natural resources. In 1960, the court acted at the behest of local citizens and residents 
to enjoin the county commissioners from commercializing ,valden Pond, which was 
held in trust under a private gift. Nikols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, 341 
Mass. 13, 166 N.E.2d 911 (1960). See also City of Wilmington v. Department of Pub. 
Util., 340 Mass. 432, 165 N.E.2d 99 (1960); Town of Hamilton v. Department of Pub. 
Util., 346 Mass. 130, 190 N.E.2d 545 (1963); Jacobson v. Parks &: Recreation Commn. of 
Boston, 345 Mass. 641, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1963). The reluctance of both public agencies 
and private utilities to include amenities among their planning considerations was 
forcefully demonstrated in a controversy involving utility line undergrounding, which 
came to the court three times. Sudbury v. Department of Pub. Util., 343 Mass. 428, 179 
N.E.2d 263 (1962), 351 Mass. 214, 218 N.E.2d 415 (1966); Boston Edison Co. v. Board 
of Selectmen of Concord, 242 N .E.2d 868 (Mass. 1968). 
Fortunately, the court was not the only institution concerned; Massachusetts had 
enacted a good deal of important resource legislation, and the Department of Natural 
Resources was enforcing it vigorously. See Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. 
Volpe &: Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965): Massachusetts Dept. of Natural 
Resources, Order Under Gen. Laws ch. 130, § 105, No. 768-1-68 (regulating coastal 
wetlands in Ipswich). Indeed, the willingness and ability of the Massachusetts court to 
move so rapidly in resource cases is undoubtedly abetted by the presence of "ringing" 
legislation, which strengthens the court's assertion that in order to enforce the as-
sumed legislative policy, impairment of trust properties will not be presumed to be 
permissible absent explicit statutory authority. This situation is but another example 
of the degree to which effective government results from intensive interplay among 
the branches; it contrasts with the traditional view that each branch has its own 
functions to perform and should be immune from intervention by the other branches 
of government. See note 86 infra. 
81. 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967). 
82. The first statute permitted the Department to take "such public lands, parks, 
playgrounds, reservations, cemeteries, highways or parkways ••• as it may deem neces-
sary for carrying out the provisions of this act." 352 Mass. at 672 n.4, 227 N.E.2d at 
480 n.4. The second statute which the Department cited stated that "the Department 
shall ••• have charge of the lands ••• belonging to the commonwealth, and shall .•• 
ascertain what portions of such land may be ••• improved with benefit to the com-
monwealth." 352 Mass. at 673 n.5, 227 N.E.2d at 480 n.5. 
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only found the statutory power inadequate, but actually used it 
against the Department. As to the first statute, the court noted that 
it had previously decided that it did not regard " 'general reference 
to unspecified "public land" as a conferring ... of a blanket power 
to take ... any land of the Commonwealth which the Authority 
chooses.' "83 The court's response to the second statute was even 
more vehement and clearly reveals the court's feeling about these 
cases. With scarcely disguised irritation, the court said: 
... the improvement of public lands contemplated by this section 
does not include the widening of a State highway. It seems rather 
that the improvement of public lands which the legislature pro-
vided for ... is to preserve such lands so that they may be enjoyed 
by the people for recreational purposes.84 
The court then noted that the legislature had recently passed a law 
directing the department to "provide for the protection of water 
resources, fish and wildlife and recreational values,"8u and stated 
that it did not believe that the new law "represented an abrupt 
change in legislative policy," but rather "an abiding legislative con-
cern for the preservation of our great ponds"-a concern which the 
court obviously did not think the Department of Public Works 
shared.86 
Despite the strong and explicit language of the court, the De-
83. 352 Mass. at 672, 227 N.E.2d at 480 [citing Commonwealth v. Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority, 346 Mass. 250, 253, 191 N.E.2d 481 (1963)]. 
84. 352 Mass. at 673, 227 N .E.2d at 480. 
85. 352 Mass. at 673, 227 N.E.2d at 480. 
86. 352 Mass. at 674, 227 N.E.2d at 480. The ultimate result of such litigation is 
usually a honing down of developers' demands or a modification of their methods. 
Thus, in Sacco, counsel for the plaintiffs reported that, "after the decision the legis-
lature enacted a bill granting the D.P.W. authority to take 4.7 acres of Spy Pond for 
the highway. The Department had wanted a much broader bill, but it was hoist [sic] 
by its ow~ petard in that it had insisted throughout the litigation that all it needed 
was 4.7 acres." Letter from Robert J. Muldoon to the author, July 21, 1969. See 
note 80 supra. In Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969), 
counsel for the objectors wrote the following as to the outcome of litigation: 
[A]fter a Herculean effort, the House of Representatives in Massachusetts voted 
130-92 to authorize a feasibility study of a westerly route, such as we have been 
working for. However, our local Public Works Department brought out its troops, 
in the form of at least six men who spent most of the week in the State House 
and, after reconsideration, obtained a bill for an opposite route by the narrow 
score of 109-105. The Senate concurred after removing some amendments and the 
Governor signed the bill. However, the whole subject of super highway construc-
tion through the Metropolitan region has been put into the hands of a seven-man 
commission which is to report whether or not any new highways are needed. It 
seems to us that they will quite surely urge that this road be built (we have not 
objected to the need of such a road) but, in the meantime, the Governor has 
stated in public and written us that he will not permit the transfer of the requisite 
parkland. 
Lettei: from Stuart Debard to the author, Sept. 5, 1969. 
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partment of Public Works continued to march to its own tune. A 
year later it was back in court, this time in Robbins v. Department 
of Public Works,87 a case involving the acquisition of some wetlands 
for its highway program. The suit was instituted by private citizens 
to protect Fowl Meadows, a "wetlands of considerable natural beauty 
. . . often used for nature study and recreation."88 The meadows 
were owned and administered by the Metropolitan District Com-
mission, a state parklands agency, which had agreed with the De-
partment of Public Works to transfer the meadows to it for high-
way use.89 The case is of particular significance because the agency 
whose specific function it was to protect parklands for the public 
was named as a co-defendant with the highway agency. Moreover, 
the applicable statute required that the transfer receive the approval 
of both the governor and the state council, and such approval had 
been given. The court's willingness to entertain a citizens' suit 
against all these guardians of the citizenry is a measure of the 
Massachusetts court's skepticism about administrative discretion in 
dealings with public resources. 
The statute at issue in Robbins was considerably more explicit 
than that which was at issue in Sacco; the Robbins court itself noted 
that "admittedly there are significant differences .... For example, 
[the statute in Robbins] is not an eminent domain statute; it con-
cerns only 'land of the commonwealth'; it requires that the transfer 
have the approval of the Governor and Council; and it restricts the 
new use to the 'laying out or relocation of any highway' ."90 
Even with these differences, the court held, the statute failed to 
"state with the requisite degree of explicitness a legislative intention 
to effect the diversion of use which the DPW seeks to accomplish."91 
The court then set out the standard which must be met if there is to 
87. Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969). Robbins 
was the most recent case of this type in the Supreme Judicial Court as of August 
1969; as of the same date, the most recent development in Massachusetts ·was a suit 
by residents of Martha's Vineyard to enjoin the Dukes County Commissioners from 
clearing state forest land for an airport extension. A preliminary injunction was 
granted on June 2, 1969. Abbot v. Osborn, No. 1465 (Super. Ct., Dukes County, Mass.). 
A collateral federal action, Kelly v. Kennedy, Civil No. 69-812-G (D. Mass., filed July 
29, 1969), seeks to enjoin the disbursement of federal funds for the airport extension 
on the ground that the applicable federal standards have not been met. See 49 U .S.C. 
§ 1108(d)(l) (1964), §§ 1651(2), 1753(£) (Supp. IV 1965-1968). The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration decided these issues adversely to the objecting citizens. In re Application 
of Dukes County (FAA July 25, 1969). 
88. 244 N .E.2d at 578. 
89. 244 N.E.2d at 578. 
90. 244 N.E.2d at 579-80. 
91. 244 N.E.2d at 580. See also James Drago v. Hudson County Park Comm., No. 
L-31694-68 P.W. (Super. Ct., L. Div., Hudson County, N.J. July 14, 1969). 
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be adequate evidence of legislative intent. That standard is patently 
designed to thrust such matters before the public, by requiring that 
the legislature specify the reallocative policy being undertaken; a 
court could not be more explicit in its effort to make the legislative 
and administrative processes more responsive to the will of the gen-
eral public and less susceptible to the tendency to make decisions 
which, as a result of inequalities of access, do not fully reflect the 
general will: 
We think it is essential to the expression of plain and explicit 
authority to divert parklands, Great Ponds, reservations and kindred 
areas to new and inconsistent public uses that the Legislature iden-
tify the land and that there appear in the legislation not only a 
statement of the new use but a statement or recital showing in some 
way legislative awareness of the existing public use. In short, the 
legislation should express not merely the public will for the new use 
but its willingness to surrender or forgo the existing use.92 
Finding the statute in question clearly inadequate under this test, 
the court ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding 
that the lands not be transferred to the Department of Public Works 
until legislation authorizing such transfer was duly enacted. 
Thus, in the cases which followed Gould, the Massachusetts court 
has clearly demonstrated both an awareness of the problems which 
are central to public trust litigation and a willingness to ensure that 
those problems are not ignored by decision-making bodies. The 
court has not attempted to make policy decisions concerning the 
proper use of public trust lands, but has instead developed a means 
for ensuring that those who do make the decisions do so in a publicly 
visible manner. The court has served notice to all concerned that it 
will view with skepticism any dispositions of trust lands and will 
not allow them unless it is perfectly clear that the dispositions have 
been fully considered by the legislature. 
3. A Tentative Application of the Massachusetts Approach: 
Public Trust Problems in Maryland and Virginia 
The Massachusetts court has been discreet enough to refrain 
from detailing the reasons which led to its skepticism of administra-
tive conduct, but those reasons appear frequently in the pages of the 
major metropolitan newspapers. 
In June of 1969, for example, newspaper stories revealed that the 
92. 244 N.E.2d at 580. For a sharply contrasting judicial approach to the problem 
of the Robbins case, see State v. Christopher, 170 N.W .2d 95 (Minn. 1969), petition for 
cert. filed sub nom. Minneapolis Park Bd. v. Minnesota, 38 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Oct. 20, 
1969). 
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Maryland State Board of Public Works, an agency composed of the 
governor, the state controller, and the state treasurer, had deeded 
to a private real estate developer approximately 176 acres of state-
owned submerged land in the vicinity of Ocean City, a popular 
summer resort.03 The developer, who already owned the adjacent 
uplands, wanted the additional area to fill, subdivide, and sell-a 
process which has become quite common in populous areas near 
shorelines, since available residential land on or near the water is 
both increasingly scarce and highly prized. When land is no longer 
available for development, pressures build to "make" new land. 
It is not uncommon for states to convey submerged lands to private 
owners; states have traditionally deeded adjacent tidelands to upland 
owners so that the lands might be filled for wharfage and similar 
purposes. But grants of that nature were historically made only when 
the adjacent lands were of small value, and when the general public 
obtained no significant benefit from public ownership of the lands.94 
Thus, although there is ample precedent to support the right of the 
state to grant such lands to private parties, the case providing that 
support all dealt with lands of very limited public value. It is 
essential to an understanding of the cases which uphold grants of 
trust lands to private parties that one be aware of the historical set-
ting in which such grants have been made. 
The recent Maryland grant does not fit into the pattern of the 
historical cases. The consideration exacted by the Board for the land 
granted was a mere 100 dollars per acre plus ten cents per ton for 
state-owned sand that was dredged from the bottom and used for 
fill. It was reported that the land so filled was subdivided into house 
lots of a fraction of an acre each, which were sold at a price between 
5,000 dollars and 7,300 dollars per lot.95 
Suit has been filed objecting to the Maryland wetlands disposi-
tion. 06 In a suit of that nature, an alert court could hardly refrain 
93. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1969, at 26, col. I; id., June 7, 1969, at 32, col. 2. 
94. There are large tracts of salt marsh lands, of which the land in suit is an 
example, which are covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the neap tides, 
and therefore belong to the State by virtue of her sovereignty, which are of no 
possible use for the purpose of navigation, but may be valuable for agricultural or 
other purposes if reclaimed from the tides. Such lands the State may undoubtedly 
grant m private ownership for the purposes of reclamation and use, for by such a 
course no right of the public to their use for the purposes of navigation would 
be prejudiced. 
Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 373 (1867). See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 
Cush.), 53, 72 (1851). 
95. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1969, at 37, col. I. 
96. Ker,_Jelman v. Mandel, Equity No. 78A, p. 142, Case No. 426-86-A (Cir. Ct. No. 2, 
Baltimore, Md., filed June 25, 1969); see Wash. Eve. Star, Nov. 11, 1969, at B-3, col. I. 
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from asking the questions which troubled the Massachusetts Court in 
the Gould litigation. Why should a state agency, invested with the 
obligation to act as trustee for the general public, grant away tide-
lands in exchange for a sum of money which, at best, is only a fraction 
of the market value of the lands? Why, in any event, should a 
resource which has a significant value to the public at large be 
reallocated to the benefit of the relatively few vacationers with the 
means to acquire waterfront residences? Is it conceivable that the 
public trust in an aquatic resource is meant to be implemented by the 
provision of additional space for housing which could undoubtedly 
be built elsewhere at only a modest inconvenience? Is the public trust 
obligation of the state, in a context "strongly suggesting a commercial 
enterprise,''97 to be viewed as including "power to permit use of 
public lands ... for what seems, in part at least, a commercial venture 
for private profit,''98 when the quid pro quo, measured either in 
money for the general fund or in public advantage, is so elusive? 
And, finally, what weight is to be given to the decisions of the state 
agencies which have an interest in such matters; that is, how im-
portant is it that the Board of Natural Resources, the Department of 
Inland Game and Fish, the Department of Water Resources, and the 
staff of the Board of Public Works all filed objections to the plan for 
development of the tidelands that were ultimately granted? 
In defense of the grant, it has been said that the development 
will produce a projected multimillion dollar increase in the ta.xable 
property base of Ocean City and the local county. But this explana-
tion proves too much; any grant of governmental property to a 
private enterprise would produce the potential for additional taxes. 
That statement is as true of the White House and Washington 
Monument grounds or of Yellowstone Park as it is of a tract of 
submerged land on the Maryland coastline. To accept the defense 
would be to remove all restrictions on the power of government 
to grant public lands to private parties. 
If the reported facts are accurate, the Maryland situation seems 
to be an easy one to bring within the ambit of Illinois Central and 
Gould. The absence of any substantial consideration for the grant, 
as well as the other circumstances surrounding the grant, give the 
controversy the same aura of disregard for the broad public interest 
that so permeated the two earlier cases. Moreover, because the grant 
was made by a state administrative agency, and not by a direct 
97. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 426, 215 N.E.2d ll4, 126 
(1966). 
98. 350 Mass. at 426, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
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statutory command of the legislature, it would be possible for the 
court to use the limited technique established in Massachusetts. 
Reference could be made to the general authorizing statute; and 
since that statute contains nothing which expressly authorizes either 
the specific grant in question or grants of the same type, the court 
could find that there is insufficient legislative authorization. In that 
manner, the court could thrust the project back to the legislature 
where the project's proponents would have to contend with wide 
public knowledge and concern in trying to persuade a majority of 
the elected representatives of the people to assert publicly their 
willingness to enter into the contract. 
Not all contemporary cases, however, are readily adaptable to a 
judicial decision which requires that the legislature itself examine 
a particular administrative action. Sometimes a court has much less 
opportunity to cast doubt upon a legislative authorization without 
directly repudiating it. An instructive example of the variant form 
in which such cases can arise is presented by a recent landfill project 
in Alexandria, Virginia. 
The basic facts in the Virginia situation are quite similar to 
those which occurred in Maryland,99 but there is one important dif-
ference. In the Virginia situation, a deed was not granted by a state 
agency; instead, a bill was presented to the legislature authorizing 
the governor to convey the desired land to a private interest for the 
sum of 60,000 dollars.100 Details of the maneuvers which were used 
to obtain the passage of the bill are not easily obtainable, but cer-
99. In the Virginia case, a private housing developer owning fast lands on the 
shore of the Potomac sought to fill adjacent submerged lands and to erect three high-
rise apartment buildings with the much sought-after features of proximity to, and a 
view of, the water. For a more thorough discussion, see works cited at note 71 supra. 
100, Except for a technical legal description of land to be conveyed, the Act read 
as follows: 
Whereas Francis T. Murtha, Trustee, and Hunting Towers Operating Co., In-
corporated, are owners in fee of certain fast land along the perimeter of Hunting 
Creek in the City of Alexandria; and Whereas, each claim riparian rights to con• 
tiguous acreage within such area; and 
Whereas, such owners wish to bulkhead most of the area within the riparian claim 
areas, and fill same with earth so that productive use may be made thereof; and 
Whereas, as the situation now exists, a health hazard is present, since such waters 
as remain are stagnant and will not support marine life, nor as same navigable 
to any extent; now, therefore, 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 
I. § I. The Governor and the Attorney General are hereby authorized in con-
sideration of the premises, and the payment into the General Fund of the Com-
monwealth of a sum to be fixed by tl1e Governor, not less than [sixty] thousand 
dollars, to e.xecute ••• a proper deed of conveyance ••. conveying ... all of the 
Commonwealth's right, title and interest in and to the following described prop-
erty: 
[Then there follows the legal description of the land to be conveyed, totalling 
slightly over !16 acres]. 
Act of March 31, 1964, ch. 546, [1964] Va. Acts 825. 
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tain features of the legislative process have been made public and 
they suggest a familiar pattern. On February 14, 1964, a bill was 
reported out of the Virginia House Committee on the Chesapeake 
and its Tributaries.101 The bill passed the House unanimously on 
February 28-a day on which a total of 100 bills were considered 
by the Virginia House. Two weeks later, the bill unanimously passed 
the Senate, on a day on which there were 59 other bills before that 
body.102 There is no indication that any debate or controversy over 
the bill took place in either house of the legislature, nor does it 
appear that the matter was brought to public attention.103 
That lack of attention is not surprising, for the bill, which be-
came law on March 31, 1964, was written in such restrictive language 
that even the most alert legislator would probably not have realized 
the extent of the private benefit that the legislature was bestowing.104 
Indeed, legislation of this kind is not an easy target for even the 
most skeptical court. The statute in question not only removes the 
opportunity to cast doubt upon the legislature's desire to convey 
the particular tract of land, but purports not to be a grant of the 
public domain at all. It speaks of existing private claims of riparian 
right to the tract and appears as if it is nothing more than authority 
for a quitclaim conveyance to clear up a technically troublesome title 
problem, rather than a disposition of public trust land. 
It is true that there was some question as to the ownership of 
the land in the Virginia situation, for there had been a good deal of 
siltation along the low water mark. Thus, the private parties in-
volved had at least a colorable legal claim of ovmership by accretion 
of some of the tract authorized to be conveyed under the Act. But 
the mere existence of their claim should not allay concern with the 
legislation, for one would think it routine practice in a case of this 
kind to obtain a legal opinion from the state attorney general. If he 
found that ownership by accretion had accrued to the upland owner, 
the state could be expected to recognize that owner's right without 
any substantial charge. Conversely, if the state found that the area 
in question was a part of its public trust, a question would necessarily 
be raised by the legislature's willingness to convey it for private 
101. Fairfa.x County (Va.) Journal Standard, Sept. 12, 1968, at I, col. 5. 
102. Id. 
103. One local state legislator replied to newspaper inquiries about the passage of 
the legislation, by saying that she voted for the bill because "as far as I was aware or 
informed there was no objection in any quarter to the proposal." Later she regretted 
her vote for the bill which was explained to her at the time, she said, as a measure 
that would permit productive use to be made of a useless tract of waste land. Id. 
104. See note 100 supra. 
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commercial purposes. In either event, it is difficult to understand 
why a minimum price of 60,000 dollars-about 1,600 dollars per 
acre-was found acceptable by the legislature since upland tracts 
adjacent to the disputed land were sold for high rise apartment 
developments at a cost of 144,000 dollars per acre.105 
It is possible to argue that 60,000 dollars was a proper price for 
the land, for it may be that the submerged lands would not be 
available for development unless permits were obtained from cer-
tain governmental agencies, such as the Corps of Engineers. If per-
mits are necessary, the argument runs, uncertainty about obtaining 
such permits must be reflected in the price of the land. But that 
argument is no more than a variant of the claim made in Gould 
that the Authority's conduct was justified because there were pres-
sures imposed by investment bankers. That a property is, or may 
be, ill-suited to private development should enhance the govern-
ment's doubts about removing the land from public trust uses and 
should not encourage disposal by the state at a very low price. That 
conclusion is valid especially when there is uncertainty about ob-
taining a federal permit, since one may assume that any reservations 
about the granting of a permit would be predicated upon the view 
that the proposed development is inconsistent with the public 
interest. 
However one analyzes the situation, the state's posture is un-
enviable, for there are only three possible conclusions that might 
be drawn and none of them justifies the legislation. First, it might be 
concluded that the state has clear ownership of the land, and there 
may be no real problem with obtaining a permit; in that case the 
legislation provides for an unreasonably low price for the disposition 
of trust land. Second, one might arrive at the conclusion that 60,000 
dollars is a proper price in light of anticipated difficulties in obtain-
ing a permit; but in that situation, the state is promoting a de-
velopment which probably does not conform with the public interest. 
Finally, it might be determined that the state does not own the 
land and that it is merely recognizing existing private rights; but 
then the state must be regarded as exacting a large price for the 
validation of a right which a citizen already holds. 
!vforeover, as with the Maryland situation, there are a variety of 
factors which cast doubts on the state's sensitivity to its obligations 
as a trustee. For example, there were no studies made by state agen-
105. THE PERMIT FOR. LANDFILL IN HUNTING CREEK: A DEBACLE IN CONSERVATION, 
H. REP. No. 91-113, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969); Ann Arbor News, March 16, 1969, at 
52, col. 1, 
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cies inquiring into the value of the land in question for public use. 
Similarly, the state did not attempt to satisfy itself as to the status 
of the riparian claims prior to enacting a law authorizing the grant. 
Finally, it is hard to determine why the governor, who had final 
authority to make or deny the grant, was unmoved by studies which 
led the Fish and Wildlife Service of the United States Department 
of the Interior to recommend against approval of a federal permit 
for residential development. Indeed, not only was the governor un-
moved, but he took the odd position that "an honorable commit-
ment has been made and ... I could hardly refuse to exercise the 
authority granted me by the General Assembly .... "106 
Because the legislation in question is quite specific, the question 
arises as to the potential for judicial intervention of the type which 
has developed in Massachusetts. It appears that there is room for 
such intervention, for the law did not itself operate to transfer the 
land; it simply authorized the governor and the attorney general to 
convey the tract and recognized the existence of private claims to 
riparian rights. It therefore seems perfectly appropriate to read the 
legislative intent as having imposed upon the governor and the attor-
ney general the duty to examine those riparian claims and then to 
make the conveyance, but only if those individuals are satisfied both 
that the riparian claims are valid and that recognizing them will not 
operate to impair the state's public trust obligation. Such a reading 
would be consistent with the principle that legislation involving trust 
lands is to be read, if possible, in conformity with the high sense of 
duty which the state has toward the administration of its trust lands. 
Furthermore, because the statute sets only a lower limit on the con-
veyance price, it could be read to mean that if the land is sold, the 
price must reflect the full market value of that land. Under this 
interpretation, the 60,000 dollar minimum price was established so 
that the public could not be economically disadvantaged by the 
transfer. Finally, the legislation might be read as authorizing the 
grant only if the governor satisfies himself that those state agencies 
upon whom the duty rests to manage public trust lands have ex-
amined the potential conveyance and have not raised substantial 
doubts as to its propriety.107 
106. Fairfax County (Va.) Journal Standard, Aug. 29, 1968, at l, col. 1. 
107. There is only one provision of the Act which indicates that there is a public 
benefit to be derived from the grant of the lands. That provision is the legislative find-
ing that "a health hazard is present, since such waters as remain are stagnant and will 
not support marine life, nor are same navigable to any extent." Act of March 31, 1964, 
ch. 546, [1964] Va. Acts 825. But that finding does not preclude reading the Act in one 
of the three ways suggested in the text for it merely suggests that the pr~sent conditions 
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Thus, there is a great deal of ingenuity which courts can use in 
dealing with factual contexts such as those in Maryland and Virginia. 
A recognition of that potential is important, not because it demon-
strates the scope of judicial cleverness, but because it indicates that 
public trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards for 
dealing with the public domain as it is a technique by which courts 
may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administra-
tive process. The public trust approach which has been developed 
in Massachusetts and the exercise in applying that approach to exist-
ing situations in Maryland and Virginia demonstrate that the public 
trust concept is, more than anything else, a medium for democratiza-
tion. To test that proposition further, it is useful to look at develop-
ments in those states which have the most amply developed case 
law in the public trust area-Wisconsin and California. Moreover, 
to indicate the breadth of the acceptance of responsibility by the 
courts for guarding public lands, public trust developments in other 
states will be examined. 
B. The Public Trust in Wisconsin 
I. The Early Developments 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has probably made a more 
conscientious effort to rise above rhetoric and to work out a reason-
able meaning for the public trust doctrine than have the courts of 
any other state. The earliest case of importance in that jurisdiction 
is Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land and Improvement Company,108 
which, like so much early litigation, contains the strong implication 
of legislative corruption. That case involved a promoter who ap-
parently asserted title to the land underlying Muskego Lake, and 
who obtained passage of a law which permitted him to drain it;109 
the basis for the law was a statutory finding that the drainage was 
required for the preservation of public health. Suit was filed to 
are not satisfactory. If the land is retained by the state, the governor may always 
promote conective or reconstructive work by state agencies in order to restore the 
area for traditional public uses as part of the recreational public domain. 
108. 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896). 
109. The ownership situation is not an unusual one under state water law. A private 
party may own submerged land in a lake or stream, with the overlying water held in 
trust by the state for public use. Thus, a fisherman may be entitled to float over the 
riparian's land, but not have the right to get out and walk over the bottom. See Annot., 
57 A.L.R.2d 569 (1958); Reis, Policy and Planning for Recreational Use of Inland 
Waters, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 155, 157 (1967). It is in light of this peculiar legal rule that 
granting an owner of bottomland the authority to drain the overlying body of water 
can be viewed as a divestment of the state's trusteeship obligation. 
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enjoin the drainage scheme, and the defense made the conventional 
claim that a legislative determination of public purpose is conclusive 
on the judiciary. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected that 
claim, holding that the final determination of whether a particular 
act is for a public or a private purpose must be made by the judiciary. 
Accordingly, the court examined the statute and found it to be 
invalid because it was for "private purposes and for the sole benefit 
of private parties."110 The court was struck by the recognition that 
if the state had power ... to convey and relinquish ... all its right, 
title, and interest in and to all lands lying ,;vi.thin the limits of 
Muskego Lake, then it may, in a similar manner, convey and re-
linquish to private persons or corporations all such right, title, and 
interest in and to every one of the 1,240 lakes in Wisconsin.111 
Such an extension, the court concluded, simply could not be viewed 
as a lawful exercise of legislative power by a sovereign which held 
such resources in trust for the public. The direct holding of Priewe 
is of limited utility, for few cases arise in such blatant form as to 
justify a finding of fraudulent legislative purpose and a total absence 
of public benefit. The case is, however, more extensive than Illinois 
Central, for the Wisconsin court directly overruled a clear statutory 
declaration to which the legislature adhered. More important, the 
court recognized, albeit sketchily, that the evaluation of resource 
policy cannot be adequately effectuated by viewing each disposition 
or development in isolation from the other public resources in the 
state or region. That need to view the total resource context has 
become increasingly important in contemporary controversies over 
wetlands policy112 and over large systems such as San Francisco 
Bay.us 
The next two cases to come before the Wisconsin court also in-
volved proposals to drain wetlands for agricultural reclamation, 
although in neither case was the setting as extreme as that in Priewe. 
In both cases, applications were made to drain low lying swamp 
lands along the Mississippi River. The major purpose was to make 
the lands available for productive agriculture, but there was also a 
desire to straighten channels in order to improve navigation. An 
inquiry into the proposals was made by a state commission as is 
110. 93 Wis. at 552, 67 N.W. at 922. 
111. 93 Wis. at 551, 67 N.W. at 922. 
112. See Permit for Landfill in Hunting Creek, Va., Hearings, supra note 71, at 
67-8; &tuarine Areas, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries Wildlife Con-
seroation, House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
See notes 139, 185 infra. 
113. See text accompanying notes 183-90 infra, 
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required in Wisconsin, and the report of the commission was 
brought before the court for confirmation. 
In the first case,114 the court found that the drainage scheme was 
within the appropriate bounds of legislative activity and therefore 
valid, but the court demonstrated that it was concerned with the 
adverse impact that the scheme would have on fishing and hunting. 
The decision, unfortunately, is bereft of factual analysis and the 
opinion is comprised of conclusory language: 
Can it be said ... that the state in authorizing this drainage scheme 
. . . has infringed on the public rights of fishing and hunting in 
violation of the trust . . . ? To constitute such an infringement 
. . . it must appear . . . that there is an unauthorized impair-
ment . . . . True, fishing and hunting will be somewhat impaired 
. . . but not to an extent amounting to a substantial infringe-
ment of the right when considered in connection with the regula-
tion and guarding of the other public interests here involved.115 
Although the opinion itself is only a medley of conclusions, the 
decision implicitly takes a most important step, for it recognizes a 
judicial responsibility to examine legislative authority not only for 
its general conformity to the scope of regulatory power, but also for 
its consonance with the state's special obligation to maintain the 
public trust. 
The significance of the majority opinion in this respect is re-
vealed by the concurring opinion, in which two justices expressed 
impatience with the very thought that the court might take it upon 
itself to balance the public right in fishing or hunting against a 
governmental determination which is within the bounds of legisla-
tive authority.116 To those judges, judicial intervention in maintain-
ing any particular balance of uses was unwarranted. They argued 
that since the state has an unquestioned right to improve navigation 
by straightening channels, 
it cannot be restrained in the exercise of that right by the mere 
fact the fishing will be substantially damaged. The right of the state 
114. In re Trempealeau Drainage District: Merwin v. Houghton, 146 Wis. 398, 131 
N.W. 838 (1911). 
115. 146 Wis. at 410, 131 N.W. at 841-42. 
116. It is significant that the court was not being asked to pass upon a specific 
legislative determination, but only upon the exercise by an administrative commission 
of a broad legislative authority. Thus, had the court been alert to the sort of technique 
which the Massachusetts court utilized in dealing with agency action, it might not 
have put the issue in such stark terms. Nonetheless, both the majority and the con• 
curring opinions did view the case as one in which the court was being asked to pass 
upon a legislative decision, and for purposes of analysis it is their perception of the 
case which is critical. 
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to better its navigable waterways is· supreme. If there be a resulting 
impairment of the quality of the fishing in the navigable stream as 
improved, even to the point of practical extinction, this is a loss 
which the public must endure without complaint.117 
It was the unwillingness of the majority to acquiesce in this attempt 
to eliminate judicial scrutiny of legislative decisions that laid the 
groundwork for modern public trust litigation in Wisconsin. Un-
fortunately, the approach which the court took caused it to ignore 
one very interesting element of the case, an element that has taken 
on great importance in more recent public trust litigation.118 The 
question which the court failed to answer was whether it made any 
difference that the proposal under consideration was meant to reclaim 
swamp land for agricultural purposes rather than for a traditional 
water-related use such as navigation improvement. Although the 
commission's report suggested that agricultural reclamation was 
really the purpose of the plan, the decision focused upon navigation. 
That focus may indicate at least that the court was more comfortable 
with a transference from one water-related use to another than it 
would be with a change to a nontraditional use. 
The second case arose in 1924 and involved a proposed levee 
project to reclaim wetland that had been used for fishing and hunt-
ing.119 The opinion in this case shows no greater judicial inclination 
for factual analysis than that in the previous case; but the court did 
appear quite anxious to protect the public trust, and the opinion is 
reminiscent of the Massachusetts cases120 in that there is a clear 
disenchantment with administrative agencies. The state commission 
which had recommended the drainage proposal reported that 
"public rights of trapping, hunting, fishing, and navigation will, by 
no means, be wholly destroyed."121 The court seized upon that state-
ment to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the commission. 
Underscoring the- commission's use of the word "wholly," the court 
said that the report thus implied "that there will be substantial 
destruction of these rights. It [the commission] sought to justify it by 
stating that the compensatory public benefits may largely exceed 
the actual damage suffered by such other public rights."122 The 
court then found that justification to be unacceptable: 
117. 146 Wis. at 411, 131 N.W. at 842. 
118. See notes 134-39, 211-20 infra and accompanying text. 
119. In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 182 Wis. 404, 196 N.W. 
874, cert. denied, 264 U.S. 598 (1924). 
120. See text accompanying notes 73-92 supra. 
121. 182 Wis. at 406, 196 N.W. at 875. 
122. 182 Wis. at 415, 196 N.W. at 878. 
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By compensatory public benefits must be meant the benefit ac-
cruing to the public by having this land reduced to an agricultural 
state, for there is no serious claim or showing that the present 
condition of the district is injurious or dangerous to public health. 
But, as has already been pointed out, it does not lie within the 
power of the railroad commission or of this court or of the state to 
change navigable waters into agricultural fields, no matter how great 
the public benefits might be in favor of the latter.123 
The language which the court used is certainly too strong to 
stand as an absolute rule against every possible contingency which 
a legislature might face.124 But as the concept has subsequently been 
used by the court, it has become a most interesting and sophisticated 
judicial effort to grapple with legislative and administrative imper-
fections. The Wisconsin court has thus been able to combat the 
tendency of the legislature and of administrative agencies to sub-
ordinate diffuse public advantages to pressing private interests. 
If the Wisconsin approach is to be properly appraised, it is es-
sential to understand the disadvantages under which courts have 
traditionally labored when dealing with cases such as those involv-
ing public trust lands. Those disadvantages arise because courts are 
accustomed to dealing with the meaning of statutory and constitu-
tional language rather than with data which help to identify and 
compare the benefits and costs at stake in the cases before them. 
Therefore, the courts have had to fashion for themselves guidelines 
123. 182 Wis. at 415, 196 N.W. at 878. Some courts have taken a very narrow view 
of their trust responsibility. For example, in Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 
159 (1930), it was held that "real and substantial relation to a paramount trust purpose" 
must be shown before the state may enjoin encroachments in navigable waters by 
riparian owners. 252 Mich. at 225, 233 N.W. at 168. Even Michigan, however, seems to 
be retreating from the restrictive view announced in Hilt. Township of Grosse Ile v. 
Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App. 556, 566, 167 N.W .2d 311, 316 (1969). 
124. The court's enthusiasm for the trust was unbounded. Turning to the language 
of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (the governing document of the territory from 
which 'Wisconsin was carved), and its mandate that navigable waters remain "as com-
mon highways and forever free," the court said, "[f]rom our acceptance of the pro-
visions ••• of the Ordinance of 1787 it follows that it is not a question of state policy 
as to whether or not we shall preserve inviolate our navigable waters. ·we are by 
organic law compelled to do so •••• And this trust we cannot diminish or abrogate 
by any act of our own." 182 Wis. at 409, 196 N.W. at 876. See WIS. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 1, incorporating the language of the Northwest Ordinance. 
The Northwest Ordinance provision is part of the organic law of a number of 
states, but it has elsewhere been much more narrowly interpreted as being intended to 
"prohibit only the imposition of duties for the use of navigation and any discrimination 
denying to citizens or other states the equal right to such use." Willamette Iron Bridge 
Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 10 (1888). See Nedtweg v. Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 20, 208 N.W. 
51, 53-4 (1927). Cf. Witke v. State Conservation Commn., 244 Iowa 261, 56 N.W .2d 582 
(1953) (holding invalid a law requiring payment of a fee to operate a water taxi on a 
lake which the state had not improved; the court found that no fee may be required 
for the exercise of the public right of navigation). 
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which will permit the court either to filter out cases in which there 
is a rather clear loss to the public interest or to thrust back upon 
administrative agencies or legislatures the responsibility to adduce 
persuasive evidence that the public interest is not being neglected. 
Sometimes courts will require that a record be made and data col-
lected in order to satisfy the court directly that every important 
interest is adequately considered. A court may also, as was seen in 
the Massachusetts litigation,125 adopt an approach which requires 
that there be an open and explicit legislative decision, so that a 
proposal will be tested against the wishes of an informed public. 
Finally, a court may serve notice that the public benefits from cer-
tain kinds of projects are so inherently unclear that such projects 
should not be advanced unless it can be shown that they are in 
fact necessary or desirable from the perspective of the public in-
terest. 
In the three early cases just discussed, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court adopted the last of these approaches. Its opinions, sensitively 
read, can be taken as a form of notice to the legislature and the 
agencies that when the public interest of a project is unclear, its 
proponents will have the burden of justifying the project and will 
not be allowed to rely on traditional presumptions of legislative 
propriety or administrative discretion. In adopting this position, 
the court does not seek a confrontation with the legislature nor 
does it attempt to substitute itself as an ultimate judge of the public 
good. Rather, it tries to identify and correct those situations in which 
it is most likely that there has been an inequality of access to, and 
influence with, decision makers so that there is a grave danger that 
the democratic processes are not working effectively. To safeguard 
against such danger, the court has warned the other branches of 
government that they must be prepared to justify their position. 
The Wisconsin court will require that such a showing of justification 
be made whenever resources which are generally available to the 
public without cost are, in any significant way, subordinated to a 
more limited set of private interests. 
2. Refining the Basic Concept 
When the Wisconsin court first developed the concept that pub-
lic trust lands can be devoted to private uses only if there is a clear 
justification for the change, it adopted a rather blunt approach. The 
nature of 'that approach is clearly demonstrated by the 1924 case 
discussed above, In re Crawford County Levee and Drainage District 
125. See text accompanying notes 77-92 supra. , 
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No. 1.126 In that case, the Wisconsin court took the position that 
navigable waters available to the whole public could never be con-
verted to private farmland. Such an approach was far too inflexible. 
The court began that process of refinement in 1927 when the 
city of Milwaukee made an exchange of land with a private steel 
company in order to obtain shoreland for development of the city's 
harbor. The attorney general sought to have the exchange enjoined 
on the ground that public trust land could not be granted to a pri-
vate corporation. This case, City of Milwaukee v. State,127 presented 
an excellent opportunity for the court to modify the position it 
had taken three years earlier, for the exchange was economically 
fair and the goal of developing a public harbor was of considerable 
benefit to the whole of the affected public. Moreover, as the court 
pointed out, the loss of swimming and fishing in the area to be given 
the steel company was extremely modest and those activities could 
easily be engaged in at nearby areas which would not be filled.128 
The project would not restrict public navigation but would ac-
tually promote it. It was therefore proper that the court eschewed 
such narrow considerations as whether any particular acre would 
be lost to public recreation, but rather examined the broad impact 
of the transaction upon public uses in general. The court first noted 
that the case did, after all, involve Lake Michigan, so the filling 
of a relatively few acres would not have a substantial impact on 
local public uses.129 Then the court turned to the extreme language 
of Crawford County,130 and drew a distinction between that case 
and the one before the court. By drawing that distinction, the court 
indicated the means by which it would thereafter identify projects 
unlikely to be in accord with the public interest. "There," the court 
said, "a considerable area would have lost its original character"131 
126. 182 Wis. 404, 196 N.W. 874, cert. denied, 264 U.S. 598 (1924). See text accom-
panying notes ll9-23 supra. 
127. 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927). 
128. 193 Wis. at 432, 447, 214 N.W. at 823, 829. 
129. A wharf or pier extended out into one of our inland lakes for a distance of 
1,500 feet could not be held to serve the purposes of promoting navigation; on the 
contrary, it would be considered an obstruction thereto. On the other hand, when 
we consider the vastness of the area of these Great Lakes, such as Lake Michigan, 
and the primary purpose which they serve, such a projection cannot be held an 
obstruction to navigation, but an aid thereto. For the state to attempt to cede to 
an individual or corporation a stretch of land under water adjoining the uplands 
of an inland navigable lake would on its face clearly violate our constitutional 
provision; but when it comes to Lake Michigan, and when we consider the main 
purpose of this large body of water, such a cession, when made in the interests of 
navigation, presents an entirely different aspect. 
193 Wis. at 447, 214 N.W. at 829. 
130. See te.xt accompanying note 123 supra. 
131. 193 Wis. at 449, 214 N.W. at 830. 
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as a public resource, and much of what had been freely available to 
the public would be set aside for private uses. In Crawford County, 
as in the earlier Priewe case, "consummation of the scheme would 
have materially affected the rights of the public to the navigable 
waters of the lakes, considering their size, depth, and the purposes 
for which they were primarily adapted."132 
Thus, the court implied that it will be hesitant to approve any 
transaction in which broad public rights are set aside in favor of 
more limited, or private, rights. And approval will certainly not be 
forthcoming if there is no persuasive justification for the transaction. 
The court did not, however, indicate that it will substitute judicial 
policy making for legislative action, or that it intends to interfere 
with legislative freedom to adapt public policy to a changing world. 
To make that fact clear, the court concluded its analysis with the 
following observation: 
The trust reposed in the state is not a passive trust; it is govern-
mental, active and administrative. Representing the state in its legis-
lative capacity, the legislature is fully vested with the power of 
control and regulation. The equitable title to those submerged lands 
vests in the public at large, while the legal title vests in the state, 
restricted only by the trust, and the trust, being both active and 
administrative, requires the law-making body to act in all cases 
where action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust, but to pro-
mote it. As has heretofore been shown, the condition confronting 
the legislature was not a theory but a £act. This condition required 
positive action, and the legislature wisely and well discharged its 
duties .... 133 
The principle which the court established in Milwaukee has served 
it well in subsequent cases. The approach developed there has since 
been further refined, but has not been significantly modified. 
The Wisconsin court was not faced with another important 
trust case until 1957, when the case of State v. Public Service Com-
mission134 arose. In that case, the City of Madison, which owned a 
park fronting a recreational lake with connecting lagoons, wanted to 
fill part of a lagoon, to remove an existing bridge, to fill a portion 
of the lake bed and use it for parking of cars, enlargement of the 
beach area, and relocation of highways, to open a new waterway 
between the lake and the lagoon, and to build a new bridge.mi 
The city's plan had been approved by the state administrative 
132. 193 Wis. at 449, 214 N.W. at 830. 
133. 193 Wis. at 449, 214 N.W. at 830. 
134. 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957). 
135. 275 Wis. at 114, 81 N.W.2d at 72. 
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agency, but suit was brought by the attorney general who claimed 
that because the fill would destroy navigation pro tanto, the project 
violated the trust doctrine. 
The court's findings, however, led it to reject the doctrinaire 
position that the attorney general had advocated. The court found 
that the project would provide a more substantial bathing beach 
and better park facilities for the convenience of park users. The 
court further found that only I to I¼ per cent of the lake area was 
to be filled, and that, although fish production would be reduced by 
some 200 pounds per year and navigation would be destroyed in the 
four acres actually filled, navigation in general would be promoted 
by the new connection to be built. Citing Priewe, Crawford County, 
and Milwaukee, the court then said that while the trust doctrine 
prevented a grant for a purely private purpose, and "even for a 
public purpose, the state could not change an entire lake into dry 
land nor alter it so as to destroy its character as a lake,"136 nonethe-
less "the trust doctrine does not prevent minor alterations of the 
natural boundaries between water and land."137 Accordingly, the 
court held that Madison's plan did not violate the trust doctrine. 
In reaching that conclusion the court relied upon five factors, the 
statement of which comes as close as judicial statement has to a 
specific enumeration of a set of rules for implementation of the 
public trust doctrine: 
I. Public bodies will control the use of the area. 
2. The area will be devoted to public purposes and open to the 
public. 
3. The diminution of lake area will be very small when compared 
with the whole of Lake Wingra. 
4. No one of the public uses of the lake as a lake will be destroyed 
or greatly impaired. 
5. The disappointment of those members of the public who may 
desire to boat, fish, or swim in the area to be filled is negligible 
when compared with the greater convenience to be afforded 
those members of the public who use the city park.138 
It is important to note that the comparison which the court made 
in the third factor is not with the whole of the state's lake resources, 
136. 275 Wis. at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 74. 
137. 275 Wis. at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 74. See Ocean Beach Realty Co. v. Miami Beach, 
106 Fla. 392, 143 S. 301 (1932), noted in 12 ORE. L. R.Ev. 166 (1932), in which it was 
held permissible to widen a road by taking part of a beach area, since the activity 
would improve access to the area; King v. City of Dallas, 374 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. Civ • 
.App. 1964), in which widening a road and bridge was allowed since the state would 
thereby develop the park to its fullest extent. 
1!18. 275 Wis. at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 73, 
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but with the particular resource at issue. Thus, the court im-
plicitly recognized the problem which would be raised by a test that 
required demonstrable infringement of recreational water uses in 
the state as a whole,139 and it was unwilling to adopt an approach 
which would require it to examine the effects of a particular change 
on the entire resources of the state. There is, however, every reason 
to believe that if the appropriate agency can present a persuasive 
regional plan for development, the court will not block the plan 
merely because its nature is regional. 
The five factors set out by the court comprise a useful approach 
to the relationship between the court and administrative agencies. 
Rather than blindly accepting agency decisions as an appropriate 
exercise of discretion, or forcing the agency to demonstrate its cor-
rectness in every case, the court announced certain guidelines. The 
court is willing to accept the expertise of administrative agencies 
within a broad range of decision making. But the court clearly 
indicated that when agencies transgress those limits, the court will 
demand something more than administrative ipse dixit. The result 
of this judicial technique is to force the agency to show, from time to 
time, that it does indeed have the qualifications-the expertise and 
the concern for the public interest-which it claims to possess. More-
over, agencies and legislatures are given an incentive to develop 
state and regional plans and to seek out information to identify, 
evaluate, and compare the elements which determine the optimum 
public interest.140 
139. See note 112 supra, note 185 infra. The problem was e.xplicitly recognized in a 
recent Wisconsin case: 
There are over 9,000 navigable lakes in '\Visconsin covering an area of over 54,000 
square miles. A little fill here and there may seem to be nothing to become ex-
cited about. But one fill, comparatively inconsequential, may lead to another, 
and another, and before long a great body of water may be eaten away until it 
may no longer exist. Our navigable waters are a precious natural heritage; once 
they are gone, they disappear forever. 
Hixon v. Public Serv. Commn., 32 Wis. 2d 608, 631-32, 146 N.W.2d 577, 589 (1966). 
140. Such an incentive was the result of the court's holding in Town of Ashwau-
benon v. Public Serv. Commn., 22 Wis. 2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 647, reh. denied, 22 Wis. 2d 
55, 126 N.W .2d 567 (1964), which required that a commission re-evaluate its refusal 
to approve a bulkhead line for a town. The court's unwillingness to adopt a doc-
trinaire position is indicated by the majority opinion, in which the court noted that 
while "the proposed Ashwaubenon bulkhead line constitutes a greater intervention 
than has previously been approved by earlier decisions of this court in its evaluation 
of the trust doctrine,'' nevertheless the court was not willing, without further evidence, 
to hold as a matter of law that permission to fill some 137 acres in the Fox River was 
a violation of the trust. 22 Wis. 2d at 50, 125 N.W.2d at 653. The court has had some 
difficulty in deciding the point at which to call upon administrative agencies for 
further evidence; the Ashwaubenon case was decided 4-3, with the minority willing to 
uphold the commission on the ground that the proposal involved a "relatively gross 
invasion of the bed of the river." 22 Wis. 2d at 54, 125 N.W .2d at 656. In Hixon v. 
Public Serv. Commn., 32 Wis. 2d 608, 146 N.W .2d 577 (1966), the balance in the court 
January 1970] The Public Trust Doctrine 519 
If the cases are seen in this light-and a careful reading of the 
cases as a whole supports such an interpretation-rather than as 
instances of rigid and unbending judicial doctrine, then it can be 
concluded that the Wisconsin courts will not adhere unyieldingly 
to a particular set of constraints. But in order for a court to change 
those constraints, it must be persuaded that the points at which it 
would othenvise become skeptical are inappropriate ones at which 
to test the public interest. Thus, if the commission should respond 
to cases like State v. Public Service Commission by showing the court 
that any or all of its five tests are not useful guidelines, but that 
public interest problems are more usefully examined by reference 
to other factors, the court would undoubtedly modify its position. 
Indeed, the next case that came before the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, City of Madison v. State,141 indicates that it is seeking to de-
velop a workable test of agency misconduct or heedlessness, rather 
than some rigidly doctrinaire formula. In that case, the court's pre-
vious formulation of the "uses of the lake as a lake" and "character 
as a lake" standards were put to a more difficult test. The city sought 
to fill about six acres of submerged shoreland in Lake Monona to 
build an auditorium and civic center building. The project was 
held to have been authorized by state legislation and the court was 
therefore squarely faced with the question whether such a project 
was constitutional under the public trust doctrine. 
The auditorium, as planned, was to include a theater, an exhibi-
tion hall, a food service area, and boating facilities. The setting was 
at a point on the shore adjacent to a steep embankment where public 
access had been extremely limited, and it was found that the project 
had shifted and the court upheld, on a very slender record, the commission's denial 
to a littoral owner of permission to maintain a breakwater reaching 75 feet into the 
lake. However, a little uncertainty as to the position of the court does no great harm; 
at worst it encourages the agencies to build records for their own protection. As the 
courts are presented with more ample administrative findings and evidence, they will 
be better able to identify genuine problem cases. See Town of Hamilton v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Util., 346 Mass. 130, 137, 190 N.E.2d 545, 550 (1963) ("The department's 
right to utilize its 'technical competence and specialized knowledge in the evaluation 
of the evidence' may be reflected ••. in the specific findings; it does not make specific 
findings unnecessary.''). 
Florida has one of the most elaborate statutory schemes for regulating city actions 
which set bulkhead lines. Not only do the trustees of the Internal Improvement 
Fund, an administrative agency, have authority to approve or reject such lines, but 
the Board of Conservation may require "a biological survey and ecological study and 
hydrographic survey" of the proposed bulkhead line. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.122 (Supp. 
1969). "Any person, natural or artificial, aggrieved" by any such decision is granted a 
right of review by the circuit court on petition of certiorari. See text accompanying 
notes 236-42 infra. 
141. I Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957). 
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would not materially interfere with boating on the lake. Al-
though the court did find the project to be permissible, it did not 
rest its conclusion on these considerations. Similarly, the court was 
not satisfied, as the trial court had been, with the assertion that "the 
state's trust in respect to land under navigable waters may be ad-
ministered not only for the purpose of improving navigation but 
also for other public purposes so long as public rights of navigation 
therein are not substantially interfered with."142 The court recog-
nized that to approve the project simply because it fulfilled a public 
purpose would be to deny that the state has any special obligation 
with respect to trust property. It saw also that to limit its inquiry to 
whether there would be substantial interference with navigation 
would open the way to enormous changes in the use of the lake, and 
would be inconsistent with the general trend of the trust law which 
the court had been developing. 
In light of these considerations, the court's handling of the facts 
was imaginative and was considerate of the state's trust obligations. 
The court began with the authorizing statute, which granted the city 
the right "to construct and maintain on, in or over said Lake 
Monona ... parks, playgrounds, bathing beaches, municipal boat-
houses, piers, wharves, public buildings, highways, streets, pleasure 
drives, and boulevards."143 If the statute were read narrowly, as the 
state argued it should be read, the authority for "public buildings" 
would be limited to uses of buildings which were related in some 
degree to the improvement of the use and enjoyment of Lake 
Monona.144 According to that view, a boathouse or locker facility 
for swimmers would be acceptable, but an auditorium or museum 
would not be. If, on the other hand, the statute were read broadly, 
the term "public building" would be very expansive and would 
include a "municipal office building, fire or police station."1411 The 
court chose to steer between those two poles. It first found that the 
legislation was meant to authorize a public building of the type 
proposed. It then held that such a building "is not so unrelated to 
the use and enjoyment of the lake as to be outside the scope of the 
term 'public buildings' as used in"146 the statute, and that the re-
lationship between the proposed building and the uses of the lake 
was sufficient to validate such an authorization under the public 
142. I Wis. 2d at 256, 83 N.W.2d at 677. 
143. 1 Wis. 2d at 258, 83 N.W.2d at 677. 
144. 1 Wis. 2d at 258, 83 N.W.2d at 677. 
145. 1 Wis. 2d at 258, 83 N.W.2d at 678. 
146. I Wis. 2d at 258, 83 N.W.2d at 678. 
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trust doctrine. The court found that, because the building was to 
be set at the bottom of a steep grade where there were already 
railroad tracks, the appeal of the area, when viewed from the lake, 
would probably be improved. Moreover, the purposes of the build-
ing were themselves recreational and would accord with recreational 
uses of the lake, including provision of a vantage point from which 
the beauties of the lake could be enjoyed. Since the facilities would 
therefore enhance each other, the court found "no conflict between 
the purposes for which the proposed building [would] be used and 
the purposes of the other facilities .... "147 
With this formulation, the court sophisticated its earlier concept 
that the lake must be used as a lake. Rather than restricting its view 
solely to water-oriented uses, it looked to conflict or compatibility 
among the various uses. This approach maintains for the court the 
opportunity to focus upon the specific facts of a case. 
In its own way, and with its own doctrinal development, the 
Wisconsin court accomplished essentially the same goal that was 
achieved, through different legal mechanisms, by the Massachusetts 
court.148 Thus, the doctrine which a court adopts is not very im-
portant; rather, the court's attitudes and outlook are critical. The 
"public trust" has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is 
no more-and no less-than a name courts give to their concerns 
about the insufficiencies of the democratic process. If, in the Monona 
Lake case, the Wisconsin court had found that the civic center pro-
posal was not legitimately attuned to the public interests, it could 
have adopted the Massachusetts technique and decided the case by 
finding that the statute authorizing "public buildings" was not to be 
interpreted to allow a civic center unless there was a specific new 
law to that effect. In that way, the court would effectively have sent 
the case back for reconsideration by the legislature in light of in-
creased public attention, and thus bolstered the political position of 
the objectors. 
The Wisconsin court has also developed another method for 
safeguarding public trust lands. Under this approach, the court 
does not rest upon the public trust doctrine, but instead expresses 
its concern for the public interest by holding that the governmental 
body whose decisions are at stake was not adequately representative 
of the public interest. Thus, for example, a questionable municipal 
act may be invalidated on the legal ground that the subject matter 
147. l Wis. 2d at 259, 83 N.W.2d at 678. 
148. See text accompanying notes 63-92 supra. 
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at stake is of statewide concern and can therefore be implemented 
only by the state legislature. 
There are two significant Wisconsin cases in which this technique 
has been adopted. In City of Madison v. Tolzmann,149 the substance 
of the litigation was rather minor, but the principle and the judicial 
technique are important. The city had imposed a requirement that 
every boat owner obtain a municipal license and pay an annual 
license fee. The court held that requirement unconstitutional on 
the ground that the use of navigable waters was a matter of statewide 
concern and could be legislated upon only by the state. The effect 
of the case is to withhold from local governments the opportunity 
to affect the use of trust properties in such a manner as to favor 
excessively localized interests.150 
The other case in which the same technique was adopted has 
a much more significant factual setting and is more complex in its 
doctrine. This case, Muench v. Public Service Commission.151 in-
volved an application by a private power company to build a dam on 
the Namekagon River. The case arose upon an appeal from the 
decision of the commission to permit the project. The commission 
had made no findings on, and had not considered, the effect that 
the proposed project would have on public rights to hunting, fish-
ing, and scenic beauty. The com~ission had not considered those 
issues because the power company had obtained the approval of the 
county board in the county where the dam was to be located, and 
under a Wisconsin statute, such approval precluded the commission's 
consideration of the effect of the dam on public recreational rights.152 
149. 7 Wis. 2d 570, 97 N.W.2d 513 (1959). 
150. Wisconsin subsequently enacted a boating regulation law by which the state 
attempted, without much success, to produce statewide control. See Cutler, Chaos or 
Uniformity in Boating Regulations? The State as Trustee of Navigable Waters, 1965 
Wis. L. REV. 311. For a more effective law, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.1001-.1199 
(Supp. 1969). For other examples of this approach, see Anderson v. Mayor &: Council 
of Wilmington, Civil No. 885 (Ch., New Castle County, Del. Jan. 9, 1958); Baker v. 
City of Norwalk, No. 6269 (Super. Ct., Fairfield County at Stamford, Conn. Dec. 4, 
1963); City of Torrington v. Coles, No. 16,984 (Super. Ct., Litchfield County, Conn. 
Nov. 30, 1964) (cities holding parkland donated by citizens may not dispose of it with-
out state legislation authorizing such disposition). 
151. 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, reh., 261 Wis. 515c, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952). 
152. The statute provided that: 
[I]n case of a dam or flowage located outside the boundaries of a state park or 
state forest no permit shall be denied on the ground that the construction of 
such proposed dam will violate the public right to the enjoyment of fishing, 
hunting, or natural scenic beauty if the county board ..• of the county ••• in 
which the proposed dam[s] ••• are located by a two-thirds vote approve the con-
struction of such dam. 
261 Wis. at 514, 53 N.W.2d at 524. 
January 1970] The Public Trust Doctrine 523 
On appeal, the project's opponents claimed that the statute was un-
constitutional in that it delegated to local county boards control over 
the public trust of the whole state. They argued that since the public 
trust is a matter of statewide concern, authority over it could not be 
so delegated. The court agreed, held the statute unconstitutional, 
and remanded the case for reconsideration of all the relevant issues. 
The court in 111:uench clearly went beyond its Tolzmann de-
cision, for by holding unconstitutional a delegation by the legisla-
ture, the court took the position that it must protect the legislature 
from itself and from its temptation to succumb to pressures of purely 
local interests. The court required the legislature to respond to a 
statewide constituency-another form of judicially imposed de-
mocratization. But to hold the delegation of power unconstitutional 
is not to hold that the legislature, acting on its own, could IJ,ot ap-
prove the dam despite its potential adverse consequences for scenic 
or recreational uses. Thus, using another of the flexible tools at its 
command, the court goes no farther than to thrust the burden of 
direct and publicly visible action on the lawmakers.153 
Thus, the Wisconsin court has developed two useful approaches 
through which it safeguards the public interest in trust lands. First, 
it has specified criteria by which state dealings with such lands may 
be judged.154 Those criteria provide useful guidelines, and yet they 
are sufficiently flexible that courts may permit deviations in par-
ticular instances. Second, the court has recognized that trust lands 
are of statewide concern and that authority to deal with them cannot 
be delegated by the state legislature to any group which is less 
broadly based.m In this manner, the court has fulfilled its function 
as an ensurer of the efficacy of the democratic process. When the 
court sees potential abuses, it can easily require a more extensive 
examination; but it retains sufficient flexibility that it can permit 
projects which do not unduly interfere with the public's interest in 
the lands that are held in public trust.156 
153. It is instructive to note that this particular controversy was ultimately resolved 
by an even more broadly based agency than the state legislature; application for a 
license was filed by the company with the Federal Power Commission. The FPC denied 
the license on precisely the grounds which had been urged by objectors, but which 
had not been considered in the original state hearing before the state Public Service 
Commission-the "unique recreational values of the river." Namekagon Hydro Co., 
12 F.P.C. 203, 206, afjd., 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954). 
154. See text accompanying note 138 supra. 
155. See text accompanying notes 141-47 supra. 
156. Some of the more recent cases are discussed in note 140 supra. See generally 
Cutler, supra note 150; Waite, Public Rights To Use and Have Access to Navigable 
Waters, 1958 WJS. L. REv. 335. 
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C. The Public Trust in California 
For over a hundred years, there have been efforts to utilize Cal-
ifornia's valuable shoreline resources along the Pacific coast and 
,vithin San Francisco Bay. Those efforts have given rise to a large 
body of judicial decisions, legislative acts, and constitutional amend-
ments dealing with the public trust.157 Because California originally 
chose to convey certain of its trust lands to private interests and 
municipalities,158 its public trust law has evolved in a way that is 
quite distinct from the Wisconsin developments. 
Legal questions about the trust in California have arisen in a 
variety of separable contexts. The courts have examined the obliga-
tions of private grantees and lessees of trust lands, the obligations 
of municipal grantees who were invested with legal title and to 
whom were delegated the state's duties as trustee, and the public 
trust obligations of the state itself. To understand the California 
situation, it is necessary to consider each of these elements of the 
trust doctrine independently. It should, however, be kept in mind 
that there is a degree of interdependence among these elements: the 
obligations imposed upon the state will have an important bearing 
on the obligations to be imposed on the state's grantees. 
I. The Obligations of Private Grantees 
The earliest phase of California trust law, the period of state 
grants of trust lands to private citizens, began in 1855 and ended 
with the adoption of the 1879 Constitution. That Constitution 
marked the beginning of the era of express legislative concern for 
157. For the history regarding California's dealings with its trust lands and a dis-
cussion of the legal problems which that history raises, see M. ScoIT, THE FUTURE 
OF SAN FRA.Ncrsco BAY (Inst. of Govtl. Studies, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Sept. 1963); San 
Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Commn., San Francisco Bay Plan Supple-
ment 411-48 (January 1969) [hereinafter B.C.D.C. Supp.]; Comment, San Francisco Bay: 
Regional Regulation for Its Protection and Development, 55 CALIF, L. REv. 728 (1967). 
See also JOINT Co11u,r. ON TIDELANDS, CALIFORNIA'S TIDELAND TRUSTS, A REPORT 'IO THE 
LEGISLATURE (4 vols. 1965). 
158. Except for conveyances made by early Spanish or Mexican gTants, all California 
land was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. 
Submerged lands and tidelands were held by the United States subject to the public 
trust, and when California became a state in 1850, that trust passed to the state. Pol-
lard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845); LeRoy v. Dunkerly, 54 Cal. 
452, 455 (1880). Also in 1850, the United States transferred swamplands in the public 
domain to certain states, including California. See note 164 infra. California began 
selling these lands for $1 an acre in 1855. 
At present 22% of the San Francisco Bay has been sold to private interests and 23% 
to local governments; 5% is owned by the federal government. The remaining 50% is 
held by the state. B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 413-14. 
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the trust.159 The deeds issued under laws enacted prior to 1879160 
took the form of conveyances of the fullest private property interest, 
the fee simple absolute.161 The grants made under these laws were 
numerous and sometimes very extensive, running at times far into 
deep water in San Francisco Bay. Not surprisingly, the question 
was soon raised whether and to what extent the recipients of such 
titles had the right to extinguish the historic public right of naviga-
tion and fishery. 
In 1864 the California Supreme Court handed down the first of 
a series of decisions which have the familiar ring of the Massachu-
setts and Wisconsin cases. The court was aware of the extent to 
which public officials could-particularly in those free-wheeling 
days-be prevailed upon to deal with the public domain in a rather 
cavalier fashion; 162 and accordingly the court adopted the approach 
of a skeptically narrow reading of legislative intent. 
Despite the seeming absoluteness of both the statutes authorizing 
the grants and the deeds themselves, the court found several grounds 
upon which to invalidate or hold voidable conveyances of tidelands 
159. The 1879 Constitution provided that "all tidelands within two miles of any 
incorporated city or town, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary, bay, or 
inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to 
private parties, partnerships, or corporations." Art. XV, § 3. Some sales of tidelands 
beyond the two-mile limit were made after 1880, but in 1909 the legislature passed a 
general statute preventing all tideland sales to private parties. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE 
§ 7991 (West 1956). 
The term "tidelands" is often used generically to cover all the state trust lands in 
and fronting on the ocean or the bay; but in California, where statutes distinguished 
various kinds of lands for purposes of disposition, it is useful to separate submerged 
lands-which are those always covered by water, even at low tide-from tidelands--
those covered and uncovered by daily tides, that is, the lands lying between mean 
high-tide and mean low-tide-and from swamp and overflowed lands-those which are 
above mean high-tide, but subject to extreme high tides so that marsh grasses grow 
on them; they are commonly called marshlands. 
160. See B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 429. 
161. E.g., Marks v. Whitney, 276 Cal. App. 2d 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1969), petition 
for reh. granted, Civil No. 24,883 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1969) (Plaintiff's exh. 3). 
162. M. Scorr, supra note 157, at 4, 9: 
It is reported, for example, that "county surveyors ••. unblushingly certified 
as lands 'above low tide' thousands of acres that lay six to eighteen feet below the 
waters of San Francisco Bay •••• But these patents were no more astonishing than 
others under which cattle barons and speculators acquired vast tracts of dry land 
in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley as 'swamp land'." 
A delegate to the state Constitutional Convention in 1879 said: "If there is 
any one abuse greater than another that I think the people of the State of Cali-
fornia has suffered at the hands of their Jaw-making power, it is the abuse that 
they have received in the granting out and disposition of the lands belonging to 
the State." Swamp lands, tidelands, and overflowed lands had been taken in such 
vast quantities, he said, that "now the people are hedged off entirely from reach- .,, 
ing tide water, navigable water, or salt water." 
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which were valuable for public navigation and fishery. The real 
purpose of the disposition statutes, the court found, was not to 
grant away tidelands which had such public utility, but simply to 
permit the reclamation of those shore and swampy lands which, 
having no recognized values, could be made productive only if they 
were filled and put to agricultural use.163 Reading the statutes nar-
rowly not only maintained a compatibility with the statutory his-
tory,164 but even more essential, it enabled the court to avoid the 
question whether the disposition laws were consistent with the 
trusteeship in which the state held publicly useful tidelands. Since 
a clear legislative purpose to grant such lands to private owners 
would bring into question the legitimacy of the legislation, it was 
only natural that the court interpret the legislative intent to avoid 
such questions. Thus, the court said that it would not permit the 
conveyance of valuable lands for purposes other than agricultural 
reclamation unless such a conveyance was given unmistakable legis-
lative approval. 
The court reiterated that view a few years later in interpreting 
an important 1868 statute which contained quite a broad view of 
the power of the state to sell public lands.m Neither that statute 
nor the many controversial land titles issued under it referred to the 
public trust or expressly reserved any right in the public. In inter-
163. Whatever the legislative intent, it would be exceedingly difficult, with respect 
to San Francisco Bay, to distinguish between lands useful only for agricultural reclama-
tion and those valuable as water resources, because the bay is very shallow throughout 
much of its area. B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 120. 
That distinction, however, is made in other states. For example, in State ex rel. 
Buford v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 S. 336 (1924), the court, in holding that a 
grant to a city for reclamation and development for residential purposes did not 
violate the trust, emphasized that the grant involved mud flats having no value for 
purposes of commerce and navigation. 
164. Shoreland disposition in California began with, and arose out of, the federal 
grant to the state of swamplands which were to be sold for reclamation for agricul-
tural purposes. See Act of Sept. 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 519. 
165. Act of March 28, 1868, ch. 415, §§ 28-29 [1867] Cal. Stats. 514. That statute 
provided, in pertinent part, that: 
The swamp and overflowed, salt marsh and tidelands belonging to the state shall 
be sold at the rate of one dollar per acre in gold coin .•• Whenever any resident 
of this state desires to purchase any portion of the swamp and overflowed lands 
• • • or any portion of the tidelands belonging to the state above low tide, he 
shall make affidavit [that he is a citizen and resident, and of lawful age, etc.] • • • 
provided, that applicants for salt marsh or tidelands which shall be less than twenty 
chains in width ••• shall in addition to the above, set forth in said affidavit that 
he or she is the owner or occupant of the uplands lying immediately back of 
and adjoining said lands sought to be purchased; provided, that the owner or 
occupant of any such upland shall not be a preferred purchaser for more than 
one-fourth of a mile front on any bay or navigable stream •••• 
The B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 427-34, contains a concise history of California's 
disposition of tide-, swamp-, and submerged lands, and includes a table, at 429, sum-
marizing the relevant statutes. 
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preting the 1868 Act, the court stated: "Nothing short of a very 
explicit provision ... would justify us in holding that the legislature 
intended to permit the shore of the ocean, between high and low 
water mark, to be converted into private ownership."166 
Following this interpretation, the early decisions either inval-
idated grants of tidelands which were useful for public trust purposes 
or read into any such grants the trust obligation that private mvner-
ship "would not authorize him [the private owner] to change the 
water-front or obstruct navigation."167 But those cases did not pro-
hibit the state from impairing historic public rights in shorelands 
by changing their use to another public purpose. The cases stand 
for the more limited proposition that the state cannot give to private 
parties such title that those private interests will be empowered to 
delimit or modify public uses. Thus, these cases-and there are 
many of them168-are perfectly consonant with the Illinois Central 
decision insofar as it dealt with the divestment of regulatory power 
which had been used to favor private citizens or businesses.169 
Similarly, they are compatible with the Milwaukee case170 insofar as 
it held that the state may, in pursuance of a specific and explicit 
state policy to promote legitimate navigational uses of public waters, 
restrict historic uses and make grants to private parties. 
These early cases draw a sharp distinction between direct grants 
which were outside the scope of any legislative program and grants 
made as part of a public program for legitimate purposes, such as 
the improvement of a harbor.171 The former were held invalid to the 
166. Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 104, 108 (1873). 
167. Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471, 473 (1871). See also Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 
365 (1867); People ex rel. Pierce v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336 (1864); People v. Cowell, 60 
Cal. 400 (1882); Rondell v. Fay, 32 Cal. 354 (1867). Not only did the court give a 
limited scope to the original statute authorizing the grants, but, after some hesitation 
[Upham v. Hosking, 62 Cal. 250 (1882)], it even held that a later validation statute, 
apparently designed to reverse decisions holding early titles void, "was merely intended 
to validate applications for land subject to sale" under the original laws. Klauber v. 
Higgins, 117 Cal. 451, 464 (1897). 
168. Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 373-74 (1867); Shirley v. Benicia, 118 Cal. 344, 
346, 50 P. 404, 405 (1897); City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 
183-85, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 585-86, 138 P. 
79, 84 (1913). 
169. It has been said, indeed, the motivation for constitutional reform of shoreland 
law, which came in 1879, was the product of "difficulties in navigation and fishing ..• 
when private owners controlled so much of the access to the shore." B.C.D.C. Supp., 
supra note 157, at 433. See note 162 supra. 
170. See text accompanying note 127 supra. 
171. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Waterfront Co., ll8 Cal. 160, 183, 50 P. 
277, 285 (1897): "[N]o grant ••• can be made which will impair the power of a sub-
sequent legislature to regulate the enjoyment of the public right •••• But ••• the 
state might alienate irrevocably parcels of its submerged lands of reasonable extent for 
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extent that they involved land subject to public trust use, and valid 
to the extent that they covered lands worthless except by reclama-
tion. But it was held that when the grant was part of a legislative 
program for public purposes, historic or potential public uses could 
validly be subordinated to such public schemes. Unfortunately, the 
scope of the state's power to further a public project affecting trust 
lands was not articulated in these early cases, for they involved such 
obviously legitimate uses of trust lands as the development of major 
harbors and watenvays.172 
While the general principle of the early cases-that the public 
trust may not be conveyed to private parties-has never been 
brought into question, the original application of that principle has 
been modified by later cases. Although the early cases had held such 
grants wholly invalid, the court subsequently decided to validate 
the grants, but to find that they were impressed with the public 
trust which required the owners to use their land in a manner con-
sistent with the right of the public. As the court stated in the land-
mark case of People v. California Fish Company,173 the grantee of 
such lands will not obtain the absolute ownership, but will take 
"the title to the soil . . . subject to the public right of naviga-
tion .... "174 
the erection of docks, piers, and other aids to commerce." See also Shirley v. Benicia, 
118 Cal. 344, 50 P. 404 (1897): 
[I]t is a legislative declaration that these lands [between the harbor line and the 
uplands] may pass into private ownership without interference with the public 
rights of navigation and fishery. They may then be reclaimed . . • and devoted 
to any one of the infinity of uses to which uplands are put, or, if suitably located, 
and there be no restriction in the grant, they may • • . be covered with wharves, 
docks and like structures. 
118 Cal. at 346, 50 P. at 405. 
172. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80 (1854). 
173. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913). 
174. 166 Cal. at 588, 138 P. at 87-88. It has been suggested that some early grants 
were so blatantly fraudulent, so inconsistent with the authorizing statute, or so im• 
perfectly consummated, that they may be subject to invalidation even at this late date. 
See B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 435-38. The issue is being raised again. In 
California v. County of San Mateo, No. 144,257 (Super. Ct., San Mateo County, filed 
April 2, 1969), the state has taken the position that it "had no statutory authority ••• 
to convey any submerged lands to private claimants ••• In the alternative, should the 
court find that the state could have conveyed the subject submerged lands, ••• said 
submerged lands are subject to the ..• public trust •.•• " Complaint 1111 12(D)(i), (v). 
Regarding the distinct meaning of the term "submerged lands," see note 159 supra. 
It may make little practical difference whether such titles are held invalid or 
whether they are held valid but impressed with a public trust obligation that justifies 
far-reaching restrictive regulation. Only if regulation goes so far as to present the 
constitutional problem of a taking of property is the question of ownership likely to 
become significant. But it is said that adequate regulation could be imposed without 
raising a constitutional right to compensation. See B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 
460-64. 
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Precisely where this rule leaves the private owners of such tide-
land grants is not certain. It is clear that so long as the land or water 
overlying it is still physically suitable for public use, the owner may 
not exclude the public-he may not fence his land or eject the public 
as trespassers.1715 It is similarly clear that a private owner may alter 
the land in a manner that impairs public uses if the alterations are 
consistent with a public decision authorizing them; such a situation 
arises when, for example, a harbor line or bulkhead line is set by 
the state and private owners are permitted to build behind that 
line.176 But the acts of private owners in such situations are the 
product of, and are in harmony with, a larger public plan for the 
advancement of navigation and commerce. It is a much more difficult 
question whether a private owner, on his own initiative and for 
entirely personal purposes, may alter the land in a manner that 
impairs pubHc uses.177 
175. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912); cf. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 
Cal. App. 2d 738 (1st Dist. 1951). 
176. In Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 36, 127 P. 156, 161 (1912), the court said: 
"The state can probably sell the land and authorize the purchaser to extend the 
water front so as to enable him to build upon this land; but it must be done in the 
interest of commerce, and that must first be determined by the Legislature." It seems 
to follow that in the absence of a legislative determination, a private owner cannot 
make such a decision. Thus, whatever title a private owner might formally hold, his 
rights under that title would be limited to making only those uses of the land which 
do not interfere with public uses, unless he has legislative authorization for more ex-
tensive use, such as filling and building a dock. See also City of Oakland v. Williams, 
206 Cal. 315, 330, 274 P. 328, 334 (1929): "Public property in the control of a private 
party may, nevertheless, serve a public purpose as an aid to, or a part of, a general 
plan •••• It is but a unit of a comprehensive plan." 
177. Although there is uncertainty about the scope of lawful uses of tideland and 
submerged land to which private parties held deeds and patents, a wide variety of uses 
have nonetheless been made of such lands. See B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 424-
26. Part of the reason for that variety is that a good deal of questionable activity has 
not been litigated; and, as might be e.xpected, shoreland titles and rights are in a 
state of great confusion arid uncertainty. Id. at 434-43. As an example of the degree of 
uncertainty, the B.C.D.C. report notes that one owner "entered into a lease with the 
State Lands Commission for dredging of oyster shells on lands it claims to own. And 
the State Legislature in 1943 granted to the City and County of San Francisco several 
thousand acres at the International Airport which San Francisco had previously 
'bought' from private 'owners.'" B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 436. In an in-
formal opinion prepared in response to a B.C.D.C. inquiry as to the limitations im-
posed by the trust on the rights of private owners to fill their lands, the California 
Attorney General said: 
The owner of lands subject to the public trust may use the property as he sees 
fit, subject to the power of the State to abate (prevent or remove) any nuisance or 
illegal obstruction he may create thereon, and to reoccupy the lands in the event 
such occupation becomes necessary for trust purposes. Such owner may be re-
strained from interfering with any existing navigational improvement or from 
filling such lands, if a properly authorized State agency determines that such 
filling will obstruct the free navigation of a bay, harbor, estuary or other navigable 
waterway. Whether or not a particular filling project by the private owner con-
.stitutes a nuisance or an illegal obstruction depends upon the navigability in 
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That question was raised in Marks v. Whitney,178 in which the 
owner of a tidelands grant brought an action in a California state 
court to quiet his title before he made any attempt at building or 
filling. The position taken by those who opposed the private tide-
lands owner was that he did not have the right to take any action 
on his own initiative in derogation of public rights in the tidelands; 
rather, they said, any such action could be taken only upon the 
determination of the state as the repository of the trust. In support 
of that view, it was pointed out that the previous California cases 
allowing infringement of public uses were based on situations 
in which a legislative determination to authorize changes had been 
present. Moreover, those who wanted to limit the power of the 
private owner found support in the state constitution of 1879 which 
indicates clearly that the public has a right to the use of the state's 
navigable waters.179 The court of appeals, however, ·wrote a very 
strong opinion rejecting the trust claims and holding that the land-
mvner's patent vested in him an unrestricted title, free of any public 
fact of the waterway in question, or the effect of flow therefrom upon other 
navigable waterways. 
B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 442. The Attorney General may be correct, but 
there is no authoritative litigation or legislation to support his view that private owners 
have broad initiative powers, subject only to regulatory or subsequent restraints. 
Thus, it may be the case that private owners may not infringe the trust except in 
response to, or with the prior approval of, a statewide authority, and that no infringe• 
ment is justified unless it is part of, or consistent with, a statewide plan for develop-
ment and maintenance of the bay. 
178. 276 Cal App. 2d 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1969), petition for reh. granted, Civil 
No. 24,883 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1969); Colby v. Marks, No. 48,336 (Super. Ct., Marin County, 
Cal., filed May 15, 1967). 
179. Art. 15, § 2: 
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or 
tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary or other navigable water in this state, 
shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is re-
quired for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of 
such water; and the legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal 
construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this state 
shall be always obtainable for the people thereof. 
See also CAL. CoNsr. art. XV, § 3, which provides that: "All tidelands within two miles 
of any incorporated city, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of any 
harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld 
from grant or sale to private persons, partnerships or corporations." CAL. CoNsr. art. 
I, § 25, enacted in 1910, provided in relevant part that " ••• no land owned by the 
State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the people the absolute 
right to fish thereupon." 
Of course, many private grants were made prior to the enactment of any of these 
constitutional provisions, and the provisions cannot retroactively withdraw property 
rights already granted. But to the extent that the constitutional provisions would be 
viewed as merely reiterating and confirming a principle already a part of the law-
namely, the presence of the trust as a servitude on all grants made-the language of 
the constitution would be relevant as evidence of the limited scope of preconstitutional 
grants. Such a theory has been judicially recognized in another context. See Broder v, 
Natoma W. &: M. Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879). 
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trust for purposes of navigation and commerce; but that decision 
is not final, for a petition for rehearing has been granted.180 
But whatever the eventual outcome of the objections raised in 
llfarks, there is a compelling reason to accept the position that a 
public determination must precede any derogation of the public 
interest in trust lands. Any action which will adversely affect tradi-
tional public rights in trust lands is a matter of general public interest 
and should therefore be made only if there has been full considera-
tion of the state's public interest in the matter; such actions should 
not be taken in some fragmentary and publicly invisible way. Only 
with such a safeguard can there 4-rany assurance that the public 
interest will get adequate public attention. This principle is essen-
tially the same as that which has been adopted by the Massachusetts 
and Wisconsin courts in their requirements for specific legislative 
authorization and for statewide rather than merely local authoriza-
tion.181 Consistency with this principle would require that decisions 
likely to inhibit public uses be made in a public forum. It would also 
require that such decisions be made as a part of a general public 
program, which, at the very least, would require that there be a per-
mit system applicable to the private use of public lands.182 
2. The Obligations of Municipal Grantees 
a. The need to restrain localism. The need for a coordination 
of the uses which are made of trust lands has been clearly recognized 
in California. While cases involving private grantees, such as the 
Marks case, are not rare, the trust issue has been raised most fre-
quently in cases involving the duty of municipal grantees to deal 
with trust lands in a manner consistent with the public interest of 
the whole state. 
A number of those cases have involved the McAteer-Petris 
Act,183 which was the single most important response to the need 
for statewide coordination of trust land usage. That Act sought to 
deal with the need for coordination by creating a Bay Conservation 
and Development Commission to prepare "a comprehensive and 
enforceable plan for the conservation of the water of the bay and 
180. Marks v. Whitney, 276 Cal. App. 2d 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1969), petition for 
reh. granted, Civil No. 24,883 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1969). The court relied upon Alameda 
Conservation Assn. v. City of Alameda, 264 Cal. App. 2d 284, 70 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 906 (1969), a case :nvolving a municipal grant. See text following 
note 183 infra. 
181. See notes 63-92, 108-56 supra and accompanying text. 
182. For a discussion of the possible claim that such restraints might infringe 
private property rights, see notes 174 supra, 236, 265 infra. 
183. CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 66600-49, -53 (West 1966), §§ 66650-51 (West Supp. 1968). 
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the development of its shoreline."184 To effectuate that mandate, 
the law imposed a two-year moratorium on filling in San Francisco 
Bay and provided an exception for only those instances in which the 
Commission issued a permit. The introductory language of the 
statute clearly identifies the nature of the public interest and the need 
for public control: 
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the public interest 
in the San Francisco Bay is in its beneficial use for a variety of 
purposes; that the public has an interest in the bay as the most 
valuable single natural resource of an entire region, a resource that 
gives special character to the bay area; that the bay is a single body 
of water that can be used for many purposes, from conservation to 
planned development; and that the bay operates as a delicate physi-
cal mechanism in which changes that affect one part of the bay may 
also affect all other parts. It is therefore declared to be in the public 
interest to create a politically-responsible, democratic process by 
which the San Francisco Bay and its shoreline can be analyzed, 
planned, and regulated as a unit .... [T]he present uncoordinated, 
haphazard manner in which the San Francisco Bay is being filled 
threatens the bay itself and is therefore inimical to the welfare of 
both present and future residents . . • further piecemeal filling of 
the bay may place serious restrictions on navigation in the bay, may 
destroy the irreplaceable feeding and breeding grounds of fish and 
wildlife in the bay .•. and would therefore be harmful to the needs 
of the present and future population of the bay region.1sis 
Although the statute has given rise to several cases involving the 
efforts of cities bordering San Francisco Bay to go forward with 
local bay fill projects, it is useful to focus attention upon only one 
of those cases to illustrate the need for restrictions to be placed upon 
municipal grantees. In People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conserva-
tion and Development Commission v. Town of Emeryville,186 the 
184. CAL. GOVT. CODE§ 66603 (West 1966). 
185. CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 66600-01 (West 1966). The principle has been forcefully re-
stated in the report of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commis• 
sion, San Francisco Bay Plan (Jan. 1969): 
[T]he Bay is a single body of water, in which changes affecting one part may also 
affect other parts, and that only on a regional basis can the Bay be protected and 
enhanced •.•• The Bay should no longer be treated as ordinary real estate, avail-
able to be filled with sand or dirt to create new land. Rather, the Bay should be 
regarded as the most valuable natural asset of the entire Bay region, a body of 
water that benefits not only the residents of the Bay area but of all California 
and indeed the nation. 
Id. at 1. 
In August 1969 the California legislature enacted a statute implementing in a 
significant way the work of the B.C.D.C. The statute imposes a bay-wide regulatory 
scheme governing all development. See ch. 713, [1969] Cal. Stats. 552 (Deering Supp. 
Aug. 1969); N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1969, at 60, col. I. 
186. 69 Cal. 2d 533, 446 P .2d 790, 72 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1968). See also Save San Fran-
cisco Bay Assn. v. City of Albany, No. 383,480 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Cal, filed 
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Commission brought an action to enjoin fill operations being con-
ducted by the tmvn without the permit required under the Act. 
The defense was that under the statute's "grandfather" clause, no 
permit was required for "any project ... commenced prior to the 
effective date" of the Act.187 The court found that while there had 
been a project "commenced" before the statute became effective, the 
town had substantially changed the purpose of the project after the 
enactment. The court held that the grandfather clause did not pro-
tect substitute projects, and it therefore ordered that the town be 
enjoined from proceeding with further diking and filling until it 
had obtained a permit. 
The particular statutory interpretation made in Emeryville is 
of little interest to the present inquiry; what is significant is the 
nature of the Emeryville operation and the nature of the attack 
which was made upon it. Originally, the tmvn's waterfront proposal 
contemplated the filling of about 145 acres, of which more than 75 
per cent was to be used for residential development for an antic-
ipated population of 15,700 persons. As early as 1965 the town 
obtained an opinion from the attorney general of the state casting 
serious doubt on the consistency of Emeryville's plan with the terms 
of the tidelands grant from the state.188 Nonetheless, the town pro-
ceeded with its plan, and the State Lands Commission challenged 
its legality. In response, Emeryville modified its plan by reducing 
the anticipated population density to 6,000 persons and by reduc-
ing the area to be set aside for residential development to about 
one-third of the land to be filled. But the Lands Commission re-
fused to accept this modification, since it was made during the 
pendency of litigation between the town and the commission. In-
deed, at the same time that Emeryville was modifying its plan, 
the legislature itself had foreclosed the possibility of any private 
residential use by deleting residential purposes from among the 
uses to which Emeryville could put its tidelands.189 Despite all these 
factors, the town persisted in its efforts to complete the fill. 
Oct. I, 1968). In the latter case, suit was filed by two nonprofit conservation organiza-
tions and eleven citizens of the San Francisco Bay area, some of whom were citizens 
and taxpayers in the defendant city; they sought to enjoin a bay fill project by the 
defendant city, principally on the ground that it was "being conducted pursuant to 
no specific plans of any sort for the use of the baylands being filled." Complaint ,r XXI. 
The absence of a plan, it was alleged, violated the obligation that trustlands be used 
for purposes in which there was a general statewide interest. At the time of this 
writing, the case was pending in the Superior Court. 
187. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66632.1 (West 1966). 
188. 69 Cal. 2d at 542 n.3, 446 P.2d 796 n.3, 72 Cal. Rptr. 796 n.3. 
189. Ch. 415, [1968) Cal. Stats. 856. 
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The case is an unusual one, for it is not often that the forces of 
a legislature, a regulatory agency, the attorney general, and the courts 
are all brought to bear against a project that will affect trust lands. 
In a slightly different setting, or at an earlier point in time, there 
might well have been only a judicial barrier to the completion of 
the town's project. The case is thus an illustration of the growing 
recognition that effectuation of the public interest may require a 
body with a statewide constituency to examine any particular pro-
posal, and that the usual political processes may not adequately 
provide the opportunity for such an examination to proceed effec-
tively unless judicial intervention is available. 
The San Francisco Bay experiences indicate that local public 
interests may interfere with the public trust in the same manner as 
private profit-oriented interests; many aspects of local self-interest 
are as inconsonant with the broad public interest as are the projects 
of private enterprises. In both situations one may observe behavior 
which is rational from the atomistic perspective of the actor, but 
which, from the perspective of the larger community, is highly dis-
advantageous. A typical example is that of citizens using a common 
pasture for grazing their animals. Although overgrazing is recog• 
nized as a problem, it is profitable for each individual to put one 
more animal out to graze; each such individual decision, however, 
brings closer the day when the common pasture will be useless to 
all.190 The Emeryville case clearly exemplifies that sort of problem 
and suggests the need to adjust traditional decision-making mech-
anisms for resources like the bay in light of the potential disjunction 
between the perceived benefit to the local entity and the total im-
pact of such local choices on the community of users as a whole. 
b. General statutory limitations on municipal grantees. A con-
siderable body of statutory public trust law is found in the grants 
of tidelands made by the state to various California cities.191 Those 
grants set out rather specifically the limitations legislatively imposed 
upon the uses which the cities may make of the tidelands, consistent 
with the public trust. While the grants made to cities vary con-
190. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE No. 3859, Dec. 13, 1968, 
at 1243. 
191. Many of the grants were made originally between 1911 and 1915, when a 
shipping boom was expected to result from completion of the Panama Canal. Each 
of the grants was effected by a separate statute, but there are certain features common 
to most of them. Sales of granted lands are generally prohibited, but long-term leases 
are permitted. The grants specify that the lands are to be held in trust for all the 
people of the state and are to be used for the purposes which the grants specify. The 
grants are also subject to public rights of commerce, navigation, and fishing. In ad-
dition, the state may revoke a grant, but it is not clear what effect such revocation 
would have on lessees or franchisees of granted lands. See generally B.C.D.C. Supp., 
supra note 157, at 420-22, which includes a map of these grants. 
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siderably, the legislature, in making those grants, has generally taken 
a rather broad view of what uses of granted tidelands are appro-
priate. It is perfectly clear that ordinary harbor improvements, such 
as docks, wharves, quays, and the like, are appropriate; but the 
typical statute goes far beyond authorizations for purely navigational 
aids. The older grants typically provide that: 
said lands shall be used by said city ... only for ... a harbor, and 
... wharves, docks, piers, slips, quays and other utilities ... neces-
sary or convenient for the promotion and accommodation of com-
merce and navigation . . . provided, that said city . . . may lease 
lands ... for the purposes consistent with the trusts .... 192 
Recent grants, however, have been considerably more far-ranging, 
as is indicated by a 1961 grant of tidelands to the City of Albany. 
The statute conveying the lands begins by providing that the tide-
lands "shall be used by said city and its successors for purposes in 
which there is a general statewide interest."193 In defining those pur-
poses, however, the statute not only includes the usual reference to 
wharves, docks, and the like, but adds airport and heliport facilities 
and their appurtenances; highways; power lines; public buildings; 
parks; playgrounds; convention centers; public recreation facilities 
such as public golf courses, small boat harbors, marinas, and aquatic 
playgrounds; and structures and appliances incidental, necessary, or 
convenient for the promotion and accommodation of any of such 
uses, including, but not limited to, snackbars, cafes, restaurants, 
motels, hotels, apartments, residences, launching ramps, and hoists. 
192. Ch. 517, [1919] Cal. Stats. 1089 (City of Berkeley). See also ch. 676, [1911] Cal. 
Stats. Hl0·i (Long Beach); ch. 656, [1911] Cal. Stats. 1256 (Los Angeles); chs. 654, 657, 
[1911] Cal. Stats. 1254, 1258 (Oakland). The grant to the city of Berkeley is perhaps 
the most restrictive form that the grants took. The grant to Oakland authorized the 
city to make leases for "any and all purposes which shall not interfere with navigation 
or commerce." Ch. 654, [1911] Cal. Stats. 1255. Similarly, the grant to Los Angeles 
allowed the city to make leases "for any and all purposes which shall not interfere with 
the trusts upon which said lands are held by the State of California." Ch. 651, [1929] 
Cal. Stats. 1086. • 
193. Ch. 1763, [1961] Cal. Stats. 3767-70. See also ch. 921, [1959] Cal. Stats. 2952 
(Emeryville). Amendments to the city of Oakland's grant have been similarly broad; 
they have permitted that city to use the granted lands for: 
an airport or aviation facilities and for the construction .•• of terminal build-
ings, runways, roadways, aprons, taxiways, parking areas and other utilities •.• 
necessary or convenient for the promotion and accommodation of commerce and 
navigation by air as well as by water, and for the construction, maintenance and 
operation thereon of public buildings and public works and playgrounds, and for 
public recreational purposes. 
[including] public multipurpose recreation centers, stadiums for football, baseball, 
basketball and all other sports ••• meeting places, parking facilities and all other 
facilities for public recreation and the public exhibition of events, fairs and other 
public activities. 
Ch. 1028, [1961] Cal. Stats. 1936; ch. 709, [1957] Cal. Stats. 1902; ch. 15, [1960] Cal. Stats., 
1st Ex. Sess., l!l9. 
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At first glance such a statutory menu for development seems so 
inclusive as to suggest that the California legislature has imposed no 
limitations whatsoever. But a closer examination of the text of the 
Albany law indicates that it is not nearly so broad as it seems. Au-
thorized uses are essentially limited to those which are directly 
water-related, including both the traditional projects, such as 
wharves, docks, and piers, and some nontraditional projects, such as 
"small boat harbors, marinas, aquatic playgrounds and similar 
recreational facilities." The permission for the building of snackbars, 
cafes, restaurants, motels, hotels, apartments and residences does not 
stand alone; the statute authorizes such buildings only if they can 
be justified as "incidental, necessary or convenient for the promotion 
and accommodation of" the directly water-related uses. The limita-
tion is a significant one, because it suggests a legislative intent that 
one test of the appropriateness of a tidelands development is that 
it be related to, and in furtherance of, use of the bay as a water 
resource. Certainly, the statute is loosely drafted, for it contains 
vague terms like "similar" recreational facilities and allows ap-
purtenant facilities which are "convenient," as well as those which 
are "necessary," to promote the water-related uses authorized. But 
it can hardly be doubted that the legislature put considerable em-
phasis on the use of the bay as a water resource, in much the same 
sense that the Wisconsin Court required that lands retain their 
"original character" and that use be made "of the lake as a lake."1114 
The second important characteristic of the Albany grant is that 
the permissible uses which are not water-related-such as airports, 
highways, bridges, utility lines, parks, playgrounds, and golf courses 
-are all essentially public uses, in the sense either of public owner-
ship or of availability to the general public.195 Indeed, the word 
194-. See text accompanying notes 138-56 supra. This principle provides one funda• 
mental pillar of the report of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission. San Francisco Bay Plan (Tan. 1969). That report sets out as one of its three 
major conclusions and policies that "[t]he most important uses of the Bay are those 
providing substantial public benefits and treating the Bay as a body of water, not real 
estate." Id. at I. See note 185 supra. 
195. To suggest that such facilities are lawful under the trust doctrine does not 
imply that they are always wise, nor, indeed, does it imply that there is not a sub• 
stantial conflict between "treating the Bay as a body of water" (see note 194 supra) 
and the wide range of public uses noted in the text. The Bay Plan, supra note 194, 
wisely seeks, as a matter of policy, to accommodate these concerns by suggesting, for 
example, that power lines should be undergrounded when that is feasible, and that 
highways should be placed on bridge-like structures rather than on fill. San Francisco 
Bay Plan, supra note 194, at 28-29. Similarly, the plan suggests that "where possible, 
parks should provide some camping facilities accessible only by boat" and that "recrea-
tional facilities that do not need a waterfront location, such as golf courses and playing 
fields, should generally be placed inland, but may be permitted in shoreline areas if 
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"public" is used in the statute six times to modify the authorization 
of features such as buildings, recreation facilities, and meeting 
places. In light of the traditional concern with the public trust doc-
trine as a device for ensuring that valuable governmentally con-
trolled resources are not diverted to the benefit of private profit-
seekers, that limitation is particularly notable; indeed, it echoes 
developments in Massachusetts and Wisconsin. While those in-
dividuals who use public golf courses may differ from those who 
use public fishing facilities, the similarities between the groups are, 
for purposes of the public trust doctrine, significantly more im-
portant than the differences. Any requirement that the facilities be 
public necessarily diminishes the potential for questionable or cor-
rupt overreaching by private interests and ensures that the benefits 
will be relatively widely distributed among the citizenry. 
The safeguards found in the Albany law are not airtight.198 The 
they are part of a park complex that is primarily devoted to water-oriented uses." Id. 
at 23-24. 
While one should not confuse policy suggestions with legal constraints, it should 
be emphasized that when a proposal is viewed either as inconsistent with over-all state 
policy or as inadequately considered, a court may have a tendency to read statutory 
authorizations narrowly. Thus, for example, if a proposal involves facilities such as 
utility lines or highways a court may infer restrictions on such a project from the 
statute, so long as the statute does not contain a provision which expressly eliminates 
all restrictions. Such restrictions might include a standard of "no feasible inland 
alternative,'' or one of permissibility "only under circumstances which will not in-
fringe water-oriented uses." 
196. California's laws of general application relating to tidelands are in most 
respects consistent with this analysis. For example, CAL. GoVT. CODE § 37385 (West 
1968) and most of § 37386 refer to leases for the improvement of harbor facilities. Sec-
tion 37387 authorizes leases for "park, recreational, residential, or education purposes, 
under conditions not inconsistent with the trust imposed upon the tidelands by the Con-
stitution." The authorization for residential housing leases is apparently conditioned 
to impose on such leases the requirement that they be public or nonprofit generating. 
Section 37388 states that "a city may lease property ••• to any non-profit corporation 
for a housing development on the property." See also CAL. GOVT. CODE § 37389 (West 
1968) (airport uses); CAL. Civ. CODE § 718 (West Supp. 1968). The one apparent 
inconsistency on the face of the statutes is that part of § 37386 which allows leases for 
"industrial uses." But since that provision is placed between the harbor authorizations 
of § 37385 and the rest of § 37386, which deals with harbor uses, and since it is entitled, 
"Industrial and other uses consistent with commerce and navigation,'' it seems ap-
propriate to read the authorization as applying to only those industrial uses which are 
necessary for, or appurtenant to, the uses of the shorelands for navigation and water-
borne commerce. Thus, while warehouses needed to store water-borne commodities 
might be allowed [City of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 274 P. 328 (1929)], general 
manufacturing plants not dependent upon navigation would not be within the statute. 
The wording of the statute does not compel this interpretation, but the context of the 
provision and the general approach of the legislature strongly suggest it. In a legal 
memorandum on this question, the City Attorney of Berkeley pointed out that the 
grant to Berkeley speaks of those industrial uses which are "necessary or convenient for 
the promotion of commerce and navigation," and thus concluded that the authority is 
limited to "industries directly related to navigation, shipping, fishing or the industries 
usually found in a harbor area." Robert T. Anderson, City Attorney, Berkeley, Cal., 
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mere requirement that a facility be public does not necessarily 
prevent commercial intrusions, as was seen in Gould.197 Further-
more, the statute is not wholly consistent with itself, for it does 
authorize utility rights-of-way for private companies, as well as uses 
like small boat harbors which may accrue principally to the affluent. 
But the central purpose of the law is clear enough, 198 and it ought to 
serve adequately as a focus for judicial intervention if it appears that 
the powers given under the statute are being used to produce private 
windfalls or sharply redistributive patterns in tidelands leases. 
The Albany statute, then, imposes two limitations on implemen-
tation of the trust: it restricts the uses that can be made of trust 
lands to either water-related activities or other activities which have 
a public nature. To the extent that the waters of the bay are them-
selves available to the general public, it may be said that the concept 
of water-related activity is no more than a particular implementation 
of the general notion of devotion to public use. In this sense, the 
statutory approach in California is in accord with historic patterns 
elsewhere, utilizing the public trust concept to constrain activities 
which significantly shift public values into private uses or uses 
which benefit some limited group. 
3. The Obligations of the State Itself 
There is no single source in California law which defines the 
limits on legislative conduct in dealing with public trust properties. 
The state constitution imposes some limitations, but they operate 
as restraints upon grants to private parties rather than as a constraint 
upon legislative policy.199 Similarly, the Act admitting California to 
the Union does provide that all the navigable waters in the state 
shall be freely available to the public,200 but California courts have 
Legal Aspects of Proposed Waterfront Development in the City of Berkeley and 
Recommendations for Amendment to the Statutory Grant of Tidelands, Feb. 27, 1961, 
at 19 (unpublished). See note 201 infra and accompanying text. 
197. See note 63 supra and text following. 
198. The statute also provides that the city may not alienate its tidelands to private 
interests and may lease them only "for wharves and other public uses and purposes 
•.• consistent with the trust." (Emphasis added.) It also reserves to the people of the 
state the right to fish in the waters on those lands and a right of convenient access. 
Both of these reservations are required by CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 25. See note 179 supra. 
199. CAL. CONST. art. XV, §§ 2-3. Section 3 does have a proviso that tidelands which 
are held by the state "solely for street purposes," and which the legislature finds are 
not needed for that purpose may be sold "subject to such conditions as the Legislature 
determines are necessary to be imposed in connection with any such sales in order 
to protect the public interest." See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25, reserving "in the people 
the absolute right to fish ••. .'' 
200. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 453, § 3: "All the navigable waters within the 
State shall be common highways and forever free, as well to inhabitants of such State 
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not found that provision a source of any particular constraints on the 
state. 
It is thus to judicial interpretation that one must look for in-
formation about the limits of state power. Judicial developments 
may best be examined through the medium of an unusually com-
prehensive legal opinion, written in 1961 by the city attorney of 
Berkeley,201 analyzing proposed plans for the use of San Francisco 
Bay tidelands which had been granted to the city.202 
The city attorney began his analysis by noting legislative restric-
tions similar to those revealed by the foregoing examination of the 
Albany grant. He found that the legislature had recognized two 
sorts of obligations in dealing with tidelands and trust lands. First, 
those shorelands which are useful and available for public trust pur-
poses such as navigation and fish~ry must be used to promote those 
purposes. Second, those lands which are not useful for such purposes 
may be freed of the particular trust obligation, but must nonethe-
less be utilized for "a use of general statewide interest."203 
as to citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost or duty therefor." This 
provision is similar to that in the Northwest Ordinance. See note 124 supra. 
201. Robert T. Anderson, City Attorney, Berkeley, Cal., Legal Aspects of Proposed 
'Waterfront Development in the City of Berkeley and Recommendations for Amend-
ment to the Statutory Grant of Tidelands, Feb. 27, 1961 (unpublished). The document 
was written in response to a request for a legal opinion on proposed plans submitted 
by a consulting firm for the use of Berkeley's tidelands. The firm had submitted 
three plans, each of which proposed development of the following uses: industry, shop-
ping center, convention center, airport-heliport, park, golf course, marina, junior college, 
and street and railroad use. In addition, one plan included university athletic facilities 
and married student housing, while another proposed residential and public school 
use. 
202. The Berkeley grants are found at ch. 347, [1913] Cal. Stats. 705; ch. 534, [1915] 
Cal. Stats 901; ch. 596, [1917] Cal. Stats. 915; ch. 517, [1919] Cal. Stats. 1089. The op-
erative portions of the grant read as follows: 
That said lands shall be used by said city ••. solely for the establishment, im-
provement and conduct of a harbor, and for the construction, maintenance and 
operation thereon of wharves, docks, piers, slips, quays and other utilities, struc-
tures and appliances necessary or convenient for the promotion and accommoda-
tion of commerce and navigation, and said city • • • shall not, at any time, grant 
••• said lands ••• to any individual firm or corporation, for any purposes what-
ever: provided, that said city ••• may grant franchises thereon for •.• in no event 
exceeding fifty years for wharves and other public uses and purposes, and may 
lease said lands • • • for the purposes consistent with the trusts upon which said 
lands are held by the State of California, and with the requirements of commerce 
or navigation at said harbor • • • . 
That said harbor • • • shall always remain a public harbor for all purposes of 
commerce and navigation • • . • There is hereby reserved, in the people of the 
State of California the absolute right to fish in all the waters of said harbor, with 
the right of convenient access to said waters over said land for said purpose. 
203. See Anderson, supra note 201, at 8. The City Attorney arrived at this conclusion 
from an analysis of Mallon v. Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199,205, 282 P.2d 481, 487 (1955); 
Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 186, 273 P. 797, 815, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 517 (1929); 
Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 29, 102 P.2d 438,441 (1940); People v. Cali-
fornia Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 585, 138 P. 79, 84 (1913); Board of Port Commrs. v. 
Williams, 9 Cal. 2d 381, 390, 70 P.2d 918, 922 (1937). 
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The first question to which the city attorney turned his attention 
was the validity of a proposal to build a small craft harbor on the 
Berkeley tidelands. While it is clear under California law that tide-
lands may be used to develop commercial ports and harbors, the ques-
tion arose whether it was consistent with the trust obligation that 
tidelands be used to promote recreational uses, rather than the uses 
of commercial navigation. In Miramar Company v. Santa Barbara204 
the California Supreme Court had not been at all troubled by the 
recreational-commercial distinction, for it noted that "[t]he right 
of the public to use navigable waters . . . is not limited to any par-
ticular type of craft. Pleasure yachts and fishing boats are used for 
navigation and the state ... can provide harborage for them as well 
as for merchant vessels and steamers."205 Subsequently, however, 
when the court approved of recreational proposals it emphasized that 
the proposals at issue were not isolated from plans for a commercial 
harbor.206 
It is extremely unlikely that the California court would today 
invalidate a recreational water development as inconsistent with the 
public trust. The matter is of interest only because of the court's 
apparent reluctance to come out flatly in favor of recreational devel-
opments, the benefits of which accrue principally to the affluent. One 
possible explanation is that the court is serving notice that a proposal 
which appears to be little more than a giveaway of valuable public 
facilities to certain private interests will be subject to judicial scrutiny 
and will not be permitted unless the nature of the development is 
truly public. In Ventura Port District v. Taxpayers,207 for example, 
the court observed that a proposed small boat harbor is a less objec-
tionable use of trust lands if it is part of a larger harbor project 
or if it is consistent with the future development of such a larger 
project than if it stands alone.208 Such a view would not only be 
consistent with long-standing judicial attitudes about the public 
204. Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 143 P.2d l (1943). 
205. 23 Cal. 2d at 175, 143 P.2d at 3. 
206. Ventura Port Dist. v. Taxpayers & Property Owners of Ventura Port Dist., 53 
Cal. 2d 227, 347 P.2d 305, I Cal. Rptr. 169 (1959): City of Redondo Beach v. Ta.xpayers 
& Property Owners of Redondo, 54 Cal. 2d 126, 352 P.2d 170, 5 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1960). 
The cases do not pass upon the underlying trust question, but rather interpret stat-
utory provisions; thus the comments that follow must be understood as an effort to 
look between the lines, rather than as a comment upon the holdings of the decisions. 
207. 53 Cal. 2d 227, 347 P.2d 305, 1 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1959). 
208. " .•• while the basic character of the proposed development is recreational, 
consideration has been given to providing needed facilities as a harbor for refuge and 
for commercial purposes to the extent that such needs are now apparent, as well as 
to providing flexibility for expansion along such lines as future community needs, in 
correlation with statewide plans for shoreline development and improvement, may 
dictate." 53 Cal. 2d at 230, 347 P.2d at 308, 1 Cal. Rptr. 172. 
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trust obligation and with the approach of cases like Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation Commission,209 but would imply a judicial concern for 
the income redistribution effects which trust land proposals so often 
have. 
In this respect, as the Berkeley city attorney noted,210 it may be 
important to distinguish between a project which is authorized by 
the state itself, either through the legislature or through one of its 
administrative agencies, and one which is initiated and advanced 
merely by a local government. The distinction does not suggest that 
a local project cannot be valid, but rather that local initiation invites 
a more substantial judicial scrutiny of the question whether the 
public interest-the "general statewide interest"-is being ad-
equately advanced. 
The next question to which the Berkeley memorandum turned 
was a proposal for facilities appurtenant to the harbor.211 There is no 
doubt about the validity of launching ramps, hoists, and repair 
facilities, for they are inherently necessary to a harbor.212 The dif-
ficulty arises with facilities such as restaurants, motels, and parking 
lots. The California cases evidence a rather expansive view as to the 
outer limits of appropriate appurtenances to a harbor. The broadest 
of the cases is probably Martin v. Smith,213 a state court of appeals 
decision which upheld a lease of tidelands in Sausalito for construc-
tion of a restaurant, a bar, a motel, a swimming pool, some shops, 
and a parking area. The decision contains no real consideration of 
tidelands doctrine; rather, the court was content to assert that a lease 
for commercial purposes is "consistent with the trust upon which 
said lands were conveyed to the city, and with the requirements of 
commerce and navigation of said harbor."214 
209. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
210. See note 201 supra. 
211. See Anderson, supra note 201. 
212. Ravettino v. City of San Diego, 70 Cal. App. 2d 37, 47, 160 P.2d 52, 57 (1945) 
("the operation of a power crane is certainly one of the incidental functions in the 
operation of a port .•.• "). 
213. 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960). 
214. 184 Cal. App. at 578, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 728. The San Francisco Bay Plan, supra 
note 194, approves the Sausalito development, on the ground that "commercial 
recreation and public assembly are desirable uses of the shoreline if they permit large 
numbers of persons to have direct and enjoyable access to the Bay. These uses can 
often be provided by private development at little or no direct cost to the public." Id. 
at 23. See diagram, id. at 25 &: Map 11. The Plan also comments favorably on such 
developments as Ghirardelli Square-Fisherman's Wharf-Northern Waterfront Area in 
San Francisco, Jack London Square in Oakland, and the downtown waterfront at 
Tiburon. 
There would be no objection to the opinion in Martin if the court made this 
distinction in arriving at its decision, instead of speaking so broadly of commercial 
purposes. Indeed, the propriety of commercial recreational uses as developed by the 
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In Haggerty v. City of Oakland215 the court of appeals approved a 
plan under which a hall for exhibitions, conventions, and banquets 
would be built on port lands.216 The justification given by the court 
was that the facilities were for uses "incidental to the development, 
promotion and operation of the port." Similarly, in People v. City 
of Long Beach,217 the court of appeals upheld a statutorily autho-
rized lease of tidelands for the construction of an armed services 
Y.M.C.A. The court said: 
We entertain no doubt that the specific purpose set forth in the 
1935 statute to promote "the moral and social welfare of seamen, 
naval officers and enlisted men, and other persons engaged in and 
about the harbor, and commerce, fishery, and navigation,'' is not 
only consistent with but in direct aid of the basic trust purpose to 
establish and maintain a harbor and necessary or convenient related 
facilities for the "promotion and accommodation of commerce and 
navigation." Personnel are as vital to these activities as the ships and 
other facilities used therein, and no distinction can properly be 
drawn between providing dormitories and other facilities for mar-
itime personnel and docks for ships, warehouses for goods, or con-
vention, exhibition, and banquet halls for use by trade, shipping, 
and commercial organizations.21s 
These cases are both puzzling and revealing. Certainly they must 
stand as a warning to Ia-wyers that standards like "water-relatedness," 
or "incidental to the promotion of navigation and commerce" can 
be read with almost unlimited breadth by a court. More important, 
they indicate how very reluctant courts are to overturn an explicit 
legislative authorization, even if that authorization seems to go to 
the outer edge of legitimacy. In short, these cases provide as good 
an answer as can be found to the stark question whether there are 
any legal constraints which courts are likely to impose in the name 
of the public trust on explicit legislative acts which are within the 
broad boundaries of governmental legitimacy. The answer is "prob-
ably not," but there are two important provisos. First, the courts 
will act in those rare situations in which there is blatant evidence 
San Francisco Bay Plan, with its focus on public access, should probably be considered 
as another variant of the public use concept. It is important, however, to realize that the 
public element in such proposals is functional rather than legal and therefore in• 
eludes uses such as a publicly owned park or a utility facility which by regulation is 
available to the whole public on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
215. 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958). 
216. Although tidelands were not involved, the grant of port land was similar in 
language to the tidelands grant statutes, and the case is therefore an appropriate 
precedent for trust and tidelands problems. 
217. 51 Cal. 2d 875, 338 P.2d 177 (1959). 
218. 51 Cal. 2d at 880, 338 P.2d at 179. 
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of corruption, such as that which existed in Illinois Central219 and 
Priewe.220 Second, and more significantly for those inclined to under-
take litigation, the courts may be willing to intervene in a more 
restricted, but nonetheless effective, way when the state engages in 
conduct which cannot be held flatly impermissible but which does 
raise doubts. Thus, for example, the courts may be willing to re-
quire that a project obtain more specific legislative authorization 
or receive the approval of another and more broadly representative 
agency. 
There is another useful role that the courts are willing to play, 
and it too is revealed by the California cases discussed above. That 
role is one in which the courts attempt to affect future cases; it is 
illustrated by their use of language which suggests to legislatures 
and administrative agencies that there are limits which courts may 
impose and that those limits were nearly, but not quite, reached 
in the particular case at bar. In this manner, the court suggests to 
other branches of government that they should be reluctant to adopt 
a more permissive view of the public trust. While such a technique · 
is of little aid to the litigants in the case at bar, it is of considerable 
importance for public trust law developments generally. The avoid-
ance of confrontation among the branches of government is not a 
one-way street; eager as the courts are to avoid collision, the legis-
latures are often equally eager not to push the courts too far. Thus, 
one should not underestimate the implicit lawmaking which occurs 
by the mere fact that a court accepts jurisdiction and sets out to 
define standards and to determine whether or not those standards 
have been met. Thus, the excerpt quoted above from People v. City 
of Long Beach221 does serve as a restraining influence on legislatures 
even though the court ultimately upheld the conduct at issue. 
The Sausalito, Oakland, and Long Beach decisions did not, after 
all, give the legislature carte blanche. In each case, the approved 
facilities maintained or provided for broad public access; even when 
they were not publicly owned, they were at least places of public 
accommodation, rather than wholly private and restrictive facilities 
such as high-rise apartment buildings. In addition, while the uses 
in the Oakland and Long Beach cases could hardly be said to have 
involved necessary incidents to the use of the water, there was at 
least some relationship to water-related activities, and the opinions 
clearly indicate that the courts were not flatly approving routine 
commercial or private uses. 
219. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. 
220. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. 
221. See notes 217-18 supra. 
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This analysis leaves uncertain the legality of tideland use for 
purposes like residential development. It does suggest, however, that 
such uses would be looked at by the courts with some skepticism. 
While the courts could not be expected to prohibit such uses flatly, 
significant pressures may be imposed on legislators and administra-
tors by the prospect of judicial inquiry into present and potential de-
mands for public shoreland uses, the need to maximize broad public 
use and access, the compatibility of the proposed use with other de-
mands on the resource, and the return to the public from the dis-
position.222 With these questions highlighted, and with efforts by 
lawyers both to encourage the use of the Massachusetts and Wiscon-
sin techniques and to avoid pressing for direct confrontation be-
tween the court and the legislature, a considerable opportunity for 
fruitful judicial intervention can be created. 
222. Several California tidelands grants do specifically make provision for residen-
tial uses. Ch. 1013, [1949] Cal. Stats. 1859 (Coronado); ch. 921, [1959] Cal. Stats. 2952 
(Emeryville). The Emeryville grant, however, authorizes use only for "residential pur-
poses in which there is a general statewide interest"-a suggestive, but ambiguous, 
limitation. Moreover, the Coronado grant preceded the decision in Mallon v. City of 
Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282 P .2d 481 (1955), which held that revenues from oil 
and gas leasing on tidelands could not lawfully be freed from the public trust by a 
municipal grantee without producing a reversion to the state. See B.C.D.C. Supp. supra 
note 1.57, at 422. This result was deemed to be required by CAL. CONST, art. IV, § 81: 
"the legislature shall have no power • • • to make any gift or authorize the making 
of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or 
other corporation whatsoever . • • ." 
The implication of Mallon for uses such as residential housing would seem to be 
that only those residential uses in which there is a "general statewide interest" would 
be consistent with the trust obligations. Any other residential use, the case implies, 
would require that the tidelands be freed from the trust-a result which is within the 
power of the legislature if there is a reasonable legislative finding that the tidelands 
are not useful for trust purposes. But, according to Mallon, if there is such a freeing, 
the revenues received therefrom must (I) be sufficient to obviate any claim that a gift 
has been made of public property, and (2) be devoted to purposes in which there is a 
general statewide interest, rather than a merely local interest. Such a principle, en-
forceable by the courts, adds to the protection against those municipal uses of tidelands 
which result from the prospect of merely local benefits. The San Francisco Bay Plan 
takes the position that housing is an appropriate use of bay shorelands-a use which 
should be given a priority below that of water-oriented industry, marine terminals, 
water-related utilities, and water-oriented recreation, but above that of uses which do 
not require access to the bay. Any such shoreline residences should be so designed as to 
improve the appearance of the shores of the bay and to provide public access to the 
water. B.C.D.C. Supp., supra note 157, at 346-47. One unusual way in which the 
maximization of public benefit from shoreline housing could be achieved is by adop-
tion of a policy that "high densities should be encouraged to provide the advantages 
of waterfront housing to larger numbers of people." San Francisco Bay Plan, supra note 
194, at 28. 
Development of tidelands for residential development has been upheld in other 
states. E.g., Hayes v. Bowman, 91 S.2d 795 (Fla. 1957); Treuting v. Bridge &: Park 
Commn. of City of Biloxi, 199 S.2d 627 (Miss. 1967). Cf. Jacobson v. Parks&: Recreation 
Commn., 345 Mass. 641, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1963). In Jacobson the court held that parkland 
may be sold for apartment development but that proceeds must be used to acquire sub-
stitute parkland. 
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4. Offshore Oil and Gas Development 
It would be inappropriate to leave the subject of California trust 
law without examining the special questions which arise with respect 
to the economically and ecologically important matter of oil and gas 
exploration in submerged lands. 
It has been held specifically that tidelands may be used for the 
extraction of minerals, oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons if the ex-
traction does not impede the use of the harbor.223 The constraint 
was undoubtedly the result of concern with conventional navigation 
uses and the problem of physical interference. Years ago, little 
thought was given to potential conflicts between oil production and 
recreational uses. More recently, however, and particularly after 
the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969,224 that issue has become very 
prominent. 
It would be difficult to point to any principle of California law 
which would prohibit the state from deciding, by duly deliberate 
legislative action, to subordinate traditional public trust uses to oil 
and gas development. And it is not at all clear that there should be 
any such rigid prohibition, for it seems far more appropriate to 
adopt a flexible approach to the task of assuring the maintenance of 
important public interests in public trust lands. Thus, for example, 
even though there is no rigid prohibition, a court, by interpreting 
the rule that mineral extractions must not "impede the use of the 
harbor," could construe tliat rule to require that any such exploita-
tion be preceded by adequate inquiry into the safeguards taken to 
protect other uses of the waters and adjacent shores, and to impose 
standards designed to make certain that only those projects which 
minimize the possibilities of such infringements are allowed to pro-
ceed.2211 The legislature could still intervene and overrule judicially 
imposed safeguards, but such intervention would put a substantial 
onus on the legislature if unwanted consequences should arise. With 
the dangers pinpointed by judicial inquiry, and with public atten-
tion focused on the problems, the constraint on a legislative over-
ruling of judicially imposed safeguards would seem substantial. 
Alternatively, the legislative intent could be interpreted to im-
pose upon those engaged in mineral extraction a financial obliga-
tion to provide against impairment of other public uses. Such 
223. City of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Cal. 2d 609, 620, 82 P.2d 362, 367 (1938); 
see Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282 P .2d 481 (1955). 
224. See note 76 supra. 
225. See the discussion of Weingand v. Hickel, note 31 supra. See also Parker v. 
United States, Civil No. C.1368 (D. Colo., filed Jan. 7, 1969). 
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an approach was recently suggested, as an administrative solution, 
by the Secretary of the Interior after the oil leakage on the federally 
leased tidelands near Santa Barbara.226 The same approach could be 
imposed judicially with respect to state lands on the theory that a 
legislative rule against impeding uses of the harbor implies an intent 
to impose the costs of any such impediments upon the proponents 
of the oil and gas project.227 Such a theory is entirely consistent with 
the policy of using the public trust doctrine to promote broad pub-
lic benefits from trust resources.228 Furthermore, it is consistent with 
an approach expressly taken by the California courts with regard to 
mineral extraction on tidelands. As noted earlier, 229 the California 
Supreme Court has held that the general revenues from tidelands 
mineral extraction may not be devoted to any uses which are of less 
than a general statewide interest, and the state constitution prevents 
making those lands available as a gift. Those two limitations imple-
ment a principle that the direct income values of the tidelands must 
go to the general public. Insofar as unforeseen damages from the 
mineral extraction are an additional, though indirect, cost to the 
public, it would appear perfectly consistent both with the Cal-
ifornia court's holding and with the constitutional provision to hold 
that such indirect costs to the general public must likewise be com-
pensated. 
D. Public Trust Developments Elsewhere 
The rather extended consideration which this Article has given 
to public trust law in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California sug-
gests the recurring themes which underlie that seemingly amor-
phous doctrine. It would lengthen this Article to an unendurable 
extent to provide as intensive an analysis of public trust law 
developments in other states. For present purposes, it must suffice 
to say at this point that the major substantive and procedural themes 
have been examined. The section which follows is designed merely 
226. A very broad proposed liability provision, 34 Fed. Reg. 7381 (1969) was vigor-
ously opposed by the oil industry and has been supplanted by a much more modest 
provision, 34 Fed. Reg. 13,547 (1969). 
227. Cf. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928). 
228. It is not suggested that this approach be adopted as a universally applicable 
rule, for the parties should always be allowed to demonstrate that some other resource 
allocation would better promote the public interest. Rather, it is suggested that a court 
begin with a presumption that the public interest is best served by preserving to the 
general public the beach and wildlife values threatened by oil and gas operations. The 
utilization of that presumption would thrust upon the proponents of a different allo-
cation the burden of proof and persuasion. Such a shifting of burden would be a 
court's contribution to the equalization of political power which is apparently much 
needed in the federal leasing situation. See note 76 supra. 
229. See note 222 supra. 
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to call attention to some interesting developments in other jurisdic-
tions. 
Most states have had, and regretted, experience with the disposi-
tion of public trust properties to private developers and the public 
agencies which work in collaboration with them. Indeed, it seems 
fair to describe the evolution of much public trust law in the United 
States as an effort to retreat from the excessive generosity of early 
legislatures and public land management agencies. The techniques 
adopted are by now very familiar: constitutional and statutory re-
straints have been placed on the disposition of trust properties;230 
it has been required that the public trust be reserved in any grants 
which are permitted;231 restrictions have been placed on sales or 
leases in order to ensure that they are consistent with the public 
interest;232 it has been stipulated that such dispositions may be made 
only for full market value and that revenues from them must be 
devoted to replacement of specific trust uses or to statewide public 
purposes;233 and authorizing legislation has been narrowly read in 
order to limit the scope of governmental conveyances or the au-
thority of administrative agencies to which the power of disposition 
has been granted.234 
230. E.g., VA. CoNsr. art. 13, § 175: WASH. CoNsr. art. 15; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-3 
(1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-793 (1962); WASH. REv. CODE § 79.16.175 (1959). When an 
agency seeks to use the power of eminent domain in a case involving trust lands-
for instance, when a highway department tries to use that power to take park land-
the agency may have to show that its use is "more necessary" than the e.xisting use. 
Aruz. REv. STAT. § 12-1112 (1956); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 8-52 (1955): IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 7-703 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9904 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37-030 
(1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-36 (1966): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 222 (1968). See also 
State v. Union County Park Commn., 48 N.J. 246, 225 A.2d 122 (1966). See generally, 
Farer, Preservation of America's Park Lands: The Inadequacy of Present Law, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1093 (1966); Tippy, Review of Route Selections for the Federal-Aid 
Highway System, 27 MONT. L. REv. 131 (1966); Comment, Reconciling Competing Pub-
lic Claims on Land, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 155 (1968); Note, Pressures in the Process of 
Administrative Decision: A Study of Highway Location, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 534 (1960). 
231. E.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913). 
232. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN, § 253.12 (Supp. 1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6047-03 (Supp. 
1968). 
233. E.g., S.C. CoNsr. art. 3, § 31; WASH. CoNsr. art. 16, § 1; see United States v. 
Certain Land in the Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965): Hilard v. Ives, 
154 Conn. 683, 228 A.2d 502 (1967); Greenville Borough Petition, II D. &: C. 2d 50 
(Pa. C.P. 1957); Aquino v. Riegelman, 104 Misc. 228, 171 N.Y.S. 716 (Sup. Ct. 1918); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-13l(j) (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT, ANN. §§ 370.16 (1962, Supp. 
1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.ll (Supp. 1969): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-27 (1967), § 13: 
8A-13(b) (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1644 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 76.12.120 
(1959); cf. United States v. South Dakota Game, Fish &: Parks Dept., 329 F.2d 665 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964); United States v. lll.2 Acres, 293 F. Supp. 1042 
(E.D. Wash. 1968); Jacobson v. Parks &: Recreation Commn. of Boston, 345 Mass. 641, 
189 N.E.2d 199 (1963); State v. Cooper, 24 N.J. 261, 131 A.2d 756, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
829 (1957). 
234. See the Massachusetts cases discussed in text accompanying notes 73-92 supra. 
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I. The Statutory Response to Public Trust Doctrine 
While the general tendency in the United States has been toward 
prohibiting the sale of trust lands to private interests,235 the practice 
of making such sales continues in some jurisdictions. Florida, for 
example, continues to allow trust lands to be sold despite some un-
fortunate experiences with public trust land disposition.236 But 
235. E.g., Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 803, 410 P .2d 20, 29 (1966), revd. on 
other grounds, 389 U.S. 290 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-3 (1964); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. 
§ 390.720 (1968); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5415(e) (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 41-811 
(Supp. 1953), § 62.1-1 (Supp. 1968). But see In re Castaways Motel v. Schuyler, 24 
N.Y.2d 120, 247 N.E.2d 124, 299 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1969). 
236. For a detailed discussion of Florida law, see F. MALONEY, S. PLACER &: F. BALD· 
WIN, WATER LAw AND ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA Exl'ERIENCE, ch. 12 (1968). See 
De Grove, Administrative Problems in the Management of Florida's Tidal Lands in 
BAYFILL AND BULii.HEAD LINE PROBLEMS-ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT PROBLE:IIS 17, 
20 (Studies in Pub. Admin. No. 18, 1959); Estuarine Areas, Hearings Before the Sub• 
comm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, House Comm. on Merchant Marine & 
Fisheries, 38-40, 67-68, 244-46, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). In the hearings, State 
Senator Griffin said: "Our files are bulging with testimony that the state has been in-
discriminate in the sale of these lands," id. at 68. In State ex rel. Buford v. City of 
Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 S. 336 (1924), the city, which was itself the recipient of trust 
lands from the state, granted an entire island from among those trust lands to a private 
developer in return for his promise to build a bridge to the island and to include parks 
in his proposed residential development. The state sought to prevent this action, but 
the court found that the state's grant to the city freed the property from the trust. 
Florida has the usual judicial rule that no grant of trust lands will be implied and 
that there must be an express legislative intent to divest trust lands. See State ex rel. 
Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 S. 353 (1908); Apalachicola Land &: Dev. Co. v. McRae, 
86 Fla. 383, 98 S. 505, appeal dismissed, 269 U.S. 531 (1923) (interpreting Spanish land 
grant). 
But once a grant is found to be authorized, courts are often inclined to cease think-
ing in trust terms. Instead of following the lead of the California court, which held 
that granted lands carry with them a retained servitude (see text accompanying notes 
165-74 supra), the courts frequently shift to more conventional private property con· 
cepts. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in Florida, where holders of 
leases or grants have thought themselves immune from the sort of restrictions on use 
which would arise from a view that their property is subject to some sort of servitude 
in favor of the public trust. For example, in Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. 
Fla. 1969), appeal docketed, No. 27,555 (5th Cir. March 27, 1969), the district judge 
refused to give the Corps of Engineers the authority to deny a dredge-and-fill permit 
on the basis of potential adverse effects on wildlife resources. Although the decision was, 
strickly speaking, based on a very narrow reading of the Corps' statutory authority, the 
opinion is notable for its disdainful statement that the case involved a claim of authority 
by the Corps "denying • • • the right of private individuals to use property to which 
their ownership is not contested •.•• " 296 F. Supp. at 769. See also Coastal Petroleum 
Co. v. Department of the Army, Civil No. 68-951 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 12, 1968), in which 
the holder of a mineral lease in Lake Okeechobee challenged the Corps' authority to 
stipulate that the lessee must, as a prerequisite to obtaining a permit, obtain approval 
from the county authority and from the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. 
The lessee's argument, in somewhat simplified form, was that its property right in 
the lease exempted it from all regulation or restriction other than inquiry into poten-
tional interference with navigation, but that if such an exemption were not recognized, 
the lessee must be compensated for a taking of its property. See also Zabel v. Pinellas 
County Water &: Nav. Con. Authority, 171 S.2d 376 (Fla. 1965); Trustees of IJ.F. v. 
Venetian Isles Dev. Co., 166 S.2d 765 (Fla. App. 1964); Burns v. Wiseheart, 205 S.2d 708 
(Fla. App. 1968). 
A similar issue has been raised in a suit filed by federal oil lessees against the 
United States. Those lessees assert that the Secretary of the Interior "interfered" with 
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Florida has learned from experience; its legislature recently passed 
a statute to ensure that whenever such sales are made, full account 
will be taken of the public interest. Under that statute, the trustees 
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, in which power over state 
lands is vested, may make sales only by a vote of five of the seven 
trustees and must first require the State Board of Conservation to 
inspect the lands and to file a ·written report stating whether the 
development of such lands would be detrimental to established con-
servation practices.237 The trustees are instructed to sell the lands 
only if the conveyance is · 
not determined by the trustees to be contrary to the public interest, 
upon such prices, terms and conditions as they see fit; provided, 
however, that prior to consummating any such sale, they shall deter-
mine to what extent ... ownership by private persons ... would 
interfere with the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other 
natural resources ... and if so, in what respect and to what extent, 
and they shall consider any other factors affecting the public in-
terests.238 
Moreover, before making any sale, the trustees must give public 
notice, and if objections are filed they must hold public hearings. 
If it appears that the sale "would interfere with conservation of fish, 
marine and wildlife or other natural resources, including beaches 
and shores, to such an extent as to be contrary to the public inter-
est,''239 the trustees must withdraw the lands from sale. Lands be-
tween the high water mark and any bulkhead line may be sold only 
to the upland riparian owner. In order to assist the trustees in 
making the determinations required by the statute, it is provided 
that they 
shall require that a biological survey and an ecological study of the 
area proposed to be sold . . . be made. . . . All such studies and 
surveys shall be made by or under the direction of the State Board 
of Conservation, which shall make a report of all such surveys and 
studies to the Trustees ... together with its recommendations. The 
Trustees may adopt regulations requiring that the cost of making 
any such survey and report be paid by the applicant for the pur-
chase of such lands .... 240 
their oil-drilling operations during the Santa Barbara oil spill and that this "inter-
ference" constituted a taking of the leases for which compensation must be paid. 
Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. United States, No. 197-69 (Ct. Cl., filed April 9, 1969). 
See generally the discussion of private property rights in California trust properties 
in the text accompanying notes 165-74 supra. 
237. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.02(2) (Supp. 1969). 
238. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.12 (Supp. 1969). 
239. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.12 (Supp. 1969). 
240. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.12(7) (Supp. 1969). 
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While even the most elaborate statutory precautions do not al-
ways prevent questionable decision making by administrative agen-
cies,241 the Florida law242 encourages more adequate decision making 
in the administrative sphere and provides a more satisfactory op-
portunity for judicial review if and when administrative action is 
brought into question. 
The statutory standards which have been developed in Florida 
have served other functions than ensuring the availability of a 
record for review and insulating agencies from pressures which might 
otherwise be placed upon them. The standards have also served the 
significant purpose of placing restraints on excessive localism in 
dealing with resources.243 Other states similarly have recognized the 
need to avoid localism and to mitigate the potential for political 
pressures on administrative agencies; toward that end, they have 
adopted measures-though not always with successful results-re-
quiring the governor to approve administrative action244 or re-
quiring another agency to approve it, sometimes in conjunction 
with the governor and a state council.245 
Although there has been a great deal of legislative progress, a 
heavy burden continues to fall upon the courts. Not only are many 
statutes of quite recent origin and without effect on earlier grants, 
but legislative language inevitably demands judicial interpretation; 
and, lamentably, even strongly worded statutes often fail to have 
much effect at the lower end of the bureaucratic line, where critical 
decisions are made every day. 
To note the continued importance of court action, even in the 
241. Morgan v. Canaveral Port Authority, 202 S.2d 884 (Fla. App. 1967): Staplin v. 
Canal Authority, 208 S.2d 853 (Fla. App. 1968); Hayes v. Bowman, 91 S.2d 795 (Fla. 
1957). 
242. See generally FLA. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 7: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253 (1962, Supp. 1969); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 370.02(9), 370.16 (Supp. 1969), §§ 377.33-34 (1960), § 377.35 (Supp. 
1969). 
243. Unfortunately the courts have not always been sympathetic to the legislative 
effort. Trustees of the I.I.F. v. Venetian Isles Dev. Co., 166 S.2d 765 (Fla. App. 1964); 
see also Trustees of the I.I.F. v. Claughton, 86 S.2d 775 (Fla. 1956); Duval Eng. & 
Constr. Co. v. Sales, 77 S.2d 431 (Fla. 1954); Burns v. Wiseheart, 205 S.2d 708 (Fla. 
App. 1967). 
244. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-4 (Supp. 1968) (leases by Marine Resources Com• 
mission in beds of state waters must be signed by the governor); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 1-357.1 (Supp. 1968) (rights of way in marshland may be granted by Budget and 
Control Board but only with the approval of the governor). 
245. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-4 (1964) (the state may sell or lease mineral rights 
in state lands under water, but must first obtain the approval of the Department of 
Administration, the governor, and the state council); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30, 
§ 44A (1966) (a commissioner may transfer state land to another department for high• 
way purposes, so long as he obtains the approval of the governor and the council). 
As was made clear in Robbins v. Department of Public Works, discussed in the text ac• 
companying notes 87-92 supra, such precautions, however elaborate, present no in-
superable obstacles to the persistent developer. 
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most progressive states, is by no means to detract from the essential 
role of legislation and administration. Indeed, nothing could be 
more mistaken than to conceive the problem as one in which it is 
necessary to choose a single branch of government to develop and 
administer the policies which will produce optimum results. This 
Article has been concerned largely with the judicial function only 
because it has been so widely believed that the task is essentially one 
for legislative and administrative action and that the scope for 
judicial action is limited to remedying blatant and express de-
partures from specific statutory standards. 
What has already been said in this Article should cast some 
doubt on that view, for the experience in states like Massachusetts, 
Wisconsin, and California suggests that the richness of interplay 
among the branches of government-indeed, the blurring of juris-
dictional lines in policy making, interpretation, and political power 
adjustments-has itself been a powerful force for more informed 
and rational decision making. 
2. The Judicial Response: A Continued Reluctance To 
Recognize the Public Trust 
While the legislatures and courts of many states have recognized 
their obligation to safeguard the public trust, there are a number 
of courts which persistently adhere to the belief that courts are not 
an appropriate forum in which to examine issues concerning ad-
ministrative actions dealing with public trust lands. The courts which 
accept that view usually follow the approach of Rogers v. City of 
Mobile,246 a recent Alabama case in which taxpayers sought to chal-
lenge development of the port of Mobile on the ground that the 
leasing of dock facilities to private concerns was an illegal internal 
improvement. The court, finding that the agency in question had 
the constitutional power to lease such facilities, said that the exer-
cise of discretion in implementing that power could not be reviewed 
in the absence of corruption, bad faith, abuse of discretion, or un-
fair dealing tantamount to fraud.247 
246. 277 Ala. 261, 169 S.2d 282 (1964). See also Nelson v. Mobile Bay Seafood Union, 
263 Ala. 195, 82 S.2d 181 (1955); Nelson & Robbins v. Mund, 273 Ala. 91, 134 S.2d 749 
(1961). In both of these latter cases, suits to enjoin the dredging of seed oysters from 
a public oyster reef were dismissed on the ground that the discretion of the Conserva-
tion Department is unchallengeable absent a showing of fraud or bad faith in issuing 
the permit. Cf. Alabama v. Kelley, 214 F. Supp. 745, 750 (M.D. Ala. 1963), affd., 339 
F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964), in which a lease of state park land by the Department of Con-
servation was invalidated: "[the] consideration expressed in the lease in question is so 
grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience, and the inadequacy of consideration 
amounts, in itself, to decisive evidence of fraud." 
247. 277 Ala. 261, 282, 169 S.2d 282, 302 (1964). The Florida cases exemplify the 
range of judicial rhetoric in reviewing administrative action-from giving it "con• 
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The leases challenged in Rogers may very well have been appro-
priate under any intelligent interpretation of trust theory, for in 
numerous situations such leases or sales of port facilities to private 
entrepreneurs have been upheld as consistent with the implementa-
tion of the trust. It would therefore be unwise to adopt a position 
directly opposite to Rogers and to prohibit an agency from making 
any such facilities available to private interests. But decisions such 
as Rogers are equally undesirable, for they demonstrate an unwill-
ingness to confront and to elucidate the considerations which dis-
tinguish appropriate dealings with trust lands from inappropriate 
ones. Since the California and Wisconsin courts have fruitfully en-
gaged in precisely that process of discrimination, it can hardly be 
asserted that such a task is beyond the competence of the judiciary. 
Nor can it be said that the necessary inquiry can be fulfilled by such 
crude concepts as fraud or corruption. Indeed, if there is any lesson 
to be learned from the cases which have been examined in this Arti-
cle, it is that a much more sophisticated examination into the manip-
ulations of legislative and administrative processes is required if the 
public interest is to be promoted. 
Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the blame for de-
cisions such as that in Rogers lies wholly ·with the judges who write 
the opinions. Attorneys invite such decisions when they assert ex-
treme and doctrinaire positions such as the claim that any project 
which involves a lease to private interests is thereby illegal. One must 
elusive" effect to the use of the "substantial evidence" standard or the standard of 
"fraud, bad faith, or a gross abuse of discretion." Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 
S.2d 388, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 839 (1944); Cortez Co. v. County of Mantee, 159 S.2d 
871 (Fla.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 816 (1964); Hayes v. Bowman, 91 S.2d 795, 802 (Fla, 
1957); Morgan v. Canaveral Port Authority, 202 S.2d 884 (Fla. App. 1967); Staplin v. 
Canal Authority, 208 S.2d 853 (Fla. App. 1968); Gies v. Fischer, 146 S.2d !161 (Fla. 
1962); Alliance for Conservation v. Furen, ll0 S.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1959), revd. on other 
grounds, ll8 S.2d 6 (Fla. 1960); Arvida Corp. v. City of Sarasota, 213 S.2d 756 (Fla. 
App. 1968); Sunset Islands v. City of Miami Beach, 210 S.2d 275 (Fla. App. 1968). The 
Florida cases are typical in that they indicate that courts are more willing to review 
administrative discretion when a property owner wants, but has been denied, admin-
istrative approval, than when the public seeks review of an administrative approval 
which has already been given. Compare cases cited above, with Zabel v. Pinellas County 
W. &: N.C.A., 171 S.2d 376 (Fla. 1965); Burns v. Wiseheart, 205 S.2d 708 (Fla. App. 
1968); Trustees of the I.I.F. v. Venetian Isles Dev. Co., 166 S.2d 765 (Fla. App. 1964). 
Occasionally a court will find a case of gross abuse of discretion and will overrule an 
agency on that ground. City of Miami v. Wolfe, 150 S.2d 489 (Fla. App. 1963). 
A variant way for courts to defer to administrative action is provided when at-
torneys charge the agency with a common-law wrong; in that situation a reluctant 
court may find the administrative action to be within the agency's broad statutory 
mandate and find that it therefore cannot constitute the alleged common-law viola-
tion. Such a finding is especially likely if the agency is charged with creating or per-
mitting a nuisance. Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wash. 2d 619, 304 P .2d 1046 (1956). See also 
Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 S.2d 388, 394, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 839 (1944). 
Sometimes, however, a conventional legal theory will be effective. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 729, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). 
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provide a court with room to maneuver. A litigation theory which be-
gins with a sophisticated analysis of public trust principles-setting 
out alternatives for the achievement of a reasonable development of 
trust lands with minimal infringement of public use-is likely to 
obtain a far more sympathetic response from the bench than is one 
which takes a rigorous legal principle and squeezes it to death.248 
3. The Breadth of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Perhaps the most striking impression produced by a review of 
public trust cases in various jurisdictions is the sense of openness 
which the law provides; there is generally support for whatever 
decision a court might wish to adopt. Similar cases from Texas and 
Mississippi249 illustrate the point. In both cases citizens challenged 
state authorization of private companies to dredge in public waters 
for oyster shells. In each case, the complainants sought to cast doubt 
on the validity of the particular authorization by arguing that there 
was a technical defect in the grant, or a limitation in the authorizing 
statute. The real concern, of course, was with the adverse impact of 
the dredging upon the general ecology of the areas in question, which 
served as feeding and breeding grounds for birds and aquatic life. 
The Texas case was summarily dismissed, but the Mississippi action 
was successful, even though the latter was susceptible to the same 
objections that were advanced in the former. In the Texas case, 
Texas Oyster Growers Association v. Odom,250 the challenge was 
dismissed on the triply technical grounds that the lawsuit was an 
impermissible action against the state's sovereignty, that the order 
granting the authorization was within the administrative agency's 
unreviewable discretion, and that even though most of the plaintiffs 
were commercial fishermen, they had no vested property rights at 
stake and thus no litigable interest in the controversy.251 
248. An instructive example is found in Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. 
Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (opinion of Judge Murphy), a case which 
was, in many respects, admirably litigated by plaintiffs. But the plaintiffs could hardly 
have expected to win a constitutional argument that the authority given to the high-
way commissioner in selecting his route was an unconstitutional delegation. Had the 
plaintiffs pursued the more limited nonconstitutional arguments made in the Massa-
chusetts highway routing cases, discussed in text accompanying notes 80-92 supra, they 
would have been likely to get a more sympathetic judicial response on that issue. It 
may have been thought tactically important to make a constitutional claim in the 
federal court, but that consideration does not explain the failure to take the preferable 
tack in their state court suit. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. McCabe, No. 
2872/ 68 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County, N.Y., filed Oct. I, 1968). 
249. Texas Oyster Growers Assn. v. Odom, 385 S.W .2d 899 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 
1965) writ of error refused, n.r.e.; Parks v. Simpson, 242 Miss. 894, 137 S.2d 136 (1962). 
250. 385 S.W .2d 899 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965). 
251. 385 S.W.2d at 901. Public trust doctrine has developed erratically in Texas 
litigation. The deference to administrative discretion in Texas Oyster Growers should 
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The Mississippi case, Parks v. Simpson,252 was brought by a tax-
payer against the Marine Conservation Commission to void a con-
tract it had made to dredge for oyster shells. The court passed over 
the concerns which had led to dismissal of the Texas case, and 
looked instead at the commission's statutory authority to lease tide-
water bottoms. The court construed that authority narrowly and 
found that oyster shells were a part of the public trust which the 
commission had not been expressly authorized to sell. 
It is true that the cases can be distinguished, for the Texas stat-
ute specifically authorized shell-dredging leases, while the Missis-
sippi law was ambiguously drafted. But those differences need not, 
and usually do not, deter courts. The Mississippi court might have 
avoided responsibility of the applicable statute by following the 
Alabama approach253 and sustaining the commission's exercise of 
discretion since there was no fraud, corruption, or explicit violation 
of statute.254 Conversely, the Texas court could have gone beyond 
the m_ere determination that shell dredging was generally legal and 
asked whether the particular leases in question were consistent with 
the public trust; it might thereby have followed the lead of those 
courts which read general grants of legislative authority as restricted 
be compared with State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1964), in which the court 
held that the Game and Fish Commission was without authority to enjoin the use of 
certain kinds of fishing nets because there was an express legislative prohibition on 
other kinds of nets, and because that prohibition constituted an implied statutory 
approval of all devices not specifically prohibited. Thus, the matter was held to be 
removed from administrative discretion. 
While the Texas courts adhere to the conventional view that public trust lands 
"cannot be bartered away by • • • implication" but must be "expressly granted" 
[Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 332, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1034 (1940)], the various in-
terpretations of that protective theory are difficult to reconcile. Compare Humble 
Pipeline Co. v. State, 2 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1928); State v. Arkansas Dock 
&: Channel Co., 365 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963); Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 
349 (1859), with Dincans v. Keeran, 192 S.W. 603 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1917); State v. 
Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 50 S.W.2d 1065 (1932); Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 143 
S.W .2d 1028 (1940); State v. Grubstake Inv. Assn., Il7 Tex. 53, 297 S.W. 202 (1927); 
Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935); Wilemon v. Dallas 
Levee Improvement Dist., 264 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1953), cert. denied, 348 
U .s. 829 (1954). 
The most important recent case in Texas is Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 
s.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964), which develops the so-called public dedication 
theory-the doctrine that trust property which has been granted away to private 
owners can be reclaimed for the public through long use. The case upheld an ease-
ment for the public beach on Galveston Island. See Dietz v. King, 1 Civil No. 25,607 
(Ct. App., 1st Dist., Div. I, Cal., filed Aug. 1, 1969); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay 
(Sup. Ct. Ore. Dec. 19, 1969). See Get Out of My Sand: Disputes Flare over Public Use 
of Beaches, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1969, at 1, col. 4; Stone, supra note 15, at 227-30. See also 
O'Neill v. State Highway Dept., 50 N.J. 307,235 A.2d 1 (1967). 
252. 242 Miss. 894, 903-06, 137 S.2d 136, 138-40 (1962). 
253. See notes 246-48 supra and accompanying text. 
254. 242 Miss. at 897-900, 137 S.2d at 136-38. See notes 246-47 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
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to authorizing action which is consistent with the obligations of the 
public trust.255 Even as to the standing of fishermen to sue to enforce 
the public right of fishery, the Texas court was compelled only by its 
own desires to find that there was no legal right sufficient to support 
an action, for individuals with precisely such interests have been 
granted standing in a number of other states.256 
In the Parks case, as in many other public trust cases throughout 
the country, the Mississippi court used a narrow statutory interpre-
tation to declare, in effect, a moratorium on decisions which seem 
to raise serious dangers for important public resources and which 
seem to have been inadequately considered either by the legislature 
or by the administrative agency which was involved. The events 
which transpired after that case illustrate how much the actions of 
any one branch of government are intertwined with the total process 
of decision making and how important it may be that the various 
branches do not isolate and compartmentalize their functions. Sub-
sequent to the decision in the case, the Mississippi legislature ex-
pressly granted to the State Marine Conservation Commission the 
authority to permit shell dredging, but only under sharply limited 
circumstances. A project must now be approved by a three-fifths 
vote of the entire membership of the commission, and the approval 
must include the vote of the commission's marine biologist member. 
There must, moreover, be a finding that "the dredging will not be 
deleterious to the aquatic life and harmful to the fishing industry," 
and that finding must be "spread full upon the minutes of the Com-
mission."257 In contrast to these salutary after-effects of Parks, the 
shell-dredging controversy in Texas has dragged on inconclusively 
in Congress, in the state legislature, in state administrative agencies, 
and in the Corps of Engineers.258 Thus, the Mississippi experience 
indicates once again the importance of judicial intervention as a 
255. In Fransen v. Board of Natural Resources, 66 Wash. 2d 672, 404 P.2d 432 
(1965), the defendant Board, which has general statutory authority to transfer state-
owned land to cities, was restrained from conveying a particular tract which was de-
voted to an important public use. See also Williams Fishing Co. v. Savidge, 152 Wash. 
165, 277 P. 459 (1929) (state enjoined from leasing Pacific shoreland despite general 
authority to do so, because such leasing would adversely affect public uses); State 
ex rel. Forks Shingle Co. v. Martin, 196 Wash. 494, 83 P .2d 755 (1938) (mandamus to 
compel sale of timber on school trust land denied despite general sale authority); 
State ex rel. Garber v. Savidge, 132 Wash. 631, 233 P. 946 (1925) (mandamus to compel 
leasing of state land for oil drilling denied despite general authority, because school 
trust land was involved). See the Massachusetts cases discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 63-92 supra. 
256. Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wash. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955); Columbia River 
Fisherman's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Ore. 654, 87 P .2d 195 (1939). 
257. MISS. ConE ANN. § 6048-03 (Supp. 1968). 
258. See AUDUBON MAGAZINE, May 1969, at 89. 
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technique to thrust a problem of significance upon a busy legisla-
ture's attention.259 
III. CONCLUSION 
A. The Scope of the Public Trust 
It is clear that the historical scope of public trust law is quite 
narrow. Its coverage includes, with some variation among the states, 
that aspect of the public domain below the low-water mark on the 
margin of the sea and the great lakes, the waters over those lands, 
and the waters within rivers and streams of any consequence. Some-
times the coverage of the trust depends on a judicial definition of 
navigability, but that is a rather vague concept which may be so 
broad as to include all waters which are suitable for public recre-
ation.260 Traditional public trust law also embraces parklands, espe-
cially if they have been donated to the public for specific purposes; 
and, as a minimum, it operates to require that such lands not be 
used for nonpark purposes. But except for a few cases like Gould v. 
Greylock Reservation Commission,261 it is uncommon to find deci-
sions that constrain public authorities in the specific uses to which 
they may put parklands, unless the lands are reallocated to a very 
different use, such as a highway.262 
If any of the analysis in this Article makes sense, it is clear that 
the judicial techniques developed in public trust cases need not be 
limited either to these few conventional interests or to questions of 
disposition of public properties. Public trust problems are found 
whenever governmental regulation comes into question, and they 
occur in a wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests 
need protection against tightly organized groups with clear and 
immediate goals. Thus, it seems that the delicate mixture of pro-
cedural and substantive protections which the courts have applied in 
conventional public trust cases would be equally applicable and 
equally appropriate in controversies involving air pollution, the 
259. While the Mississippi legislature did respond effectively to the particular prob-
lem by enacting a shell-dredging law, it did not undertake to deal generally with 
estuarial and shoreline problems; the courts, no doubt, will have to be called upon 
again to meet problems as they arise, and they, in tum, will have to call upon the 
legislature for needed statutory reforms. 
260. Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937). 
261. See text accompanying notes 63-72 supra. 
262. But see Parker v. United States, No. C-1368 (D. Colo., filed Jan. 7, 1969): 
Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed June 5, 1969). See also the cases cited 
in notes 39-40 supra, enforcing statutory provisions or donor-required constraints in the 
use of parkland. 
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dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, 
and strip mining or wetland filling on private lands in a state where 
governmental permits are required. 
Certainly the principle of the public trust is broader than its 
traditional application indicates. It may eventually be necessary to 
confront the question whether certain restrictions, imposed either 
by courts or by other governmental agencies, constitute a taking 
of private property;263 but a great deal of needed protection for the 
public can be provided long before that question is reached.264 
Thus, for example, a private action seeking more effective govern-
mental action on pesticide use or more extensive enforcement of air 
pollution laws would rarely be likely to reach constitutional limits. 
In any event, the courts can limit their intervention to regulation 
which stops short of a compensable taking.265 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the djscussion contained in 
this Article applies with equal force to controversies over subjects 
other than natural resources. While resource controversies are often 
particularly dramatic examples of diffuse public interests and contain 
all their problems of equality in the political and administrative 
process, those problems frequently arise in issues affecting the poor 
and consumer groups.266 Only time will reveal the appropriate limits 
of the public trust doctrine as a useful judicial instrument. 
B. The Role of the Courts in Developing Public Trust Law 
The principal purpose of this Article has been to explore the 
role of the courts in shaping public policy with respect to a wide 
spectrum of resource interests which have the quality of diffuse pub-
lic uses. The attempt has not been to propose or to identify the 
particular allocative balance which is appropriate for a wise public 
policy as to any particular resource problem, but rather to examine 
263. See notes 174, 236 supra and accompanying text. 
264. E.g., Shorehaven Golf Club v. Water Reservation Commn., 146 Conn. 619, 153 
A.2d 444 (1959); Gies v. Fischer, 146 S.2d 361 (Fla. 1962); Township of Grosse Ile v. 
Dunbar &: Sullivan Dredging Co., 15 Mich. App. 556, 167 N.W.2d 311 (1969); Smith v. 
Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 729, 453 P .2d 832 (1969). 
265. For a case in which a court missed the opportunity to examine the limits of 
regulatory authority short of taking, see Department of Forests &: Parks v. George's 
Creek Coal &: Land Co., 250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968). 
In some instances a legislature will simply impose the desired regulation, leaving it to 
the landowner to seek compensation if he believes the regulation has gone so far as to 
comprise a taking. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1968). 
266. See, e.g., Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 
216 Ouly 1969), citing considerable literature; Nashville 1·40 Steering Comm. v. Elling-
ton, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Powelton Civic 
Home Owners Assn. v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
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an important and poorly understood institutional medium for better 
obtaining that wisdom which leads to intelligent public policy. 
Thus, as is usually the wont of lawyers, the author has attended es-
sentially to problems of process rather than to problems of sub-
stance. It is hoped, however, that the Article makes clear the futility 
of any rigid separation between those two elements. It should be 
obvious that courts operate with an extraordinary degree of free-
dom and that the procedural devices they employ are very signif-
icantly determined by their attitudes about the propriety of the 
policies which are before them. It is virtually unheard of for a court 
to rule directly that a policy is illegal because it is unwise; the courts 
are both too sophisticated and too restrained to adopt such a proce-
dure. Rather, they may effectively overrule a questionable policy 
decision by requiring that the appropriate agency provide further 
justification; alternatively, the courts may, in effect, remand the mat-
ter for additional consideration in the political sphere, thus manip-
ulating the political burdens either to aid underrepresented and 
politically weak interests or to give final authority over the matter 
to a more adequately representative body. 
The very fact that sensitive courts perceive a need to reorient 
administrative conduct in this fashion suggests how insulated such 
agencies may be from the relevant constituencies. A highway agency, 
for example, which has a professional bureaucracy, which performs 
its function within a large geographic area rather than within a par-
ticular community, and which is rarely the subject of attack in polit-
ical campaigns, may feel quite free to hold perfunctory and essentially 
predetermined public hearings. In such circumstances, the decision-
making process may be inadequate even though a proceeding called 
a public hearing has been held. These realities imply that there is a 
need for the more searching sort of judicial intervention described 
above. 
Understandably, courts are reluctant to intervene in the pro-
cesses of any given agency. Accordingly, they are inclined to achieve 
democratization through indirect means-either by requiring the 
intervention of other agencies which will serve to represent under-
represented interests or by calling upon the legislature to make an 
express and open policy decision on the matter in question.267 The 
267. A fascinating example of this problem is presented by the Hudson River Ex• 
pressway litigation, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F. Supp. 804 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). The dispute had received a great deal of attention not only by the 
state authorities, but by the Hudson River Valley Commission and the United States 
Department of the Interior. Despite the formalities of public hearings and independent 
studies by outside agencies, the objectors alleged that there had not been a truly ob-
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phenomenon of indirect intervention reveals a great deal about the 
role of the judiciary. The closer a court can come to thrusting de-
cision making upon a truly representative body-such as by re-
quiring a legislature to determine an issue openly and explicitly-
the less a court will involve itself in the merits of a controversy. This 
relationship suggests that democratization is essentially the function 
which the courts perceive themselves as performing, and that even 
those courts which are the most active and interventionist in the 
public trust area are not interested in displacing legislative bodies 
as the final authorities in setting resource policies. 
That self-perception is an appropriate one, for in theory there 
is no reason that the judiciary should be the ultimate guardian of 
the public weal. In the ideal world, legislatures are the most repre-
sentative and responsive public agencies; and to the extent that 
judicial intervention moves legislatures toward that ideal, the cit-
izenry is well served.268 Certainly even the most representative legis-
lature may act in highly unsatisfactory ways when dealing with 
minority rights, for then it confronts the problem of majority 
jective and open examination of the proposal. They sought to raise such issues as the 
unavailability of highway department maps, the inadequate manner in which the 
public hearing was conducted, and the incompleteness of the investigation made by 
the Department of the Interior. It was also argued that the project could not go 
forward in the absence of ex.press congressional approval, since an old statute provides 
that it is unlawful to construct dikes in or over navigable waters without the consent 
of Congress. 297 F. Supp. at 807 n.I. After listening to intensive arguments over the 
definition of a dike, the court finally held that congressional consent was required and 
that the project could not go forward without such approval. It also held that under 
the same statute the approval of the Secretary of Transportation was required because 
causeways were a part of the project. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 
302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (opinion by Judge Murphy). Judge Murphy's will-
ingness to invoke the dike law and to enjoin the project pending congressional au-
thorization may have resulted not only from traditional statutory interpretation, but 
also as the result of doubts about the adequacy of the attention which the defendant 
agency had given to the objectors' positions. 
268. It should be emphasized that the judicial function is properly invoked prin-
cipally to deal with issues which, while very important, tend to be made at low-visibil-
ity levels, even though they may be endorsed by very highly placed officials. Conversely, 
when there is high public visibility on an issue, when it is dealt with as a central 
matter of state or national policy, and when account has been taken of open and 
widespread public opinion from all quarters, the judiciary does not ordinarily have 
a role to play as a perfector of the political process. In such cases, the charge that 
judicial intervention would amount to displacement of the considered judgment of 
co-equal branches of the government has merit. The attempt to get courts to displace 
the congressional and presidential decision to engage in nuclear testing as a central 
component of defense policy exemplifies the sort of case in which judicial reticence is 
appropriate. The cases in which such attempts have been made, however, do contain 
much procedural language that is not to be commended. See, e.g., Pauling v. McElroy, 
164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C.), affd., 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 
835 (1960); Pauling v. l\lcNamera, 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
933 (1964). 
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tyranny. But that problem is not the one which arises in public 
resource litigation. Indeed, it is the opposite problem that fre-
quently arises in public trust cases-that is, a diffuse majority is 
made subject to the will of a concerted minority. For self-interested 
and powerful minorities often have an undue influence on the pub-
lic resource decisions of legislative and administrative bodies and 
cause those bodies to ignore broadly based public interests. Thus, 
the function which the courts must perform, and have been per-
forming, is to promote equality of political power for a disorganized 
and diffuse majority by remanding appropriate cases to the legisla-
ture after public opinion has been aroused. In that sense, the public 
interests with which this Article deals differ from the interests con-
stitutionally protected by the Bill of Rights-the rights of perma-
nent minorities. That realization, in turn, lends even greater 
support for the rejection of claims that public trust problems should 
be considered as constitutional issues which are ultimately to be 
resolved by courts even if there is a clear legislative determination. 
Not all the situations which have been examined in this Article 
fit directly into the majority-minority analysis suggested above, but, 
if properly understood, they do meet the principle of that analysis. 
For example, in a dispute between advocates of parks and those who 
would take parkland for highways, it often cannot be said that one 
group constitutes a majority and the other a minority. It can, how-
ever, be said that one interest is at least adequately represented in 
its access to, and dealings with, legislative or administrative agencies 
while the other interest tends to face problems of diffuseness and 
thus tends to be underrepresented in the political process. In such 
cases, all that is asked of courts is that they try to even the political 
and administrative postures of the adversaries; if that equalization 
can be done judicially, the courts may properly withdraw and leave 
the ultimate decision to a democratized democratic process. 
Frequently, judicial intervention takes the special form of moving 
decisional authority from one constituency to another. In taking 
such action, a court might hold, for example, that a matter is of 
state-wide interest and must be approved by the state legislature, 
rather than by a municipal or county agency. Obviously there are 
no very firm principles which identify the proper constituency for any 
given issue, and the debates about localism, statism, and feder-
alism are as old as the nation. However, on the smaller scale in 
which those problems are presented in public trust litigation, the 
courts seem to have found a reasonably satisfactory solution. The 
pattern is not wholly clear, but in general the courts have pro-
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moted a broad consideration of all potential public interests by 
requiring that decisions be made by a body with a constituency 
broad enough to be responsive to the whole range of significant 
potential users.269 Thus, to take the most obvious example, au-
thority over the uses of San Francisco Bay is given to an agency 
that is responsive both to the constituency which has ready access 
to the resource and to the broader constituency that has an interest 
in the use of the bay as a whole.270 While one may question whether 
the relevant decision-making authority should be bay-wide, state-
wide, federal, or international, it seems sufficient to ask the courts 
to choose an entity that is large enough to ensure some representa-
tion of all the significant interests which ought to be heard and to 
allow the courts to decide, on the basis of evidence presented, 
whether a particular entity does in fact represent all those interests 
in some reasonably ample way. 
Having determined that the fundamental function of courts in 
the public trust area is one of democratization, the next subject for 
analysis is the means by which courts are to identify the problems 
which require judicial action. The first step in this process is the 
search for those situations in which political imbalance exists, and 
the signal for the existence of that problem is diffusion. Political 
imbalance is to be found wherever there are interests which have 
difficulties in organizing and financing effectively enough that they 
can deal with legislative and administrative agencies. When a claim 
is made on behalf of diffuse public uses, courts take the first step in 
the process by withdrawing the usual presumption that all relevant 
issues have been adequately considered and resolved by routine stat-
utory and administrative processes. That first step is tantamount to 
a court's acceptance of jurisdiction. 
269, This general statement does not mean that the courts function only to enlarge 
constituencies, although that is the function they have generally performed in the 
cases discussed in this Article. It may well be that adequate consideration for all rel-
evant interests will require granting to a small constituency a veto power or at least 
a right of consultation. 'Vhile excessive localism is the most common problem, as the 
Wisconsin and California cases indicated (see text accompanying notes 108-56, 183-229 
supra), a state or national agency may take inadequate account of important local 
considerations. For example, in a recent controversy over a proposed atomic plant, the 
state of Minnesota, at the behest of local citizens, adopted standards more stringent 
than those of the Atomic Energy Commission. Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1969, at 8, col. 4. 
Unless it is determined that national standards are meant to pre-empt local interests 
[see First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946)], there is no reason 
for a court to avoid seeking that mixture of decision-making constituencies which 
most adequately represents all relevant interests, but does not produce destructive 
fragmentation of authority. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn. v. Continental 
Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963). 
270. See text accompanying notes 183-85 supra. 
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The next critical step is to seek out the indicia which suggest 
that a particular case, on its own merits, possibly or probably has not 
been properly handled at the administrative or legislative level. 
That is the 'most difficult part of the process, and to cope with it the 
courts have developed four basic guidelines. 
First, has public property been disposed of at less than market 
value under circumstances which indicate that there is no very 
obvious reason for the grant of a subsidy? That determination 
can be relatively simple if it appears that the grant serves a public 
purpose by aiding the poor, by promoting an important service 
or technological advance for which no private market has devel-
oped, by encouraging population resettlement, or by sustaining 
a faltering economy which appears unable to sustain itself. These 
are but a few of the easily verifiable grounds which would sug-
gest to a court that objections are unworthy of further judicial 
attention. Conversely, if land is being given away to a devel-
oper of proposed luxury high-rise apartments, a court would be 
very much inclined to seek further explanation and to interpose 
a substantial dose of skepticism. Even in such a case it might be pos-
sible to satisfy a court that some rational public policy supports the 
conduct, but there will be a strong inclination to examine statutory 
authority with great care and to seek out substantial supporting ev-
idence in order to ensure that all the issues have been made fully 
public. 
Second, has the government granted to some private interest 
the authority to make resource-use decisions which may subordinate 
broad public resource uses to that private interest? In the ex-
treme case, that question raises the problem of Illinois Central,271 
and a court might appropriately interpose a flat legal prohibi-
tion on the ground that the state has divested itself of its gen-
eral regulatory power over a matter of great public importance. 
More often, the situation is one in which a court seeks to deal 
with the ramifications of a private property system in relation to 
resources which have the element of commonality. A resource like 
San Francisco Bay, for example, is of such a physical character that 
the exercise of ordinary private property rights may have very large 
direct effects on the whole public which has had the use of that bay. 
In such circumstances courts are inclined to scrutinize with great 
care claims that private property rights should be found to be su-
271. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra. 
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perior to the claim of continued public regulatory authority. Indeed, 
it is unlikely that such rights will be allowed unless they are con-
sistent with a general public plan for regulation of the resource. 
This issue has arisen in litigation in the San Francisco Bay cases272 
and in several Florida cases.273 
In such situations, the courts generally purport to be merely in-
terpreting and defining traditional property law rights, but im-
plicit in their analyses is a hesitancy to recognize that any such 
expansive private rights could have been granted if due considera-
tion had. been given to the public interest. Thus, in order to make 
a retrospective "reformation" of earlier, imperfectly considered gov-
ernmental decisions, courts may read into patents or grants implied 
conditions, such as a servitude in favor of the public trust. They 
would thereby force the private claimant to go before a contem-
porary administrative tribunal, whose conduct will itself be subject 
to judicial scrutiny, and there to establish the consistency of his 
project with the public interest. 
Third, has there been an attempt to reallocate diffuse public 
uses either to private uses or to public uses which have less 
breadth? This is the most complex of the judicial bench marks. 
In one respect, it merely reflects judicial concern that any act in-
fringing diffuse public uses is likely to have been made in the 
absence of adequate representation for the diffuse group, and ac-
cordingly the courts are willing to send such decisions back for 
reaffirmation or more explicit authorization. That procedure is ex-
emplified by the developments in Massachusetts.274 
In addition, although there is little specific supporting evidence, 
there seems to be implicit in the cases a feeling that there is some-
thing rather questionable about the use of governmental authority 
to restrict, rather than to spread, public benefits. At the extreme, that 
attitude is reflected in the judicial rule that government may not 
act for a purely private purpose. While cases involving such holdings 
are rare, there are many situations in which benefits are sufficiently 
narrow that it is difficult to determine what public purpose is meant 
to be achieved by a particular governmental act. That difficulty is 
emphasized when the price of providing any such narrow benefit is 
the withdrawal of a beneficial use which is available to a wide seg-
ment of the population. 
272, See text accompanying notes 159-82 supra. 
273. See notes 236-42 supra and accompanying text. 
274. See notes 63-92 supra and accompanying text, 
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Such problems arise in many contexts. The proposed New Jersey 
constitutional amendment, which would have confirmed private 
title to shorelands that had been held as public beach is perhaps 
the most dramatic illustration of the issue.275 Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation Commission,216 in which a public park would have 
been converted to an apparently little-needed ski area, with great 
potential profit accruing to a private developer, is another. And the 
California court's uneasiness about making shoreland available for 
a private yacht club is a third.277 The courts are not ready to hold 
such dispositions illegal per se; but they do want to know what 
public purpose justifies them, and they want to put legislatures and 
administrators on notice that such dispositions will be closely scruti-
nized and must be reasonably justifiable in terms of the public 
benefits to be achieved. 
This judicial device serves to call attention to the inadequacies 
in conventional public techniques for evaluating resource decisions 
involving diffuse public uses. Rarely do the decision-making agen-
cies attempt to make a careful benefit-cost analysis which would pro-
vide useful information about the effects of such decisions. What is 
lost, for example, when a local public beach is closed and the area 
filled for garbage disposal, highway development, or residential de-
velopment? Governmental bodies have made little effort to answer 
such questions; yet they do make decisions that one sort of allocation 
or another advances the public interest. The courts properly evince 
reluctance to approve decisions based upon ignorance; and when 
that factor is joined with the courts' strong feeling that diffuse pub-
lic uses are both poorly represented and, by their nature, difficult to 
measure, judicial wariness is inevitably enhanced. 
One product of such judicial reluctance is an incentive for de-
cision-making agencies to begin seeking careful and sophisticated 
measurements of the benefits and costs involved in resource realloca-
tions. To the extent that judicial hesitancy cautions the agencies 
against making such reallocations without better information on the 
public record, the courts are deterring ventures into the unknown. 
And if the relevant facts are unknown, and yet legislatures and ad-
ministrative agencies show eagerness to go fonvard, the courts are 
only reinforced in their over-all suspicion that they are dealing with 
275. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
276. See notes 63-72 supra and accompanying text. 
277, $,;,; t\Otes 204-06 supra an4 i;tc<;Qtn_panying text. 
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governmental responsiveness to pressures imposed by powerful but 
excessively narrow interests. 
The fourth guideline that courts use in determining whether a 
case has been properly handled at the administrative or legislative 
level is to question whether the resource is being used for its natural 
purpose-whether, for example, a lake is being used "as a lake." 
This is perhaps the most specific of the guidelines the courts use, 
but, as is shown by the Wisconsin cases, it is seldom employed with 
rigor.278 In fact it is little more than a variant of the previous guide-
line, under which courts question the reallocation of resources from 
broader to narrower uses, for it is very often the case with natural 
resources that they have their broadest uses when they are left es-
sentially in their natural state. This result is in part a product of the 
physical fact of commonality, as with a lake, and in part a result of 
the extraordinary diversity of many natural systems, as with an 
estuarial area which may contain fishery resources, opportunities for 
swimming and boating, scenic views, and wildlife. To fill such an 
area and to build an apartment house on it would eliminate all 
those uses, which are enjoyed by a wide variety of people, in favor 
of a use that would benefit a small class of residents. Courts must be 
persuaded that any such transition promotes a significant public 
purpose. 
Although this guideline could theoretically be subsumed within 
the third, there are advantages to maintaining it as a separate con-
cept. It applies to particular water resources more clearly and more 
directly than does the third guideline and thus seems to be useful 
to the courts. Indeed, it might be helpful if such an approach were 
attempted with terrestrial resources. 
IV. POSTSCRIPT 
This Article has been an extended effort to make the rather 
simple point that courts have an important and fruitful role to play 
in helping to promote rational management of our natural re-
sources. Courts have been both misunderstood and underrated as a 
resource for dealing with resources. It is usually true that those who 
know the least about the judicial process are often the most ready 
to characterize the courts as doctrinaire and rigid, and the adversary 
process as a somewhat sinister game in which neither truth nor in-
telligent outcome are of importance to the participants. This Article 
278. See notes 138-56 supra and accompanying text. 
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should help to dispel some of those beliefs, for it is demonstrable 
that the courts, in their own intuitive way-sometimes clumsy and 
cumbersome-have shown more insight and sensitivity to many of 
the fundamental problems of resource management than have any 
of the other branches of government. If lawyers and their clients 
are willing to ask for less than the impossible, the judiciary can 
be expected to play an increasingly important and fruitful role 
in safeguarding the public trust. 
